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Abstract
Data is an important competitive resource in digital online markets. As a result, the access and
availability of data can be the basis for a competitive advantage. This thesis analyzes the role and
competitive effects of data in digital markets and contributes to an improved understanding of data as
a (potential) basis for market power. Thereby, the thesis also contributes to the ongoing policy debate
on how to safeguard a fair and open competitive environment for internet-based digital (i.e., online)
services as well as traditional services.
In doing so, Study 1 surveys the literature and discusses (i) the challenges that are associated with
assessing market power in digital markets, (ii) the challenges in creating a level playing field in digital
markets, e.g., by harmonizing regulatory obligations for online and oﬄine services, and (iii) the vital
role of data and data protection in the context of data-driven business models. Study 2 and Study 3
focus on the competitive effects of transferring data between online competitors. The study on social
logins (Study 2) highlights the strategic effects as well as welfare implications if competing online
services deliberately and voluntarily decide to share user and usage data. Whereas Study 2 abstracts
from the user’s decision how much data to provide to an online service, Study 3 focuses on the amount
of data that firms require for their services and that is provided by users. In particular, Study 3
investigates the competitive and welfare effects of a new fundamental consumer right: The right to
data portability. This right is part of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) which becomes
effective in May 2018 for all online services available to users in the European Union and allows users to
transfer their personal data from one online service to another (competing) online service (c.f., GDPR
Article 20). In this context, the study examines the firms’ strategic reactions to the introduction of
such a right and identifies the ensuing market outcomes as well as policy and managerial implications.
In conclusion, this doctoral thesis contributes to an improved understanding of (i) the competitive
effects that arise from data as an economic good or valuable asset for digital services, and (ii) the
aspects that may constitute market power in digital markets. Moreover, from a policy perspective,
the thesis can be understood as a theoretically founded research project that (i) informs which market
failures may arise in the context of digital (data-driven) markets and that (ii) highlights the peculiarities
that need to be considered to define appropriate legal requirements in order to establish a level playing
field between online services and traditional (established) services, but also between competing online
services. Therefore, the thesis also contributes to the discussion on whether and how dominant online
platforms should and can be regulated.
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Introduction
In 2017, the European Commission emphasized the importance of online services and platforms for
the economy as well as society (European Commission 2017b). Such platforms regularly act as a
intermediary between users and online services. A small share of these platforms is visited by a large
share of online users and is therefore considered to be gateways to the internet. The user activity on
these platforms makes large datasets of user and usage data available. This data represents a critical
competitive resource in digital markets, because online services and platforms are predominantly fi-
nanced by the collection and analysis of this data. In particular, firms improve offered services through
personalization (c.f., e.g., Ansari et al. 2000), or display advertisements that better fit users’ interests
(c.f., e.g., Iyer et al. 2005). This thesis analyzes the role and competitive effects of data in digital mar-
kets and contributes to an improved understanding of data as a (potential) basis for market power. In
doing so, the thesis also contributes to the ongoing policy debate on how to safeguard a fair and open
competitive environment for internet-based digital (i.e., online) services as well as traditional services
(c.f., e.g., BEREC 2016, Bundeskartellamt 2016, European Commission 2017b, Monopolkommission
2015).
Due to the economic importance of online services and platforms and (as emphasized by Nobel prize
laureate Jean Tirole in his speech on competition and regulation of online platforms, c.f., Valero 2016)
the novelty of many issues arising within the context of the internet—especially the role of data—, the
research questions discussed in this thesis are relevant from the perspective of academia and practice.
They (i) provide a timely and practically very relevant research object, and (ii) are characterized by
economic, technical as well as legal aspects and thus, require an interdisciplinary approach, which is
why they are particularly suited for scholars within the field of Information Systems.
The scope of the thesis and its individual studies is illustrated by Figure 1, which provides an overview
of the central actors and their main competitive relationships: First, a gateway data-driven online
service A is competing with data-driven online service B. Both services are data-driven, i.e., they
obtain user and usage data from users that decide to be active at the respective online service and use
this data—that can also be shared voluntarily between online services or ported by users—to generate
revenues, e.g., by displaying targeted advertisements. Second, also traditional, oﬄine services which
follow a one-sided business model may compete with online services. In general, these traditional
services are financed by users directly, i.e., users need to pay a positive price for the offered service.
In this context, Study 1 surveys the literature and discusses (i) the challenges that are associated
with assessing market power in digital markets (c.f., the gateway online service A in Figure 1), (ii) the
challenges in creating a level playing field in digital markets, e.g., by harmonizing regulatory obligations
for online and oﬄine services (c.f., competition between the traditional service and online service
A in Figure 1), and (iii) the vital role of data and data protection in the context of data-driven
business models (c.f., the data provision by users in Figure 1). Study 2 and Study 3 focus on the
competitive effects if data is transferred between online competitors. The study on social logins
(Study 2) highlights the strategic effects as well as welfare implications if competing online services
deliberately and voluntarily decide to share user and usage data. Whereas Study 2 abstracts from
the user’s decision how much data to provide to an online service, Study 3 focuses on the amount
of data that firms require for their services and that is provided by users. In particular, Study 3
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Figure 1: Illustration of the scope of this thesis and its three individual studies.
investigates the competitive and welfare effects of a new fundamental consumer right: The right to
data portability. This right is part of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR, c.f., European
Commission 2016) which will become effective in May 2018 for all online services available to users
in the European Union and allows users to transfer their personal data from one online service to
another (competing) online service (c.f., GDPR Article 20). In this context, the study examines the
firms’ strategic reactions to the introduction of such a right and identifies ensuing market outcomes
as well as policy and managerial implications.
From a methodological perspective, Study 2 and Study 3 consider game-theoretic models, because
(i) public data is scarce, i.e., the relevant data necessary to answer the formulated research questions
is proprietary to firms, (ii) the identified results based on a stylized model are generalizable to a broader
range of settings, and (iii) the competitive effects of introducing regulatory obligations or remedies
can be analyzed before they are implemented in practice, i.e., the models can be used as a testbed for
regulatory interventions ex-ante. With regard to the considered setting, Study 2 and Study 3 both
assume that there is a dominant online service (the gateway): Whereas in Study 2 the provider of the
social login can decide whether and under which circumstances the social login is provided, Study 3
explicitly assumes that one of the online services initially serves the market as monopolist. Analyses
of competitive settings with a dominant online service are seen especially relevant because (i) they
allow to demonstrate how (the access to) data and the introduction of regulatory obligations may
affect the market power of firms in different positions in digital markets, and (ii) they allow to assess
the effectiveness of the European Commission’s aim to achieving market entry “to access data markets
dominated by digital giants” (European Commission 2017c, p. 2).
Consequently, this doctoral thesis contributes to an improved understanding of (i) the competitive
effects that arise from data as an economic good or valuable asset for digital services, and (ii) the
aspects that may constitute market power in digital markets. Moreover, from a policy perspective,
the thesis can be understood as a theoretically founded research project that (i) informs which market
failures may arise in the context of digital (data-driven) markets and that (ii) highlights the peculiarities
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that need to be considered to define appropriate legal requirements in order to establish a level playing
field between online services and traditional (established) services, but also between competing online
services. Therefore, the thesis also contributes to the discussion on whether and how dominant online
platforms should and can be regulated.
All three studies in this thesis have been published or are accepted for publication in double-blind peer
reviewed journals or (ranked) conference proceedings: The first study “Market power, regulatory con-
vergence, and the role of data in digital markets” has been co-authored with Jan Kra¨mer (c.f., Kra¨mer
and Wohlfarth 2017). It is published in the journal Telecommunications Policy (VHB-JOURQUAL3
(JQ3) rating1: C). The second study “Winners, Losers, and Facebook: The Role of Social Logins in
the Online Advertising Ecosystem” has been co-authored with Jan Kra¨mer and Daniel Schnurr (c.f.,
Kra¨mer, Schnurr, and Wohlfarth 2018). It is accepted for publication at Management Science (VHB-
JQ3 rating: A+). Finally, the single-authored study “Data Portability on the Internet: An Economic
Analysis” (c.f., Wohlfarth 2017) is published in the Proceedings of the International Conference on
Information Systems (ICIS) (VHB-JQ3 rating: A) and was nominated for the “Best Theory Devel-
opment Award” at this conference. Moreover, it was awarded with the “Best Student Paper Award”
at the 28th Regional Conference of the International Telecommunications Society (ITS). Currently,
an extended version of this study is under review at the journal of Business & Information Systems
Engineering (VHB-JQ3 rating: B). In the following, the research questions and the main findings of
the three studies are summarized.
The first study (Kra¨mer and Wohlfarth 2017) is a literature overview spanning across three major
topics in (data-driven) digital markets: the harmonization of regulatory obligations, the assessment of
market power in digital markets, and the role of data and data protection.
First, the study discusses how a level playing field between online and traditional services that compete
with each other can be ensured from a regulatory perspective. For example, established (traditional)
telecommunications services offered by integrated network operators (e.g., voice telephony or SMS)
are in competition with online telecommunications services such as WhatsApp or Skype. Here, a
controversial debate with regard to the competition between digital services, which are most commonly
defined as Over-the-Top services (OTTs), and traditional (telecommunications) services evolved (c.f.,
BEREC 2016, Kra¨mer and Wohlfarth 2015). Although both services may be in (direct) competition,
the legal requirements for OTTs and traditional telecommunications services differ significantly (i.e.,
asymmetric regulation exists); even though it has been argued that consumers might benefit if the
rules for traditional services would also apply to OTTs. However, simply applying the same rules on
digital services might not be justified, e.g., because (i) users can multi-home at several services and
(ii) OTTs have technical peculiarities that differentiate them from traditional services. Consequently,
the first research question of the study is:
To which extent are digital services (OTTs) treated differently from traditional (telecommunica-
tions) services and which instruments can be utilized to harmonize regulatory obligations?
The study first highlights the specific domains where OTTs and traditional telecommunications services
are classified differently under the current regulatory framework (c.f., European Commission 2002).
1The ranking of academic journals is provided by the German Academic Association for Business Research (VHB). The
latest version of this ranking (JQ3) is available at: http://vhbonline.org/VHB4you/jourqual/vhb-jourqual-3/
gesamtliste/.
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Furthermore, the characteristics that lead to this diverting classification are summarized and dis-
cussed. However, the paper also highlights that the classification of online services is not unambiguous
and subject to political debate and interpretation. Moreover, the study discusses how harmonization
should be implemented on a fundamental level, i.e., whether regulatory obligations should be lifted
(for traditional services) or whether additional rules should be formulated (for OTTs). In this context,
formulating new rules for OTTs is by no means limited to transferring all known legal requirements
used for traditional telecommunications services (particularly, interconnection, interoperability, or ac-
cess obligations). After highlighting the arguments why this approach is (not) reasonable, the study
discusses more nuanced approaches such as only enforcing additional data protection, data retention,
or transparency obligations on OTTs. The study highlights that these remedies are particularly suited,
if the considered (communications) OTTs and the traditional telecommunications services are in di-
rect competition. Whereas the study examines the telecommunications sector, the results may also be
applied to the discussion in other regulated markets that currently undergo structural changes in the
context of digitization.
Second, problems of market power may also exist within digital (online) markets, i.e., with regard
to the competition between online services. In traditional (oﬄine) markets, such distortions, e.g.,
an abuse of market power, are treated with an established procedure: First, the relevant market is
defined, second, the market power of a firm under investigation is measured and third, if the firm has
market power and abuses this dominant position or is very likely to do so, remedies are formulated.
However, because of several peculiarities of online services, the measures used in this procedure cannot
be adequately applied to digital markets. The resulting research question thus is:
Which aspects need to be taken into account when defining the relevant market and assessing
market power in digital markets?
In this context, the complex relationships and interdependencies in digital markets, e.g., the difficul-
ties in determining the substitutive effects that may even be asymmetric, in incorporating bundled or
exclusive offers, in incorporating the dynamic aspect of digital markets, or in incorporating a missing
price in two-sided business models, are highlighted. These aspects necessitate extensions to the tra-
ditional toolset of antitrust authorities to define the relevant market; however, the data requirements
for these extensions are oftentimes impossible to meet in practice. Moreover, even if a market can be
defined appropriately, determining a firm’s market power remains complicated. In traditional markets,
market shares are used as an initial trigger for the assessment of market power. However, due to the
peculiarities of digital markets (e.g., scaling and network effects, potential contestability, dependence
on the underlying infrastructure), high markets shares are not a suitable proxy for market power.
Next to highlighting alternative approaches to define the relevant market and to assess market power
in digital markets, the study also emphasizes that high market shares in different (digital) markets
can indeed constitute market power if the considered firm operates a data-driven business model be-
cause heterogeneous data sources may provide a holistic view on specific users which may provide a
competitive edge, e.g., in the advertising market.
Third, as outlined above, data can be seen as an important economic asset in digital markets because
it enables the possibility to display targeted advertisements or to personalize or improve services.
The study thus highlights the role of data in digital markets from different perspectives. Next to
highlighting the user’s perspective by emphasizing that a user’s stated and actual attitude towards
4
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data usage and data protection may be diverting, the study highlights the relationship between data
and market power. In this context, (limited) access to data can be the basis for competitive distortions
if this data is deemed necessary for effective competition. In general, obtaining access to competing
firms’ data is subject to high legal barriers in the European Union and the United States, alike.
However, firms may nevertheless have an incentive to share data voluntarily.
The second study (Kra¨mer, Schnurr, and Wohlfarth 2018) investigates the strategic effects when
competing online services agree to voluntarily share user and usage data by means of a social login.
Social logins allow users to authenticate with third-party content providers (CPs) through their social
network account (c.f., Gafni and Nissim 2014, Janrain 2014). Consequently, social logins provide
the possibility to share user and usage data among otherwise unaffiliated online outlets. Thus, the
following research question arises:
Under which conditions do online services voluntarily agree to share user and usage data and
which competitive effects arise in the context of data sharing?
To answer this research question, a game-theoretic model is developed. The model offers a microfoun-
dation and characterization on how social logins affect CPs’ competition for users, as well as CPs’
competition in the advertising market, where better user and usage data can be utilized to place more
relevant ads. It is based on three stylized facts:
First, it is assumed that there are special-interest CPs, i.e., outlets that cover a special informational
need for users, and general-interest CPs, i.e., gateways to the internet that are visited by all users
irrespective of their specific informational need. Consequently, special-interest CPs are in competition
for the same subset of users, whereas general-interest CPs are visited by all users.
Second, although a general-interest CP is not in direct competition for users with special-interest CPs,
all CPs are in competition in the advertising market. Here, it is assumed that data sharing through
using the social login facilitates the ability for behavioral targeting, i.e., the ability to place targeted
advertisements may increase, which, all else being equal, leads to higher advertisement revenues.
However, through sharing user and usage data through a social login, also the targeting ability of the
competing CP is likely to increase.
Third, additional data gained through adopting a social login allows special-interest CPs to increase the
user experience. For example, users can utilize their existing login credentials, which limits password
fatigue and lowers the transaction costs of registration. Additionally, information sharing enables
better personalization and customization of content. In this vein, the social login is considered to
improve the utility that users derive from using a CP, which, all else being equal, can give it a
competitive edge in the competition for users.
The game-theoretic model based on these stylized facts is used to answer the research question raised
above. In doing so, the equilibrium market outcomes can be derived by calculating the anticipated
profits of a CP given its rivals’ decision. Subsequently, these profits can be used to calculate three
critical thresholds: The first and the second threshold delineate whether a social login is adopted
by special-interest CPs and whether adoption is actual profitable for them, respectively. The third
threshold defines whether the social login is offered by a general-interest CP. The critical adoption and
offer threshold define the market outcome where the social login is used, i.e., where user and usage data
5
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is shared between unaffiliated CPs. However, one of the key insights of the model is that voluntarily
adoption is not necessarily beneficial for special-interest CPs, i.e., the profitability threshold includes
only a subset of the outcomes. If the social login is adopted but not profitable for the special-interest
CPs, they find themselves in a prisoner’s dilemma. The three critical thresholds are further analyzed to
investigate how variations in the exogenous model parameters affect the market outcomes. Moreover,
a variety of extensions shows the robustness of the model (especially with regard to the existence of
the prisoner’s dilemma) and offer more nuanced results.
The study provides important insights to policy makers as it highlights potential threats that may
result from the existence of a single gateway to the internet (in the study’s context, the general-interest
CP). In the context of potential competitive distortions from having limited access to a firm’s data,
Study 2 investigates the firms’ perspective whether (not) to share user and usage data voluntarily
with a competing firm. Complementary, and in light of the GDPR and the therewith introduced
right to data portability that enables users to port their personal data from one online service to
another (competing) online service, considering this alternative perspective on obtaining data is worth
investigating.
The third study (Wohlfarth (2017) and the extended version Wohlfarth (2018)) is motivated by the
European Commission’s goal to protect users and to promote market entry and innovation by intro-
ducing a right to data portability with the GDPR (c.f., e.g., European Commission 2016, 2017c). This
regulation will have important ramifications for online services. However, thus far, the Information
Systems literature did not consider the introduction of a right to data portability from a strategic
perspective. Consequently, it is questionable whether allowing users to port their personal data is an
appropriate instrument to achieve the envisaged goals (e.g., protecting users, intensifying competition,
promoting market entry). The research question thus is:
Which competitive effects as well as welfare implications are induced from introducing a right to
data portability?
In answering this research question, the study provides a game-theoretic model that is the first to
investigate the competitive effects of a right to data portability on online services, but also the induced
effects on consumer’s surplus.
The model assumes that online services benefit from personal data entered by users, i.e., all else
being equal, they can increase their revenues if they obtain more data from users. In contrast, users
experience a disutility from revealing personal data (e.g., the time needed to enter personal data).
Moreover, to study the effects on market entry and innovation, the study considers a competitive
setting, where an incumbent online service is already offering its services whereas an entrant is entering
the market in a later period.
The analysis of the model setting yields an interesting insights: Incumbent online services have an
incentive to increase their data collection in anticipation of the market entry of competing online
services. Intuitively, the incumbent requires a high amount of data (even higher than in a one-period
monopoly) to generate (higher) switching costs to weaken competition in later periods. It is shown
that the effect of weakened competition dominates the (negative effect of) reduced profits in earlier
periods. The observation that the incumbent requires an even higher amount of data than in monopoly
is, at first sight, contrary to the traditional switching cost literature. Here, anticipated entry results
6
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in price wars lowering early-period prices to gain market shares, which can thereupon be harvested in
later periods (c.f., Klemperer 1989, 1995). But, within the considered setting of a data-driven market
environment, lock-ins are not generated by participation alone (e.g., positive network externalities or
the functionalities of a service), which can be stimulated by low prices, but additionally by a user’s
invested effort to enter, i.e., a user’s disutility to reveal (personal) data. Thus, lock-in effects do also
play a pivotal role for services in these market environments (i.e., data-induced switching costs exist)
although the underlying mechanisms differ compared to traditional markets.
Furthermore, the study investigates the effects of a right to data portability by comparing equilibrium
market outcomes with and without a right to data portability and analyzes how variations in the
exogenous model parameters affect these market outcomes. In doing so, the study inter alia demon-
strates that users may be worse off with a right to data portability because market entrants then have
an incentive to increase their data collection level. In contrast, profits for entrants and total surplus
always increases. This is likely to improve innovation and service variety in the long run. On this basis,
important insights for policy makers and case-specific recommendations for managers are formulated.
To test the robustness of the model and to obtain more nuanced insights, three model extensions are
considered: (i) costs for providing users the possibility to port data, (ii) the possibility that users may
also transfer irrelevant data to their new online service, and (iii) network effects, i.e., a user’s utility
is now also affected by the number of other users active at the service.
In conclusion, this doctoral thesis contributes to the extant research on the competitive effects of
data-driven (online) services and deepens the understanding on the role of data as a competitive
resource in digital markets by (i) providing new theoretical insights, (ii) emphasizing important findings
for policy makers in digital markets, and (iii) offering recommendations for managers of data-driven
business models. However, the main insights provided in this thesis are solely derived from game-
theoretic modeling which inherently necessitates to abstract and simplify from specific business models.
Although game-theoretic models allow for the generalizability of results and can be used to identify
the main drivers of competitive effects, the peculiarities of different market environments (e.g., in
which way and to which extent does additional data improve the offered service?) and the individual
user behavior (e.g., how do users react to data sharing or data disclosure?) should be considered
and analyzed in more detail. Consequently, the thesis should be understood as one building block in
analyzing data-driven business models in digital markets that simultaneously calls for more academic
research.
In closing, three potential avenues for future research are highlighted: First, future research should
extend the analysis of this thesis on how (the access to and the availability of) data may constitute
market power, shapes the competitive environment in digital markets, and which tools are suited to
mitigate problems associated with the availability of data-induced market power. More specifically,
Fast, Schnurr, and Wohlfarth (2018) highlight how firms can transform data into value and which
factors may promote (persistent) market power. Although the authors also discuss possibilities to
mitigate potential problems associated with market power, there is only few research on specific con-
cepts. For example, analyzing whether users benefit from Personal Information Management Systems
(PIMS, c.f., European Data Protection Supervisor 2016) and how these systems shape the competitive
environment in digital markets seems to be a valuable contribution to the extant literature. Second,
future research should analyze data-driven business models with complementary methodologies. As
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highlighted above, the studies contained in this thesis use stylized models (next to desk research) inter
alia due to the unavailability of relevant (public) data. In this context, laboratory experiments may
be used to analyze behavioral aspects that have been neglected in this thesis. Especially with regard
to a user’s decision to reveal or share (personal) data, these behavioral, use case-specific aspects might
prove to be interesting and worth investigating. The possibility to explicitly control the market en-
vironment and the possibility to systematically modify the considered scenario may be used to, e.g.,
analyze the degree to which data-induced switching costs are relevant for a user’s decision whether to
switch online services, or to estimate the actual attractiveness of a social login for users. Third, future
research should continue to analyze dominant platforms and their incentives to influence the compet-
itive environment through collecting or sharing data. For example, on a policy level, the question of
how online platforms promote affiliated or own services is currently considered to be a relevant and
important issue (c.f., European Commission 2017a). In this context, research may not only analyze
how a monetary compensation affects such prominence, but also how a service’s willingness (not) to
share data with the platform affects a platform’s decision whether to promote this service.
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A B S T R A C T
The increased economic importance of digital services has profoundly changed the power struc-
ture in telecommunications and media markets. Although these services sometimes directly
compete with traditional telecommunications services, the regulatory obligations for both players
differ signiﬁcantly. This article discusses three important areas deemed relevant in order to deﬁne
a coherent regulatory framework and to account for the speciﬁc peculiarities of digital markets:
First, challenges associated with assessing market power in digital markets. Second, challenges in
harmonizing different regulatory obligations for digital services, and third, the vital role of data
and data protection in the context of data-driven business models.
1. Introduction
The increased economic importance of digital services such as instant messaging, video streaming, VoIP, or social networking has
profoundly changed the market power in telecommunications and media markets. Traditionally, these markets were characterized by
vertically integrated network operators, which controlled the physical infrastructure (e.g., the ﬁxed and/or mobile network) and the
deployed services available at these networks (e.g., TV, internet, voice telephony and SMS). Thus, the different services accessed via the
same network (e.g., voice telephony and SMS), could be monetized individually. The regulation of services therefore focused on network
operators to secure information and media diversity, or interoperability (i.e., interconnection) of the deployed services. However, in
Next Generation Access Networks (NGAN) that rely on packet switching rather than line switching, the (physical) network layer is
separated from the service layer; in consequence, the monetarization of different types of services by the network operator is no longer
feasible. Moreover, network operators lose control over the services deployed on their networks. This also implies that network op-
erators themselves become substitutable because digital services can be consumed independently from a speciﬁc network operator or
network infrastructure: network access has become a commodity. On the other hand, also content and service providers lose control over
the transmission, i.e., they are unable to guarantee a certain quality of service, which is relevant especially for real time applications such
as (video) telephony.
Digital services deployed on the already existing physical network infrastructure are most commonly deﬁned as over-the-top services
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(OTTs). BEREC (2016) deﬁnes OTTs as “content, a service or an application that is provided to the end user over the public Internet”
(BEREC, 2016, p. 3). Thus, this deﬁnition excludes services that operate over private IP networks (e.g., intranets), and includes digital
services provided by traditional (telecommunications) network operators, i.e., telcos. However, it is useful for the subsequent discussion
to differentiate between digital services that are offered by telcos and digital services that are offered by companies without an own
network infrastructure on the last mile. According to Kr€amer andWohlfarth (2015), OTTs are sensu stricto characterized as services that
do not own network infrastructure at the local loop, but offer their services to end users by utilizing the existing infrastructure of
traditional telcos. Hence, they do not necessarily have a customer relationship ex-ante and are unable to exercise control over the data
transmission on the last mile network. Depending on the provided service, OTTs can thus be differentiated in those having rather high
and those having rather low infrastructure requirements. However, this does not imply that OTTs do not own any infrastructure or
would not be able to exercise control over the transmission at all as the (technical) infrastructure deployed by OTTs comprises inter alia
servers, data centers, private routes in the backbone of the internet, and content delivery networks, i.e., servers located close to the end
users to cache content. Moreover, and in contrast to traditional telco services, OTTs are not necessarily ﬁnanced by users only and may
even provide their service free of charge to end users. Thus, OTTs can be differentiated according to their pursued business model that
can either be one-sided or two-/multi-sided. As it will be outlined later, this differentiation and the resulting diverging economic
principles (c.f., Rochet& Tirole, 2006) are crucial in analyzing the competitive effects of OTTs. Finally, the provided (digital) services of
OTTs include substitutive as well as complementary applications to the already existing services of (traditional) telcos. To summarize,
Fig. 1 provides a framework to differentiate OTTs according to these dimensions.
Moreover, with regard to the type of offered service, Peitz and Valletti (2015) differentiate between “communication services […]
Real-time entertainment […] social networking sites […] marketplaces […] ﬁlesharing services […] storage services […] gaming
services [… and] web browsing” (Peitz & Valletti, 2015, p. 899). Not explicitly mentioned are search engines. Search is considered by
Kr€amer andWohlfarth (2015) and—in the context of this paper—also deemed relevant as this type of service (i) is potentially dominated
by a single provider, Google, and (ii) has far reaching economic impact as nearly half of the total internet advertising revenues on the
internet are realized via search (c.f., IAB/PwC, 2017).
Several OTTs gained large popularity, many active users, and remarkable economic success. Consequently, the competitive envi-
ronment in the telecommunications markets as well as the underlying rationales for regulatory interventions considerably changed
(Koske, Bitetti, Wanner, & Sutherland, 2014). In this vein, Peitz and Valletti (2015) assess the competitive concerns of the changing
industry and highlight the complexity, inter alia, due to different business models and different regulatory obligations for OTTs vis-a-vis
traditional telco services. BEREC (2016) discusses the impact of OTTs on the current regulatory framework of the EU and highlight the
challenges for regulatory authorities in the OTT environment (BEREC, 2016). We build on these observations and—by summarizing the
relevant literature in the analyzed ﬁelds—provide an extensive discussion of the evolving regulatory problems and questions that arise
when regulators and competition authorities deal with OTT services and seek to harmonize regulatory obligations in order to ensure
a level playing ﬁeld. Moreover, as most OTT services are data-driven, we discuss how the peculiarities of data and data protection in the
context of data-driven business models affects this investigation. In doing so, we are to the best of our knowledge the ﬁrst that combine
the insights of current policy issues in (i) the investigation of OTTs, (ii) the harmonization of different regulatory frameworks, and (iii)
the vital role of data in a consolidated way.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: First, we focus on the market for digital services in Section 2 and emphasize the
challenges in assessing market power in these markets. Moreover, we provide potential solutions to these problems. As the assessment of
market power is seen as a prerequisite for regulatory intervention, the provided insights are not only important if the competition
between OTTs is analyzed, but especially if OTTs and traditional telecommunications services offer substitutive services and compete
Fig. 1. A framework to differentiate OTTs (Kr€amer & Wohlfarth, 2015, p. 76).
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against each other. The latter aspect motivates the discussions in Section 3, where the challenges in harmonizing different regulatory
obligations to create a level playing ﬁeld for competing services are outlined. Moreover, many dominant OTTs possess extensive user
data and data may even be seen as a key asset of these OTTs. Simultaneously, the protection of (personal) data gets increasingly
important for users and regulatory authorities, alike. To address this development in the complex environment outlined thus far, Section
4 discusses the vital role and peculiarities of data from a user's, company's, and regulatory authority's perspective.
2. Challenges in assessing market power in digital markets
A competitive or regulatory intervention is oftentimes triggered by an abuse of market power. According to standing legal practice in
the US and EU, to assess market power, ﬁrst the relevant market has to be deﬁned. On this basis market shares, market concentration, or
entry barriers are derived as a proxy for a ﬁrm's market power (c.f., OECD, 2012, 2014). Consequently, the deﬁnition of the relevant
market is the ﬁrst necessary step for possible regulatory intervention.
2.1. Deﬁning the relevant market
The deﬁnition of the relevant market generally considers product, geographic and time dimensions. However, in the EU as well as in
the US, market deﬁnition is predominantly conducted by means of the Hypothetical Monopolist Test (HMT). The idea of the HMT is that
(at least) a ﬁrm with 100% market share (i.e., a monopolist) has to be able to execute market power in the considered (i.e., relevant)
market. If this would not be true, according to the HMT, the relevant market has been deﬁned too broadly and needs to be deﬁned more
narrowly. In this context, market power is understood as the ability of a ﬁrm to permanently set high(er) prices. For example, this idea is
implemented in the Small Signiﬁcant Non-transitory Increase in Price (SSNIP) test, which operationalizes the idea of the HMT (c.f.,
Moresi, Salop,&Woodbury, 2017) by considering a small but signiﬁcant increase in price, usually an increase of 5%–10% over a period
of one to two years. The SSNIP test is applied in the EU as well as in the US (with minor adaptations) to deﬁne the relevant market
(OECD, 2012, p. 19). An alternative but conceptually similar method to implement a HMT is the Critical Loss Analysis, which has been
applied in the EU and the US with increasing frequency over the past years (Hüschelrath, 2009). Competition and regulatory authorities
have established great expertise in deﬁning the relevant market by means of the HMT in traditional markets. This signiﬁcantly con-
tributed to greater legal certainty. However, in digital markets, market deﬁnition becomes increasingly complex, due to several reasons
outlined next.
2.1.1. Determining substitutive effects
Considering the convergence and multi-functionality of different digital services and products, a product-related deﬁnition of the
relevant market with regard to the substitutability is already very complex. For example, (instant) messages can be sent via SMS/MMS,
WhatsApp, Twitter, Skype, Threema, social networks (e.g., LinkedIn or Facebook), games, and even via e-mail (e.g., between two
smartphones), with slightly different characteristics, respectively. The deﬁnition of the relevant market thus depends on the economic
substitutive effects and not necessarily on the comparability of the underlying business models, i.e., whether the service is provided free-
of-charge via a two-sided business model, or fee-based via a one-sided business model (c.f., Peitz& Valletti, 2015). According to the logic
of the HMT, the consideration of substitutive effects suggests that the relevant market will inherently be broader, making it less likely
that a certain ﬁrm has market power.
2.1.2. Asymmetric substitutive effects
The aforementioned substitutive effects in digital markets are oftentimes asymmetric. Consequently, the substitutive effect on
a service with few features (e.g., SMS) vis-a-vis a service with many features (e.g., WhatsApp) can be more pronounced than vice versa.
Therefore, the deﬁnition of the relevant market inherently depends on the considered service. However, these issues are no peculiarity
that only arise in digital markets. Instead, they have already emerged in the context of traditional telecommunications services, e.g.,
with regard to the substitutability of mobile and ﬁxed telephone services (c.f., BEREC, 2012). Hence, solutions may already exist and it
might be argued that these problems are, in principle, controllable. However, in digital markets many issues related to the deﬁnition of
the relevant market occur in combination and have high requirements on the amount and quality of data. This additional complexity
aggravates the applicability of potential solutions in practice.
2.1.3. High ﬁxed, low marginal costs
Digital services and markets are generally characterized by high ﬁxed and very low marginal costs. The HMT, and especially the
Critical Loss Analysis, is implicitly grounded on the assumption that market power allows ﬁrms to set prices signiﬁcantly above marginal
costs (c.f., e.g., Hüschelrath, 2009). However, the relationship between prices and marginal costs can be distorted in digital markets
because marginal costs are close to zero (Elzinga & Mills, 2011).
2.1.4. Multi-sided markets
Another characteristic of many digital markets is the existence of indirect network effects between different market sides. Markets
entailing this feature are commonly classiﬁed as two- or multi-sided markets. Examples include ad-ﬁnanced services (e.g., Google
Search), but also ecommerce platforms such as eBay or the Amazon marketplace, as well as digital intermediaries (e.g., Uber or dating
portals). Two- or multi-sided markets differ substantially from one-sided markets (such as the market for ﬁxed network access) with
regard to their economic characteristics (Armstrong, 2006; Caillaud & Jullien, 2003; Rochet & Tirole, 2003, 2006; Wright, 2004).
J. Kr€amer, M. Wohlfarth Telecommunications Policy 42 (2018) 154–171
156
Market power, regulatory convergence, and the role of data in digital markets
13
Consequently, the logic of the HMT is not immediately applicable. The scientiﬁc literature presented numerous suggestions on how to
apply the SSNIP test on two- or multi-sided markets (Alexandrov, Deltas, & Spulber, 2011; Argentesi & Filistrucchi, 2007; Filistrucchi,
2008; Filistrucchi, Geradin, Van Damme, & Affeldt, 2014), e.g., by taking the sum of the prices of both market sides instead of the price
of only onemarket side. Although these suggestions are contentious, they imply that both (respectively all) market sides have to be taken
into consideration to deﬁne the relevant market for services active in a two- or multi-sided market. Hence, it is inappropriate to limit the
deﬁnition of the relevant market to the substitutive effects on the user side, without simultaneously analyzing the substitutive effects on,
e.g., the advertising side. This induces a signiﬁcantly increased amount of data that is necessary in order to deﬁne the relevant market.
Additionally, “prices” have to be made comparable across different market sides. This task can be very complex, either due to the
existence of different units (e.g., advertising prices based on clicks and prices per search query), or due to the fact that services are
provided free of charge (c.f., Filistrucchi et al., 2014).
Furthermore, according to Filistrucchi et al. (2014), a distinction between transaction based and non-transaction based two-sided
markets is necessary to apply the HMT. Whereas transaction based markets are deﬁned by the imposition of fees per transaction
(e.g., per ride at Uber), non-transaction based markets (e.g., Google Search) are deﬁned by no fee at all, or, alternatively, by a partic-
ipation fee that is independent of the (actual number of) transactions. Conceptually, to apply the HMT in transaction based markets, the
assumption of a single market seems more reasonable, whereas non-transaction based markets might be classiﬁed as two interconnected
markets. However, existing business models in digital markets are oftentimes characterized by both transaction-types simultaneously,
i.e., by transaction based relationships (e.g., prices per click on shown advertisements) and by non-transaction based relationships (e.g.,
subscription models). Finally, it has to be noted that one- or multi-sidedness of a business model is not deﬁned by the service type, but is
a free corporate decision (Hagiu & Wright, 2013, 2015), possibly also inﬂuenced by the regulatory interventions to be expected.
2.1.5. Missing price
Closely related to the properties of multi-sided markets is the fact that digital services are oftentimes provided free of charge. This
is not necessarily an expression of predatory pricing, but can be the outcome of an optimal pricing behavior in the logic of multi-sided
markets—even for monopolists (c.f., e.g., Evans, 2008; Parker & Van Alstyne, 2005). Whereas this pricing scheme would lead to zero
proﬁts in traditional one-sided market (e.g., not billing customers for phone calls), it can be proﬁt maximizing for platforms to set
a zero price for end users and to generate revenues only from the other market side (e.g., advertisements). From a regulatory per-
spective, this pricing complicates the deﬁnition of a relevant market in several dimensions: First, in the past, regulatory authorities
were inclined to judge that there is no market without the existence of a price and consequently, no potential abuse of market power
(c.f., Filistrucchi et al., 2014, e.g., Kinderstar v Google or BSkyB v Kirch PayTV). Second, it is unclear how a markup of 5%–10% can
be calculated (e.g., to apply the SSNIP test). It has been proposed to consider quality reductions rather than (price) markups, e.g., by
displaying more advertisements (Dewenter, R€osch, & Terschüren, 2014; Peitz & Valletti, 2015), by expanding a service's data usage
(Haucap & Stühmeier, 2015), or by changing technical parameters of the service. However, this also induces a variety of methodical
questions, because either a relationship between the number of displayed advertisements and demand-related behavior (click
behavior, respectively), or between data usage and demand (which can potentially be affected by the quality of experience), has to be
estimated in lieu of using the price-demand function. In most cases, this does not seem to be feasible; in any case, there is no (sci-
entiﬁc) consensus for an objective measure. Third, a service provided free of charge (potentially even below marginal costs) for one
market side, generally implies that the price for the other market side is above marginal costs. This asymmetric pricing is typical for
multi-sided markets (Rochet & Tirole, 2006). With respect to the HMT (or the SSNIP test), this implies that current market prices (at
one market side) are an inappropriate reference value. This may result in the so called “cellophane fallacy” which leads to markets
being deﬁned too broadly, which induces that the identiﬁcation of market power is less likely (Dewenter et al., 2014). Finally, services
provided free of charge are difﬁcult to grasp from an economic perspective, because the zero-price has (also) psychological effects on
consumers: even slight deviations from a price of zero can have major implications on the resulting demand (Shampanier, Mazar, &
Ariely, 2007). This strong non-linearity has to be considered in assessing market power. However, as these effects are empirically hard
to determine, the complexity of concepts relying on the effects of changing prices (e.g., the SSNIP test) additionally increases, making
their application burdensome.
2.1.6. Bundled offers
In digital markets, services are frequently offered in bundles. For example, Google offers a variety of different services (e.g., search, e-
mail, maps, word processing), which are all accessible directly via the Google homepage by using the same login credentials. Bundled
offers are also typical for telcos. Furthermore, they are not limited to the bundling of different services at the network level (e.g.,
broadband access, TV, voice telephony), but also exist in combination with (unrelated) OTT services (e.g., free premium subscriptions
for music streaming services during the contractual period). Usually, bundles can have pro-competitive as well as anti-competitive
effects (c.f., e.g., Nalebuff, 2003). Therefore, the existence of bundled offers does not immediately indicate market power. However,
the existence of bundled offers makes the application of the SSNIP test more difﬁcult (Pereira & Vareda, 2013; Pereira, Ribeiro, &
Vareda, 2013). Additionally, bundled offers are scrutinized critically, if they are perceived as a device of a dominant ﬁrm trying to
leverage its market power from onemarket to another market (c.f., Nalebuff&Majerus, 2003; for a compilation of relevant cases). In this
context, increased attention is currently directed to Google: The European Commission (2016) sent a statement of objections to Google
alleging that manufacturers are contractually obliged to deﬁne “Google Search” as default search engine in order to (be also allowed to)
offer the Google Play store on produced devices (Google Android Case 40099; additionally, c. f., Edelman, 2014).
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2.1.7. Exclusive offers and restrictions
Competing digital services may try to differentiate themselves inter alia by acquiring exclusive content (e.g., exclusive series on
video streaming platforms). In other cases, market players may be impeded to be active on several platforms simultaneously through
exclusive contracts, e.g., by contractually prohibiting advertisers to transfer advertising campaigns to other platforms (c.f., e.g.,
Monopolkommission, 2015a). Ultimately, these practices try to increase the switching costs for market participants in order to establish
lock-ins, which weaken competition. Although strong competition for exclusive content can occur ex-ante (“competition for the mar-
ket”), weaker competition in the market may evolve (“competition in the market”). Thus, exclusive contracts have ambiguous effects on
total welfare (Farrell & Klemperer, 2007). The assessment of market power via the static HMT can hardly capture this dynamic
dimension of competition.
2.1.8. Customization and business services
The characteristics of digital goods allow to fully personalize the offered services (“mass customization”). This may not only result in
lock-in effects, but also in difﬁculties in deﬁning the relevant market with respect to the product and time dimension. For example,
specialized as well as business services have traditionally been considered as separate markets because they are relevant to different
types of customers (private end customers and business customers, c. f., e.g., OECD, 2014). However, in the context of digital services,
this clear-cut separation between the two types of customers is not always feasible, because (i) services are used in both contexts
simultaneously (e.g., Skype or Dropbox) and (ii) there is a ﬂuent transition between privately and commercially used services due to
a multitude of conﬁguration possibilities (e.g., with regard to the capacity of a cloud storage or the performance of on-demand (cloud)
computing).
2.1.9. Multidimensional market deﬁnition
Another issue arises from the fact that a solely product-based deﬁnition of the relevant market is not sufﬁcient (Peitz & Valletti,
2015). For example, although services are offered world-wide, the geographic location of a customer can have immediate impact. For
example, some services are not available in every geographic region or only in English (e.g., mobile payment systems like ApplePay,
video streaming services like Hulu, or personal assistants like Amazon Alexa, Google Home or Apple HomePod), or services are offered
with a reduced amount of features (e.g., Google Maps where information on public transportation are only integrated for some cities).
Moreover, the access technology (i.e., terminal devices or the network access, respectively) can have an impact on the service avail-
ability or service quality. Both examples illustrate the necessity to (additionally) consider the geographic dimension in deﬁning the
relevant market. Furthermore, digital services are highly dynamic with regard to the features offered, market shares and relevant
competitors. In combination with quickly changing user preferences, this might induce to (also) consider the time dimension in deﬁning
the relevant market (Peitz & Valletti, 2015).
2.1.10. Dynamic markets
As outlined above, digital markets are in many cases highly dynamic which leads to quickly shiftingmarket boundaries. For example,
Google (now Alphabet) acquired more than 229 ﬁrms since 2001 (CB Insights, 2017) and now offers more than 100 different services
(Google, 2017). The established ecosystem and the possibility to promote or integrate own services vis-a-vis competing services (c.f.,
Google Search (Shopping) Case 39740 and European Commission, 2017a) highlights the complex interrelations in these dynamic
markets. Moreover, as data might be seen as a central input for innovation, and as digital ﬁrms have the possibility to increase their
amount of data by offering new services (c.f., Section 4 as well as Manyika et al., 2011), the dynamics of digital markets may arguably
increase even further. However, this does not necessarily imply that the market power relations actually change, because the rela-
tionship between market share and market power is unclear (especially) in digital markets (c.f., Section 2.2). However, the HMT is
inherently relying on the assumption of static (i.e., temporally invariant) market conditions as well as on the concept of demand-side
substitution (OECD, 2012, p. 19). As just argued, assuming static market conditions is inappropriate in a dynamic framework. Moreover,
the established ecosystems of digital service providers (e.g., Google, Apple, Amazon) may also lead to lock-ins and switching costs
(related, c. f., Klemperer, 1987; Wohlfarth, 2017). Consequently, one may also argue that the preconditions for the existence of demand-
side substitution are questionable. Finally, from a conceptual perspective, it has to be stated that an integration of supply-side substi-
tution into the HMT (i.e., the short-term emergence of substitutes that occurred after the hypothetical price increase, e.g., through the
reallocation of resources from existing companies) is possible (c.f., e.g., Briglauer, 2008). However, this concept is based on speculations
and is thus, empirically, not objectively applicable. Therefore, it is hardly applied in practice. To summarize, the HMT may be inap-
propriate to capture the dynamics of digital markets.
Insight 1 In accordance with established legal practice, the ﬁrst step to assess market power is the deﬁnition of the relevant market. This is
conducted by the Hypothetical Monopolist Test or closely related concepts. The complex economic relationships of digital markets and services
require numerous extensions to the standard practice in order to deﬁne the relevant market. These extensions have high data requirements, which
are often impossible to meet in practice. Consequently, a robust and reliable deﬁnition of the relevant market for digital services is in many cases
infeasible.
2.2. Market shares as an indication of market power
After the relevant market has been deﬁned, market shares are of particular importance as an initial trigger for the assessment of
market power. In the EU, dominance is further analyzed if a single ﬁrm has a market share of over 40% (c.f., Article 102 of the Treaty on
the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and additionally, European Commission, 2013). In Germany, for example, the national
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Act Against Restraints of Competition (GWB) deﬁnes a threshold of 40% for a single ﬁrm (GWB x18(4)), a threshold of 50% for up to
three ﬁrms (GWB x18(6)), and a threshold of 66.6% for up to ﬁve ﬁrms (GWB x18(6) no. 2). In the US, dominance is de facto only
considered if market shares exceed 70% (U.S. Department of Justice, 2008, p.21). Although market shares are even in traditional
markets no sufﬁcient evidence for market power (c.f., Kaplow, 2013, 2015), we argue next that the role of market shares is even less clear
in digital markets.
First, market shares exceeding 40% are no special feature in digital markets as digital business models inherently require highmarket
shares due to scaling and network effects (Peitz & Valletti, 2015). Moreover, these market shares highly depend on the underlying
(assumed) relevant market, whose deﬁnition bears several problems as outlined in Section 2.1.
Second, one could argue that certain digital markets are sufﬁciently contestable because potential competitors could quickly adapt
a successful business model (Argenton & Prüfer, 2012; Kr€amer &Wohlfarth, 2015). The theory of (perfectly) contestable markets states
that even a monopolist is (under certain assumptions) not able to exploit its market power, because it would be replaced by a rival ﬁrm,
which is not yet active in the market. Although the underlying assumptions of the theory of (perfectly) contestable markets are unlikely
to be matched in existing, traditional markets (Schwartz & Reynolds, 1983), it nevertheless can be argued that many digital markets
comply with the main assumptions. For example, sunk costs for market entry are—especially for ﬁrms already offering other digital
services—comparably low as these are mainly determined by human capital. Additionally, the necessary technical infrastructure can be
scaled dynamically or leased, e.g., by outsourcing computing infrastructure to the cloud. These features may enable established ﬁrms to
enter adjacent markets fairly fast and on a large scale, if the expected earnings are high enough and the costs of exiting the market are
relatively low.1 Thus, market entry is likely, especially if the established ﬁrm tries to exploit its market power, e.g., by (i) raising the
price of a previously free service, (ii) degrading the quality of the service, or (iii) displaying more advertisements. Hence, it is often
argued that in the highly dynamic environment of digital markets, the necessity to maintain a continuously high innovative performance
is a precondition to remain successful in terms of the “creative destruction” according to Schumpeter (Haucap & Heimeshoff, 2014;
Haucap & Stühmeier, 2015; Monopolkommission, 2015a). Two examples highlight that contestability is feasible: First, Google suc-
cessfully entered the search engine market, which at that time had been dominated by Altavista. Second, as Facebook's acquisition of the
messaging service Whatsapp became ofﬁcial in February 2014, privacy concerns resulted in many users installing the alternative service
Threema, which provided a strong end-to-end encryption. As a result, Threema was ranked as the number one application in the iTunes
App store in February 2014 (c.f., Beuth, 2014), and WhatsApp was forced to introduce end-to-end encryption itself. However, although
leading ﬁrms like Google or Facebook apparently manage to maintain their dominant position in certain service segments over several
years, it is neither theoretically, nor empirically deducible whether this is a result of market power, a result of continuously winning the
innovation contest (possibly, due to better data; c. f., Section 4), or a result of not exploiting market power in the sense of the contestable
markets theory. With this said, a direct relationship of market power and market shares cannot be derived.
Third, it has to be stated that market power in digital markets is not necessarily determined by a high market share in a certain (sub-)
market, but by the presence in many different markets (c.f., Prüfer & Schottmüller, 2017). As many digital business models are
essentially based on the collection of data, the presence in different markets and the connection of the data derived in these markets,
which concerns the very same user, might be seen as valuable (Monopolkommission, 2015a). Consequently, market power might rather
be deﬁned by the quality of the gathered data concerning a speciﬁc user (c.f., Section 4) than by the market share in the underlying
market.
Fourth, the interaction of players at different layers of the value chain is crucial in assessing market power. Although it is technically
relatively easy to differentiate the transmission of data (carried out by the network operator) from the applications that rely on that
transmission (i.e., the digital service), economically, the consumption of the digital service is nevertheless seen as an inseparable bundle
(Peitz & Valletti, 2015). Whereas the transmission itself is worthless without the existence of complementary services, the very same
holds for digital services which are useless without the necessary accessibility. Consequently, without regulatory limitations, the market
power of an OTT—if present at all—is conditional on the transmission of the network operator; at least with regard to the users
reachable by the considered network operator. On the other hand, the market power of the network operator—if present at all—is
conditional on the existence and attractiveness of the services reachable over its network. This intertwined structure of relative market
power is also at the core of the net neutrality debate (c.f., Kr€amer, Wiewiorra, & Weinhardt, 2013; for an overview). In this context,
market power can possibly be strengthened by vertical integration of service providers and network operators (Lee, 2013; Peitz &
Valletti, 2015). For example, this can be achieved by acquiring exclusive broadcasting rights for sporting events, which are afterwards
only available in a speciﬁc network, or by upgrading the own network infrastructure, respectively developing own operating systems
which provide the content of the offered service exclusively or at least preferentially. Thus, to assess market power, the dependencies
along the value chain of the internet have to be taken into account. However, these dependencies are only insufﬁciently represented by
the isolated consideration of market shares.
Finally, (high) market shares as a proxy for (high) market power, as suggested by competition law, can already be criticized in
traditional markets for inhomogeneous goods. For example, Kaplow (2013, 2015) argues that there is no valid method to extrapolate
market power from market shares (in markets with inhomogeneous goods). Moreover, Kaplow states that it is necessary to estimate the
market power of a considered ﬁrm to properly deﬁne the relevant market, which arguably leads to a vicious circle.
1 In this context, contestability and supply-side substitution are closely related because both concepts assume that exploiting market power (e.g., by a price increase)
might result in the emergence of new, substitutive products or services. The concept of contestability emphasizes the disciplining effect due to the threat of repla-
cement—although an actual market entry does not have to occur. In contrast, the concept of supply-side substitution refers to the potentially (compared to the static
consideration of the elasticity of demand) increased competitive pressure exerted by close rivals.
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Insight 2 In digital markets a high market share in only one (i.e., the considered) market is not a sufﬁcient indication for market power. High
market shares are commonly resulting from concentration tendencies, which, however, do not necessarily imply market power, because many
digital markets might be considered as contestable. However, market power may arise from data about speciﬁc users, often stemming from access
to several heterogeneous data sources across different markets. Consequently, high market shares in many different markets could indeed con-
stitute market power.
2.3. Alternative approaches to deﬁning the relevant market and to assessing market power
Due to the outlined challenges in assessing market power with traditional concepts, alternatives to assessing market power in digital
markets are discussed next.
2.3.1. Pricing pressure
Instead of using the HMT, alternative concepts summarized by “pricing pressure evaluations”, e.g., the concept of Upward Pricing
Pressure (UPP), which initially does not require a deﬁnition of the relevant market (Farrell & Shapiro, 2010), are highlighted next. The
concept of UPP has been suggested to initially and quickly evaluate corporate mergers. Especially in the US, the concept of UPP is
controversially discussed. The underlying idea is to determine whether a ﬁrm has an incentive to increase the price of its own products,
the products of the merged ﬁrm, or both prices post-merger. In its application, price effects are calculated based on the previous demand,
assumptions with respect to the substitutive effects (i.e., diversion ratios2), and assumptions regarding efﬁciency advantages gained
through the merger. Assuming a two-ﬁrm, two-product merger, the merged ﬁrm will set a higher price for product i, if UPPi >0⇔Dij⋅
ðPj CjÞ>Ei⋅Ci, with Dij representing the diversion ratio, Pi the prices, Ci the marginal costs, and Ei the efﬁciency gain due to the merger
for products i; j ¼ 1;2; i≠j (c.f., Farrell& Shapiro, 2010, p. 11). As it can be seen in this inequality, the larger the diversion ratio, i.e., the
fraction of lost sales from product i that is recaptured by product j, or the higher the margin of product j, the more attractive is a price
increase of product i (c.f., OECD, 2012, p. 19). Although the UPP was introduced with regard to merger analysis, the concept is closely
related to HMT methods. It may be a suitable device to quantify the lost sales due to increasing the price that are recaptured by other
products owned by the hypothetical monopolist. The higher this “recapture percentage”, the higher the incentive to increase the prices
(c.f., Shapiro, 2010, p. 90f). This logic shows the tight connection to traditional approaches to deﬁne the market. However, similar to the
HMT, applying the UPP or related concepts basing on pricing pressure evaluations in practice is seen as critical in dynamic markets
because they (i) are grounded solely on supply-side substitution, which is difﬁcult to measure (c.f., Section 2.2), (ii) assume efﬁciency
gains with respect to marginal costs, which are anyhow close to zero in digital markets, and (iii) assume markets to be in equilibrium,
which is questionable in the highly dynamic environment of digital markets.
2.3.2. Simulation
Especially in the context of mergers, simulation models are occasionally employed. Most commonly, oligopoly models are consid-
ered, which are calibrated according to the conditions of the considered market. Although simulation models have several beneﬁts like
the possibility to analyze the effects of market entry, market exit, or imposed remedies, the data requirements for such an approach are
very high (e.g., with regard to econometric estimations of the demand function) andmany degrees of freedom exist (OECD, 2012, p. 19).
Moreover, complexity and data needs make it difﬁcult to carry out robust, short-term estimations of market power. However, simulation
models are generally suitable to describe complex dynamic market models.
2.3.3. Direct effects approach
Due to the aforementioned problems arising in complex, dynamicmarkets, the assessment of market power without a prior deﬁnition
of the relevant market has been suggested: the so called “Direct Effects Approach” (OECD, 2012, p. 19; Zingales, 2013). Instead of
considering margins or elasticities, this approach directly focuses on “potential anticompetitive effects, such as the reduction of output”
(U.S. Department of Justice, 2008, p.30). At the EU level, the approach can be seen as the continuation of the “Effects Based Approach”
relating to Article 102 TFEU; however, this interpretation is de lege lata controversial. The Direct Effects Approach assumes that it is
sufﬁcient to show that a ﬁrm abuses its market power, i.e., demonstrating that a ﬁrm hasmarket power in the relevant market in the ﬁrst
place is not necessary anymore, because this is seen as necessary precondition for an abuse (Gual et al., 2005). Consequently, if there is
an evidence of competitive harm, then there inherently is also evidence of market power. The U.S. Department of Justice (2008) has
formulated similar suggestions and thus, stimulated an intense debate concerning the Direct Effects Approach. Currently, the insufﬁcient
legal certainty of the procedure arising from (i) the unavailability of a standardized approach to assess market power using the Direct
Effects Approach, and (ii) lacking precedents, are criticized (OECD, 2012, p. 19). However, it might still be useful to intensify the debate
to establish the Direct Effects Approach de lege ferenda also in the EU. Prospectively, this could introduce an alternative device to
enforce regulatory goals. For example, access regulations (e.g., granting access to a dominant ﬁrm's data to intensify competition),
interconnection regulations (e.g., requiring communications OTTs to forward calls or messages to other OTT networks), or transparency
obligations (e.g., requiring Google to publish the inﬂuencing factors of the search ranking algorithm) might be introduced for dominant
ﬁrms in digital markets independent of the deﬁnition of the relevant market where market shares are an insufﬁcient signal of market
power.
2 The diversion ratio represents the increase in additional sales (or increase in revenue share) by a ﬁrm relatively to the lost sales (or decrease in revenue share) by
the other ﬁrm. Consequently, if the diversion ratio is high, the products of the ﬁrms are close substitutes.
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Insight 3. Alternatives to the commonly used deﬁnition of the relevant market exist. However, the applicability of these approaches in digital
markets requires further examination. Especially the Direct Effects Approach is a promising alternative, because it does not rely on the deﬁnition of
the relevant market which is associated with several problems in digital markets.
3. Challenges in harmonizing different regulatory obligations for digital services
Individual players in the ecosystem of the internet are often characterized by different regulatory guidelines or obligations. Inter-
estingly, such asymmetric regulation can even be observed for services that obviously offer substitutive products. This is particularly
immanent in the ﬁeld of telecommunications services, in the context of which a vivid scientiﬁc (Allouet, Le Franc, Marques, & Rossi,
2014; Brown, 2014; Kr€amer &Wohlfarth, 2015) as well as political (BEREC, 2016; Rossi, 2015) debate evolved. In principle, it can be
argued that end customers might beneﬁt if certain regulatory obligations, which have been established for traditional telecommuni-
cations services, would also be binding for OTT services. For example, if messaging services would be obliged to forward messages to
other messaging networks (e.g., a WhatsApp message is forwarded to Apple's iMessage network), the increased positive direct network
effects might lead to users being better off just like in ﬁxed or mobile telecommunications networks. However, it can also be argued that
this impedes innovation as service providers might be unable to differentiate themselves, e.g., if messages cannot be encrypted, because
the receiving network uses another encryption method or no encryption at all. In the following, we will elaborate on these issues with
respect to the ﬁeld of traditional telecommunications services vis-a-vis communications OTTs; however the discussion concerning the
necessity of regulatory harmonization is under no circumstances limited to this area. Instead, existing regulations for brokerage of
transportation services (taxi licences vs. Uber), for banking services (vis-a-vis payment services such as Paypal) and for many areas of
media regulation (e.g., must carry regulations, protection of pluralism, book price ﬁxing) have to be scrutinized in the age of digitization
(c.f., e.g., Monopolkommission, 2015a; Haucap, 2015).
Considering the competitive effects of OTTs and traditional telecommunications services, the necessity to harmonize the regulatory
framework is motivated by the fear of competitive distortions as OTTs, providing substitutive services to the existing regulated tele-
communications services (e.g., messaging, voice telephony, c. f., Section 1), are subject to much less restrictive regulatory obligations
(Kr€amer &Wohlfarth, 2015; Monopolkommission, 2015a). Such substitutive effects are present in ﬁxed and mobile networks alike. For
example, it is observable that traditional telcos lose traditional revenue streams from SMS and MMS particularly due the success of
WhatsApp, Apple iMessage or the Facebook messenger. Similar, substitutive effects arise for voice telephony, e.g., via services such as
Skype, WhatsApp or Viber.
Although these de facto substitutive effects are present (irrespective of the problems outlined above with respect to the deﬁnition of
the relevant market) and the principle of technological neutrality (c.f., e.g., K€orber, 2015) grounded in the EU Directive 2002/21/EC
exists,3 communications services offered by OTTs are generally not affected by sector speciﬁc regulatory obligations (BEREC, 2016;
Monopolkommission, 2015b). Existing regulatory requirements for communications services can roughly be differentiated in three
categories: (i) requirements protecting competition (inter alia, access regulation, interconnection and interoperability agreements), (ii)
requirements protecting consumers (inter alia, integrity of networks, minimum quality standards, forwarding of emergency calls, data
retention, existence of an end user contract with speciﬁed requirements on the data protection, transparency obligations, central number
assignment and a central, consistent number directory), and (iii) measures safeguarding regulatory monitoring (inter alia, the duty to
collaborate with respect to data provision). Different regulatory obligations are used because OTTs are not classiﬁed as Electronic
Communications Service (ECS) in the EU or Common Carrier in the US, respectively. Instead, OTTs are legally deﬁned as an Information
Society Service (ISS), or Information Service. Sector speciﬁc regulation is not applied to the latter (BEREC, 2016). However, due to the
technological convergence of networks and services, there exists uncertainty with respect to the “correct” classiﬁcation of OTT com-
munications services under the existing regulatory framework—in the EU and the US. For example, in the US, internet access providers
who have been classiﬁed as Information Service in 2004 have been re-classiﬁed as Common Carrier in order to allow the jurisdiction
under applicability of the sector speciﬁc regulation (Frieden, 2014). In the EU, the deﬁnition of an ECS is currently based on three
characteristics (c.f., Article 2(c) of Directive 2002/21/EC): First, the service is usually provided for remuneration. Second, the service
consists wholly or mainly in the conveyance of signals, and third, services that provide or exercise editorial control over content
transmitted are excluded. Here, the ﬁrst point is understood broad in current jurisdiction and also comprises services free of charge, if
they are ultimately proﬁt-oriented (BEREC, 2016). Vital for the unequal treatment of traditional telco services and OTT communications
services is the second point, because it differentiates ECS from ISS according to Article 1 of Directive 98/34/EC. However, it has to be
noted that this aspect is considered by the proposal for establishing the European Electronic Communications Code (c.f., COM (2016)
590 ﬁnal), which will be discussed below.
A request of information by BEREC at the national regulatory authorities revealed ambiguous interpretations with respect to the
meaning of “transmission of signals” in the EU member states. However, BEREC (2016) suggests the following taxonomy and classi-
ﬁcation of OTT services based on the current regulatory framework4
3 The principle of technological neutrality refers to the “desirability of making regulation technologically neutral, […] it neither imposes nor discriminates in favor of
the use of a particular type of technology” (Directive 2002/21/EC recital 18). In this context, this might imply that communications services offered by OTTs and
traditional telcos might be treated equally because they both offer substitutive products; either by lifting regulatory obligations (for traditional telcos) or adding new
obligations (for OTTs).
4 It has to be noted that the following classiﬁcation of OTTs differs substantially from the ones introduced by Kr€amer and Wohlfarth (2015) and Peitz and Valletti
(2015). In the deﬁnition provided by BEREC, OTT-0 services also comprise communication services offered by traditional telcos.
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 OTT-0: Communications services that can be classiﬁed as ECS. According to BEREC, this especially comprises services that have
a connection to the public telephone network (e.g., Skype-Out).
 OTT-1: Communications services that cannot be classiﬁed as ECS but compete with an ECS (e.g., Skype (without Skype-Out) or
instant messaging).
 OTT-2: All other OTT services, i.e., those who do not offer communications services, e.g., ecommerce or streaming services.
In this taxonomy, the question whether the differentiation between OTT-0 and OTT-1 is meaningful arises. Additionally, it is
questionable whether regulatory obligations for ECS should be relaxed, or whether the regulatory framework should be adjusted in
order to allow the classiﬁcation of OTT-1 services as ECS to ensure equal competition, i.e., a level playing ﬁeld. On the one hand, several
regulatory obligations (e.g., the guaranteed availability of emergency calls) seem to be dispensable in the age of digitization and
ubiquitous connectivity. Therefore, they should be reviewed with regard to their commensurability (Brown, 2014). On the other hand,
some regulatory obligations (e.g., interconnection and transparency obligations) might also be seen as useful remedies for OTT com-
munications services (which are currently not classiﬁed as ECS), because they provide a substitutive service and users could beneﬁt from
these obligations just like they should with regard to traditional telecommunications services (e.g., ﬁxed or mobile network access).
Particularly, taking into account the aforementioned difﬁculties in deﬁning the relevant market, and considering the length of
ongoing competition cases in this context (e.g., seven years for the Google shopping (search) case5), the effectiveness of ex-post
competition law in such highly dynamic markets can be questioned (Monopolkommission, 2015a). Therefore, ex-ante regulations for
dominant OTT services may be seen as more favorable in some cases. In this context, the German monopoly commission (c.f.,
Monopolkommission, 2015b) initiated a discussion concerning data portability (comparable to the number portability of traditional
telcos), interconnection obligations (in the sense of interoperability), and with respect to emergency calls.
However, it has to be traded off whether such obligations are justiﬁed after all. For example, with regard to interconnection obli-
gations, it has to be noted that the possibility to multi home several service providers allows users to switch between providers quite
easily and typically does not induce high (additional) costs. Notwithstanding, even if a harmonized regulatory framework would exist,
there will nevertheless be technical peculiarities that differentiate an OTT service from an integrated service of the network provider.
Particularly, OTTs are unable to inﬂuence the transmission of data packages (e.g., prioritization), which, in turn, might lead to com-
petitive distortions, even in the presence of the current net neutrality regulations (c.f., net neutrality debate as outlined by, e.g., Kr€amer
et al., 2013).
Hence, more nuanced approaches have been suggested. For example, it has been discussed to assign obligations with regard to data
protection and data retention on OTT communications services only and to implement further regulatory obligations later on demand
(Brown, 2014). Of course, in the EU the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR; becoming effective in May 2018) will also apply to
OTT services. Therefore, a harmonization may also be achieved by lifting additional regulations concerning data protection and secrecy
of telecommunications for telco services (Allouet et al., 2014; Brown, 2014; and Section 4). Speciﬁcally, Monopolkommission (2015b)
and Larouche, Purtova, and Peitz (2016) suggest to include the sector-speciﬁc regulations of the ePrivacy Directive into the GDPR (c.f.,
Regulation (EU) 2016/679) to omit sector-speciﬁc data protection rules as far as possible.
Alternatively, it has been suggested to drop the deﬁning characteristic of the “conveyance of signals” in order to classify a service as
ECS (Allouet et al., 2014; Brown, 2014; Monopolkommission, 2015b). In this context, the proposed European Electronic Communi-
cations Code (c.f., COM (2016) 590 ﬁnal) makes the suggestion for a new legal distinction. Speciﬁcally, it distinguishes between
“interpersonal communications services” that are “number-based” (i.e., connecting to the public switched telephone network) and
“number-independent interpersonal communications services” (i.e., not connecting to the public switched telephone network, c. f.,
Article 2, number 5 and 6, respectively of the Code). Consequently, referring to the classiﬁcation of BEREC (2016) outlined above, OTT-
0 as well as OTT-1 services would be treated as ECS. It is questionable whether this distinction is very useful, because, in essence, it does
not solve the aforementioned problems. Instead, a distinction that is based on substitutability, or at least functional similarity would be
preferable.
Additionally, BEREC (2016) proposes to issue transparency as well as reporting obligations on OTT communications services to
enable regulatory authorities to collect relevant data in the ﬁrst place (e.g., data required to decide whether a regulation might be
necessary). This could also alleviate the data collection problems related to deﬁning the relevant market (see Section 2.1). BEREC (2016)
adds that national regulatory authorities should be granted with additional authorities under the existing net neutrality regulation (in
the course of the “Connected Continent” regulation package) as well as under the changes of the framework directive by Directive 2009/
140/EC (e.g., with respect to the surveillance of trafﬁc ﬂows and with respect to access and interconnection questions) for OTTs which
are not classiﬁed as ECS. Furthermore, BEREC (2016) emphasizes that certain directives (e.g., the ecommerce Directive 2000/31/EC as
well as the ePrivacy Directive 2002/58/EC) are already applicable to ISS under certain conditions.6
Above, we have outlined that the consideration of different regulatory obligations is not limited to substitutive OTT communications
services only. However, complementary OTT services do not directly exert a negative impact on telcos' existing business models, because
the value of the network access increases with the availability of complementary services (Peitz & Valletti, 2015). Moreover, evolving
regulatory problems, e.g., with regard to the allocation of revenues from complementary services between OTTs and telcos, are pri-
marily addressed by the net neutrality debate. In this context, it is nevertheless worth investigating whether (most commonly) two-sided
OTTs that are perceived as dominant, generally qualify for regulatory obligations. For example, an obligation to grant access to OTT
5 See: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code¼1_39740.
6 In fact, the proposal for a (new) ePrivacy Regulation published in January 2017 also considers new (OTT) players as outlined by European Commission (2017c).
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platformswould be conceivable if some kind of “essential facility” is alleged. In essence, the Essential Facility Doctrine (EFD) is a concept
that speciﬁes the circumstances under which a monopolist controlling a bottleneck (the essential facility) needs to grant access to
competitors (c.f., Renda, 2010; OECD, 2000; Graef, Wahyuningtyas,& Valcke, 2015). Although the conditions vary between the US and
the EU (c.f., OECD, 2000; for an extensive overview), the common denominator can be seen in the necessity that the bottleneck (i.e., the
input) cannot be replicated or purchased by third parties. However, granting access is a severe regulatory intervention and the scientiﬁc
discussion is yet at an early stage (c.f., Section 4.5). Furthermore, next to the already discussed problems in deﬁning the relevant market,
the adaption of known regulatory obligations or concepts like the EFD has to be considered in light of the underlying market model and
the resulting economic effects (Kr€amer & Wohlfarth, 2015). Especially the activities of prominent OTTs operating in a two- or multi-
sided market environment (e.g., Facebook, Google Search, AppStores) require special attention because welfare effects strongly
depend on the respective market conditions. Here, central points comprise the questions (i) whether these markets can be seen as
contestable (Argenton & Prüfer, 2012; Kr€amer &Wohlfarth, 2015), which would induce that a regulation would be inappropriate, and
(ii) whether—under the assumption of an “essential facility”—access obligations would actually increase total welfare, which is
questionable from an economic point of view in the context of two-sidedmarkets (Kr€amer&Wohlfarth, 2015; Verdier, 2013). Moreover,
providing evidence for an essential facility is (next to the problems in assessing market power) de facto very difﬁcult in the context of
digital goods. For example (and as we will highlight in the following section), evidence for the essentiality of a speciﬁc data set seems
hard to provide because the actual value might be seen in the combination of different data sets from different sources and algorithms
trained upon the available data. Therefore, the (justiﬁed) high legal barriers for access obligations (for instance, according to the US
Essential Facility Doctrine or the EU Article 102 TFEU) seem insurmountable (Graef et al., 2015).
Insight 4 In general, the provision of OTT services increases the attractiveness of network access from which traditional telcos can beneﬁt.
Although some OTT communications services are in (direct) competition with the communications services of traditional telcos, in many cases, the
regulatory obligations for both differ—especially with respect to access, interconnection, interoperability, transparency, and data protection
obligations. In this context, a harmonization of the regulatory framework that establishes a level playing ﬁeld by either lifting regulatory obligations
for traditional telcos or imposing new rules for (communications) OTTs should be examined; especially with regard to provisions concerning data
protection and data retention, but also with respect to transparency and reporting obligations.
4. The role of data
Many of the OTTs currently perceived as dominant posses extensive user data. This enables to target advertisements or recom-
mendations to the users' interests but also to personalize or improve services that are attractive to users. Consequently, (personal) data
might be seen as the key asset of many OTTs and a potential source of market power. Hence, especially if regulatory interventions are
discussed, the vital role and peculiarities of data need to be considered. This also requires to address the protection of (personal) data. In
the following, we highlight and discuss these issues from a user's, ﬁrm's and regulatory perspective.
4.1. Users’ attitude and effects of revealing (personal) data
The increasing importance of digitization and the accompanying generation, collection and integration of different heterogeneous
data sources induced a new quality of data analysis and information acquisition, which can be summarized under the buzzword “Big
Data” (Chen & Zhang, 2014). Providers of digital services use a variety of techniques to collect data from their users. This is not limited
to technical means (e.g., cookies), but also comprises services designed in a way that users voluntarily reveal a multitude of personal
data (e.g., in social networks). Consequently, users are confronted with the trade-off between a (short-termed) gain in utility by the use
of the service and a (long-termed) necessity to protect their privacy.
Especially business models in the ﬁeld of the sharing economy “force”market participants to expose parts of their privacy and share
these information with the public, e.g., details concerning the location and the furnishing of their apartments, as well as contact details.
This, in turn, can facilitate discrimination. For example, empirical studies show that the ethnicity of an apartment owner has an in-
ﬂuence on the required monthly rent (Bertrand &Mullainathan, 2004). Additionally, it is more difﬁcult for an individual to protect her
privacy the more others expose their personal data (Acquisti, Brandimarte, & Loewenstein, 2015). This can imply negative economic
consequences for these individuals, for example, as insurance rates increase (or do not equally decrease) only because certain infor-
mation (i.e., personal data) is not exposed to the insurance company in order to protect one's privacy (in contrast to the potential
majority of other insured persons). These externalities have to be taken into account but are not yet considered by data protection rules.
The developments just stated led to a debate concerning the amendment of the regulatory framework to handle data, in particular,
regarding data protection. In principal, the protection of personal data (or privacy protection, respectively), has two dimensions
(Acquisti et al., 2015): On the one hand, data protection has the connotation of protecting data against unauthorized access. On the other
hand, data protection refers to an individual's granted rights over the usage of her personal data. Especially with regard to the latter
dimension, the effectiveness of data protection in digital business models is questionable. Although service providers in the EU generally
have the obligation to ask for permission to collect and process personal data, in many cases, especially if a service is provided for free,
users grant this permission carelessly. Moreover, it is non-transparent for users how and where their personal data is stored and
processed.
Handling personal data responsibly cannot be addressed by regulatory instruments alone. A central point in deﬁning an appropriate
regulatory framework can thus be seen in the right balance between the public duty of care and a right to informational self-
determination. From a scientiﬁc perspective, the so called “privacy paradox” (Acquisti, 2004; Acquisti et al., 2015; Norberg, Horne,
& Horne, 2007) has to be considered in this context. The privacy paradox states that the expressed attitude towards data protection
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signiﬁcantly deviates from the observable actions of information exposure. Although one may be inclined to argue that especially
uninformed individuals are prone to becoming victims of the privacy paradox (Kshetri, 2014), this phenomenon can indeed also be
observed for informed individuals (Acquisti, 2004).
From a scientiﬁc perspective, it is still an open question to which extent the degree of data protection is a relevant strategic variable
for ﬁrms in the digital economy. On the one hand, empirical studies showed that customers did not change their buying behavior after
they were informed that their data was transferred to third parties (Belanger& Crossler, 2011). On the other hand, empirical studies also
showed that customers were more likely to be willing to pay higher prices for (more) privacy preserving services (Tsai, Egelman, Cranor,
& Acquisti, 2011). In Germany, for example, 86% of the participants in an online survey stated that they have dealt with the privacy
settings of their social network and 77% stated to have changed them afterwards (Huth, Arns, & Budde, 2011). Nevertheless, there
generally seem to be great differences between nationalities and age groups in how individuals reveal personal data (Acquisti et al.,
2015). However, there are indications that the awareness and importance of data protection in the digital economy has increased over
time, which subsequently induced actions for (more) privacy protection (Acquisti et al., 2015; Goldfarb & Tucker, 2012; Stutzman,
Gross, & Acquisti, 2012).
Insight 5 The individually expressed attitude towards data protection oftentimes signiﬁcantly deviates from the observable actions of in-
formation exposure (“privacy paradox”). Consequently, a responsible handling of data cannot be addressed by regulatory interventions alone. A
central point in the deﬁnition of an appropriate regulatory framework can thus be seen in determining the right balance between public duty of care
and informational self-determination.
4.2. Data as an economic good
Many of today's digital business models, especially those primarily ﬁnanced through advertisements, rely on the collection and
analysis of comprehensive data of the visitors of their websites in order to be able to place targeted advertisements (c.f., Monop-
olkommission, 2015a). Even ecommerce business models, which per se do not require data collection on a personal level, signiﬁcantly
rely on the collection of data about users and their website usage, e.g., to provide individual prices (price discrimination) or personalized
offers. This data is not only used to increase sales, but also for cost side efﬁciency gains, e.g., for inventory optimization. In almost all
cases website operators place so called cookies (i.e., small text ﬁles) on the visiting user's computer. In this vein, an explicit recognition
of a user is possible when she visits the website again—potentially, even across different websites (so called “tracking”). This technique
can be valuable for a user, e.g., because an ecommerce shopmay be able to restore the shopping basket if the user unintentionally left the
website. However, it is particularly useful for service providers as it facilitates to create a comprehensive user proﬁle without the ne-
cessity of an explicit user registration. Although users can refuse to accept cookies or delete placed cookies manually or automatically,
the usage of the website may thereupon be uncomfortable or not possible at all. In the consultation on the EU ePrivacy Directive, several
stakeholders have therefore called for a stricter regulatory approach which discourages and limits services' use of cookies and so-called
tracking walls (c.f., European Commission, 2017b). However, ﬁrms already deploy services that circumvent these obligations. For
example, Facebook is able to observe the usage behavior of their users on other (non-Facebook) websites if they click on “Like” buttons,
or use their Facebook credentials for registration (“Login with Facebook”). These techniques, however, are not targeted by this regu-
lation as they explicitly require the user's consent. Additionally, ﬁrms may also integrate data from a variety of different sources (i.e.,
services) across all areas of life (e.g., Facebooks acquisition of WhatsApp).
The economic value of data—especially the value of user proﬁles—is not easy to determine. As an example, consider the acquisition
of WhatsApp by Facebook in 2014. As Facebook also offers a messaging functionality in its social network, one of the reasons might be
seen in the reduction of future competition. However, Facebook payed approximately USD 19 bn for the messaging service which at that
time had roughly 600mn users and an annual revenue of only USD 10.2mn. Thus, Facebook payed USD 31.7 per user (for the data), who
hitherto payed a yearly fee of USD 1 for the service at most. This asymmetric valuation not only illustrates that the perceived value of
data might differ signiﬁcantly between users and service providers, but also that data itself can be seen as a relevant economic asset.
Insight 6 Comprehensive personal data is a valuable economic asset in the digital economy because it enables personalized offers and targeted
advertisements. Service providers use different techniques to obtain (personal) data, e.g., designing the service accordingly, placing cookies or
tracking pixels, offering their service at third-party websites, or by acquiring other service providers. If data-driven service providers or the
competitive effects of an acquisition are analyzed, these techniques and the resulting availability of user proﬁles have to be taken into
consideration.
4.3. Data ownership
It has been argued that even free services are “too expensive” and that users should be able to ﬁnancially participate from the
exploitation of their data (Lanier, 2014; Laudon, 1996). However, this monetary compensation would require that users are aware of the
actual value of the generated data and of the consequences associated with data use. Certainly, this transparency is currently not
warranted. Legal scholars discuss these aspects referring to the term “data ownership” (c.f., Hornung & Goeble, 2015; for a discussion
with regard to connected cars). This discussion leads to the question to what extent (personal) data, generated by the mere usage of
a service or product, can be sold at all under the current legal framework. On the one hand, service providers made monetary in-
vestments to acquire and collect data and should therefore somehow be authorized to use this data (especially in comparison to other
service providers). On the other hand, users should have the control over their personal data, which qualiﬁes them to look at or force
deletion of personal data stored by service providers. This claim is derived from the right to informational self-determination (see
above), which is, for example in Germany, constitutionally grounded (c.f., German basic law Article 2(1) in conjunction with Article
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1(1)), and consequently, not alienable.7 In this spirit the “right to be forgotten” is also embedded in the new GDPR. Consequently, the
unalienable privacy rights with regard to personal data interfere with the monetarization of these.
Thus, the discussion on data ownership has to focus on other, non-personal data arising from digital transactions. However, the
distinction between personal and non-personal data is oftentimes difﬁcult, because de-anonymization through aggregation and sta-
tistical combination of different non-personal data is feasible (Ohm, 2010; Wang, Leon, Chen,& Komanduri, 2013). This gives rise to de
facto personal data, which, however, is not subject to the same data protection rules as data that is classiﬁed as personal data ex-ante
(Roßnagel & Scholz, 2000). Moreover, it is not yet predictable which data will (potentially) become relevant in the future. This insight
has already been formulated by the German Federal Constitution Court in 1983 in the course of the national census decision, in which it
stated that there is no irrelevant data in the age of automated data processing (c.f, court decision 65, 1 as of December 15, 1983).
Non-personal data can comprise, e.g., technical parameters arising at the user and the service provider from the transmission of data.
Obviously, such data is less relevant for the setup of an individual user proﬁle and therefore of subordinate interest for both parties
involved. However, the importance of this type of data can gain momentum in the context of the Internet of Things (IoT), where it arises
from machine-to-machine communication. However, according to the current legal opinion in the EU, nobody owns non-personal data
(Hornung& Goeble, 2015). In principle, such data can thus be marketed by all parties involved in the data generation, data transmission
and data storage. This said, there might be a necessity to deﬁne a “data processing law” exceeding the scope of existing data protection
laws.
In principle, the commercialization of exploitation rights of personal data can be based on the regulatory framework for intangible
goods mutatis mutandis (Hornung & Goeble, 2015). However, several problems due to the mere nature of data arise. On the one hand,
personal data often stems from social interaction (e.g., communication). Thus, it seems questionable whether data can exclusively be
associated to a single individual (Hornung&Müller-Terpitz, 2015). On the other hand, a negotiation with the service provider on equal
footing seems to be unlikely anyhow (Hornung & Goeble, 2015). Consequently, even if a legal obligation for service providers to
purchase data would be introduced, the resulting price would likely be zero. However, there are initial concepts of third-party providers
that act as data intermediaries trying to establish a marketplace for personal data by aggregating and processing data coming from
diverse data sources in order to make it attractive for potential data purchasers.8 It remains to be seen if these business models will be
successful.
In this context, it has been proposed that digital service providers should be compelled to offer a fee based (advertisement free)
service that does not aim at collecting personal data, in addition to a free (ad ﬁnanced) service (c.f., e.g., Monopolkommission, 2015a).
Although this implies that data inherently has a certain value because the user is per se able to pay for the service with “money” instead
of “data”, this approach is accompanied by several practical problems, which make this suggestion questionable. First, the fee based
service does not eliminate the collection of personal data per se, which could still be used for targeting at a later point in time. Second, if
it would be proﬁtable to offer both service variants, then providers would already do so (e.g., offering a freemium service). Therefore, it
is very likely that service providers seek to avoid the obligation by charging prohibitive prices for the fee based service, which would in
turn require an ex-post price regulation. Given the variety of different digital services and the problems of assessing market power, this is
clearly infeasible.
Insight 7 The right to informational self-determination is often constitutionally grounded, and embedded in the GDPR by the “right to be
forgotten”. It therefore cannot be alienated. Consequently, in the EU, the sale of personal data for the purpose of economic proﬁt generation is in
general not possible. Moreover, because of a lack of bargaining power, it is questionable whether individual users are able to negotiate a positive
price for their personal data at all. However, data marketplaces, which aim at pooling bargaining power are emerging. Non-personal data that
arises from the usage of digital services is not exclusively assigned to any of the parties involved, and can thus, in principle, be marketed by anyone.
Hence, there might be a necessity to deﬁne a “data processing law” that augments the existing data protection laws.
4.4. Data and market power
From a regulatory perspective it has to be scrutinized to which extent data represents a basis for market power and if so, whether and
how the access to data should be regulated. On the one hand, as outlined above, the collection and analysis of data—especially personal
data—may lead to a competitive advantage.However, this only applies if data is used to offer individualized or extended services (Acquisti
& Varian, 2005). However, providing a service that satisﬁes the users’ demand better does (of course) not constitute market power and is
particularly no indication for the abuse of it. However, it is argued that superior datamay not only temporarily lead to a dominantmarket
position, but—due to the increased user interaction that results from the better service—enables the dominantﬁrm to improve the quality
of its data basis faster than potential competitors and may thereby lead to a permanent advantage (Argenton & Prüfer, 2012). In other
words, this could result in entry barriers, which again challenge the assumption that digitalmarkets are contestable, and thus,may indeed
constitute market power (Argenton & Prüfer, 2012; Kr€amer &Wohlfarth, 2015; Schepp &Wambach, 2016).
On the other hand, several counterarguments can be formulated: First, the described centralization of users' activities at one provider
is not necessarily problematic and might—in light of network effects and the ability to better satisfy users' demand due to superior
data—even be evaluated positively from an economic point of view; although this might be accompanied by the manifestation of market
power. However, an abuse of market power, of course, would still have to be tackled effectively. Second, although contestability in
a relevant market might be challenged with respect to de novo market entry, this may not be true for other established ﬁrms in related
7 We address the concrete scope of the right to informational self-determination in Section 4.6.
8 For example, http://www.datacoup.com or http://www.commodify.us and related, http://meeco.me/.
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markets, which have a dominant market position with respect to data collection themselves. For example, if Google tries to exploit its
market power in the search market, Facebook, arguably having a comparable data quality, might be attracted to enter that market
(additionally, c. f., Section 2.2). However, the concern that only a handful of companies are able to collect comprehensive data remains
(Acquisti et al., 2015). Third, the collected user data becomes outdated quite fast, e.g., because personal living conditions are changing.
Keeping the data up-to-date might induce additional effort, i.e., costs. In essence, this means that also ﬁrms currently perceived as
dominant need to innovate at steady pace, and have to build up users' trust in the long-run in order to retain their users' activity and to
acquire new users (especially if personal data is processed). Maintaining users' trust and the need for steady innovation may restrict the
possibilities to exploit potential market power. In this context, opt-in rules for the collection of data as commonly propagated by
consumer rights groups might even strengthen already dominant ﬁrms, because newcomers (e.g., start-ups) oftentimes do not enjoy
users’ trust to the same extent as established ﬁrms (Campbell, Goldfarb, & Tucker, 2015). Fourth, more data is not necessarily better
data. The analysis of larger datasets is not only more complex from a technical perspective, but also more error-prone which is known as
the curse of dimensionality in statistics. For example, speciﬁc problems arise from an increased variance of the estimators due to
overﬁtting, multi-collinearity of the inﬂuencing variables hampering the interpretability of statistical models, as well as spurious cor-
relations, which result from low observation density in high dimensional spaces (Hastie, Tibshirani, Friedman,& Franklin, 2005). Thus,
the statistical challenge of big data is to identify the relevant inﬂuencing variables and observations. Therefore, Google, for example,
uses only a fraction of its available data to optimize its search algorithm (Haucap, 2015).
Insight 8 The effect of superior data, which, e.g., enables to offer targeted products or personalized services, may lead to a non-transient
competitive advantage. This is likely the case if superior data leads to increased user interaction, such that the service provider is able to improve
its data quality faster than its potential competitors. In principle, this may increase entry barriers and questions the contestability of the market.
However, users may beneﬁt from a single service provider, e.g., if network effects are important. Additionally, the possibility of supply-side sub-
stitution and the need to innovate at steady pace to retain a competitive advantagemay reduce the possibilities to exploit a dominantmarket position.
4.5. Access to data
The access to data can be the basis for competitive distortions, especially if a dominant ﬁrm restricts the access to data, which is seen
as a necessity for effective competition (Monopolkommission, 2015a). In this context, access has (also) to be understood in a technical
sense, because data is most frequently retrieved via technical interfaces (i.e., Application Programming Interfaces, APIs). Furthermore, it
is useful to differentiate between access requests of other ﬁrms, and (end) user requests, i.e., users trying to obtain access to their data in
order to transfer it to another service. In the following discussion, we focus on access requests by other ﬁrms.
In the EU as well as in the US, several legal cases of data access requests have already been documented although not all have resulted
in legal decisions, because often out-of-court settlements were reached (Graef et al., 2015). Moreover, the legal opinion differs sig-
niﬁcantly between the US and the EU. Generally, it seems to be more likely that data access requests will be granted in the EU. However,
access requests from other ﬁrms also require evidence that there is no economically viable alternative to the data requested (Graef et al.,
2015). This evidence will be hard to provide for individual data sets, especially as not the isolated data set itself, but the linkage of many
coherent data sets and their analysis is important. Therefore, each single data set seems to be dispensable.
Moreover, the quality and the level of data access plays a crucial role. Considering data quality, there can be substantial differences,
e.g., (i) if data is provided immediately or with time delay only, (ii) how much data can be retrieved per request, and (iii) which in-
terfaces and data formats are provided by the service provider (Graef et al., 2015). Furthermore, data access is feasible at several degrees
of granularity, ranging from raw data (e.g., direct, unstructured user input) to attributed user proﬁles.
As an example, consider the case of a search engine. It can be argued that the value of a search engine resides in the development of
the algorithm, which provides useful recommendations based on unstructured user input. Of course, the search engine delivering the
best results will also be the one consulted most often, which leads to superior data, which can again be used to optimize the search
engine's algorithm (see Section 4.4). Therefore, it has been suggested to grant competitors access to the raw data of search engines, i.e.,
the user's input, so that competitors can develop search algorithms under similar preconditions (Argenton& Prüfer, 2012). These aspects
are discussed under the keywords “Open Data” and (related) “Open Innovation”. On the other hand, this argumentation is not applicable
to all digital services because in other digital industries the innovation can already be seen in the way in which user data is generated
(e.g., Twitter). For these services, granting direct access to user input, or obligating them to immediately share the entered data, would
destroy innovation incentives. Furthermore, the de-anonymization of data is facilitated by sharing raw data, which negatively affects
users' privacy, as no effective data protection is present in this case (additionally, c. f., Section 4.3 and Section 4.6).
Insight 9 Accessing the data of other ﬁrms is justiﬁably subject to high legal barriers (e.g., c. f., Essential Facility Doctrine). It has to be further
examined under which preconditions and in which granularity and quality the access to raw data (“open data”) is a useful regulatory device to
promote innovation and to counteract the possible concentration of market power without jeopardizing data protection.
4.6. Data protection
In the EU, the scope of data collection and analysis is limited by the regulations concerning data protection, yet mainly determined by
the EU Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC. However, it is applied differently in the individual member states. Moreover, special
regulations may be applied for speciﬁc areas if needed. At the EU level, especially the ePrivacy Directive (2002/58/EC) for commu-
nications services has to be mentioned which has been complemented by the Cookie Directive (2009/136/EC) in 2009 and has recently
been revised (c.f., COM (2017)10 ﬁnal). Additionally, the EU Directive concerning telecommunications data retention is worth men-
tioning, although it has been declared void by the EU Court of Justice in 2014. However, onmember states’ level, regulations concerning
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telecommunications data retention still exist (e.g., in the United Kingdom or Germany).
The EU's data protection law is mainly characterized by the principle of prohibition, i.e., it generally prohibits companies (and the
state) to process personal data except where certain exceptional cases exist or explicit consent has been provided by the individual
concerned (Hornung, 2013). In the US, no comparable data protection rules exist. Most notably, the principle of prohibition does not
exist. However, certain sectors are subject to speciﬁc regulations (e.g., determining the creditworthiness or in the healthcare sector).9
Furthermore, case law, regulations concerning the tapping of telephone lines (c.f., Electronic Communications Privacy Act, which,
however, only applies to ECS and not to ISS, c. f., Section 3), and voluntary directives of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC, Fair
Information Practice) exist. Summarizing, data protection rules in the US are currently far less strict compared to the EU regulations.
This, among others, recently led to the termination of the Safe Harbor treaty between the US and the EU.
Deduced from the national peculiarities just outlined, representatives of the internet economy argue that the EU's (and especially the
German) data protection rules hamper innovation (FAZ, 2015), because companies in the EU are unable to collect and utilize data the
same way US-based companies are able to (c.f., Section 4.2). Additionally, high compliance costs arise due to the mere necessity to fulﬁll
the data protection guidelines (Koske et al., 2014).
However, current data protection guidelines are criticized to be outdated both in the US and in the EU. For example, in the US
a debate whether self-commitments according to the rules of the FTC (which are equivalent to the EU data protection rules in a broader
sense) should at least partially have a binding character evolved (Nissenbaum, 2011; Reidenberg, 1999; Schwartz, 1999). Furthermore,
in the EU, there are major differences with respect to the implementation of data protection guidelines in the member states. Con-
sequently, companies might have an incentive to (re-)locate their headquarters to a better suited member state with regard to data
protection (Hornung, 2012).
However, in May 2018, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR, Regulation 2016/679) becomes effective in the EU.
Although the GDPR will generally apply a less stringent standard as, e.g., the current German national legislation—especially with
respect to the data protection regulations in the telemedia act (TMG xx12ff) as well as lacking basic principles for anonymization and
pseudonymization according to the Federal Data Protection Act x3a (“Bundesdatenschutzgesetz”, BDSG)—the GDPR is formulated as an
EU “regulation”. Thus, it is binding in all EU member states equally without further degrees of freedom and so, harmonizes data
protection rules EU-wide. Consequently, the GDPR effectively counteracts the forum shopping of service providers that has become
common. Moreover, the regulation is supposed to be binding for all services available to users in the EU; irrespective of the location of
the provider's headquarter.
According to Hornung (2013), the new core elements of the GDPR are inter alia the “right to be forgotten” (Regulation 2016/679,
Article 17) as well as the “right to data portability” (Regulation 2016/679, Article 20). Although both articles in principle strengthen
consumers’ interests, they may be afﬂicted with legal as well as practical problems, which could make these articles ineffective in
practice. For example, the right to be forgotten is conditional on an appropriateness clause. Additionally, the individual may not
necessarily know where her data is stored and who needs to be contacted in order to exercise her rights. Besides, the right may be in
conﬂict with the liberty of press andmedia (“right to remember”), which can be of sui generis design throughout different member states
(Hornung, 2013). With regard to the right to data portability, feasibility issues arise not only with respect to linked data sets (e.g., if the
complete (user) proﬁle should be ported from a social network, c. f., Gans, 2017), which are not ported, but also with respect to the
compatibility of different data formats. Providers which heavily invested into the lock-in of their users will arguably be quite innovative
in designing information systems hampering the possibility to port data; especially as the current regulation only considers data
portability, but not interoperability between different services (Hornung, 2012). However, the regulation can be effective and favor
competition in the case of less complex data (c.f., Monopolkommission, 2015a; Wohlfarth, 2017).
Furthermore, the GDPR includes instruments to protect data by technical means (e.g., “data protection by design and by default”, c.
f., Regulation 2016/679, Article 25). This comprises data protection friendly default settings (“privacy by default”), criteria for data
breach notiﬁcations, criteria for data protection impact assessments (c.f., Regulation 2016/679 Section 3), as well as suggestions to
create incentives to protect (personal) data by means of certiﬁcation and seals (Hornung, 2011, 2013; Hornung & Hartl, 2014).
However, the speciﬁc legal implementation of the GDPR and especially the speciﬁc aspects mentioned above are currently relatively
vague. Additionally, it remains unclear whether these (market) incentives will be effective as long as data protection is not perceived as
strategic variable by ﬁrms (Hornung, 2012).
Insight 10 The EU data protection is mainly characterized by the principle of prohibition, which generally prohibits companies (and the state)
to process personal data except certain exceptional cases exist or explicit consent has been provided by the individual concerned. In the US, no
comparable data protection regulation exists. Most notably, the principle of prohibition does not exist. However, certain sectors are subject to
speciﬁc regulations (e.g., determining the creditworthiness or in the healthcare sector). New core elements of the GDPR are inter alia the “right to
be forgotten”, the “right to data portability”, as well as measures to protect data by technical means, including criteria for data breach notiﬁ-
cations. The GDPR is binding for all (digital) services available to EU users, i.e., irrespective of the location of the provider's headquarter. However,
due to practical problems in the implementation and a lack of market incentives, it has to be seen to which extent these new rules and induced
incentives improve data protection in practice.
5. Conclusions
This article tackles three important areas deemed relevant in order to deﬁne a coherent regulatory framework and to account for the
9 Speciﬁcally, the Fair Credit Reporting Act and the Health Insurance Portability and Accounting Act.
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speciﬁc peculiarities of digital markets: challenges associated with assessing market power in digital markets (Section 2), challenges in
harmonizing different regulatory obligations for digital services (Section 3), and the role of data in the digital economy (Section 4).
Finally, we compile the most important aspects for each of these areas.
5.1. Assessing market power
A pivotal reason for regulatory interventions is the (potential) abuse of market power. In the current regulatory framework of the EU,
this requires that market power in the relevant market is ascertained, and subsequently, that an abusive action in the relevant market has
been observed (competition law) or is deemed very likely (sector-speciﬁc regulations). However, the formal proof that a ﬁrm has market
power is yet based on traditional instruments to deﬁne the relevant market that are questionable in the context of digital services from
a practical as well as economical point of view. Speciﬁcally, the highly dynamic nature of digital markets is per se in conﬂict with static
approaches to deﬁne the relevant market (e.g., by means of the SSNIP test). Suggestions to modify the SSNIP test, e.g., to account for
two-sided market environments, exist. However, these extensions require a high amount of data, which is often infeasible to obtain; and
even if the relevant market could be deﬁned properly, traditional proxies to evaluate market power, such as market shares, often do not
provide sufﬁcient evidence in digital markets. In fact, digital markets and services are oftentimes characterized by strong concentration
tendencies due to direct and indirect network effects. Consequently, instead of purely focusing on demand-side substitution, rather
supply-side substitution and potential competition (contestability) may be considered in evaluating a ﬁrm's dominance. In many cases, it
will be decisive whether a currently dominant ﬁrm is able to sustain a superior data basis in the medium- and long-term due to higher
user interaction. Arguably, this may manifest the dominant market position.
Consequently, not a service's price, which is frequently set to zero (for end users), but rather innovations (e.g., in algorithms or
business models) seem to be the relevant strategic parameter in digital markets. Thus, especially the foreclosure of innovative com-
petitors needs to be encountered effectively. In particular, this requires an acceleration of competition law proceedings. However, due to
the simultaneously increased complexity of deﬁning the relevant market and the retention of the current practice to determine market
power using the HMT, which exacerbates the assessment of market power, the exact opposite may occur.
Simultaneously, considerations to adjust the thresholds for merger control, as suggested by the Monopolkommission (2015a) seem
appropriate in order to protect substitutive competition: revenues (alone) are no sufﬁcient signal for a ﬁrm's economic importance in the
digital economy.
Finally, the common practice to determine market power by considering market shares in the relevant market can be questioned
more generally (additionally, c. f., Kaplow, 2015). Additionally, the increased complexity of these apparently objective and accepted
instruments questions the legal certainty that these instruments provide. Consequently, alternative approaches, relinquishing the
deﬁnition of the relevant market and solely assuming that the mere possibility to abuse market power already implies market power,
might be taken into consideration in the context of digital markets. For example, using a Direct Effects Approach could resolve problems
associated with the deﬁnition of the relevant market and accelerate proceedings. However, due to missing precedents in the legal
practice, the suitability of a Direct Effects Approach for digital markets has to be further analyzed.
5.2. Harmonization of regulatory obligations and level playing ﬁeld
Due to digitization and digital convergence, the boundaries of once clearly separated regulatory realms are increasingly blurring.
This becomes particularly obvious considering communications services. Traditional telcos, which are deﬁned by their technical
characteristic to convey electronic signals are nowadays in direct competition with OTT communications services, which oftentimes do
not establish a connection to the public telecommunications network and are subsequently not classiﬁed as communications but in-
formation services. The resulting regulatory obligations differ signiﬁcantly and are considered to impede fair and equal competition.
Therefore, BEREC (2016) suggested to revise the deﬁnition of communications services on an EU level. However, the revised deﬁnition
suggested in the European Electronic Communications Code (c.f., COM (2016) 590 ﬁnal), which proposes to distinguish interpersonal
communications services based on their use of traditional telephone numbers, seems odd in a world of all-IP Next Generation Networks.
This should also be taken as impetus to review the current regulatory framework for communications services with regard to the
proportionality of the deﬁned obligations in the age of digital, ubiquitous interconnectedness, and in light of new market participants,
services and applications. On the other hand, duties to collaborate and transparency requirements might also be imposed on information
services. This would not only be beneﬁciary in terms of consumer protection, but would also allow regulatory authorities to better assess
further regulatory needs. However, it should be taken into account that intermodal competition strengthens due to digital convergence.
Consequently, this might rather allow to lift superﬂuous regulatory requirements than to establish new ones. This not only affects the
area of telecommunications services, but also other regulated markets experiencing structural changes, e.g., transportation services in
the context of the sharing economy or digital media in the context of ebooks.
5.3. The role of data and data protection
Data is an important economic asset in digital markets, because it enables digital service providers to offer personalized services that
are attractive to users. Therefore, data can be the basis for market power. On the other hand, the continuous development of innovative
business models, which try to gather data rather than money, might be the nucleus for the Schumpeterian “creative destruction” in the
digital economy and the driving innovative force in this industry. However, a regulatory framework has to consider not only the
ﬁnancial dimension of data but also the aspects affecting the personal rights of individual users. Consequently, regulatory certainty with
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regard to the access to data as well as the possibilities of data collection and analysis are of paramount importance. To keep up
innovative performance, the protection of data-related innovation rents as well as the possibility to develop innovative, personalized
services needs to be ensured. Simultaneously, possible path dependencies and self-reinforcing effects, which increasingly encourage the
centralization of data and thereby manifest market power, need to be prevented.
It can be stated that the barriers to get access to competitors’ data are currently rather high; especially as it seems impossible to prove
(i) market power and (ii) the imperative nature of the requested data. Therefore, it seems likely that the ability to collect comprehensive
user proﬁles is conﬁned to only a few ﬁrms in the future; however, this does not necessarily mean only one ﬁrm. In some cases, it may be
feasible to grant access to raw data so that competition on the basis of algorithms evolves. However, this needs to be evaluated on a case-
by-case analysis and additionally increases the danger of de-anonymization.
With regard to the possibilities to collect and analyze data, uneven competition because of diverging data protection standards
between the EU and the US, but also between different EU member states, can be noted. Although data protection obligations might be
perceived to reduce competitiveness, (strong) data protection (rules) can also lead to competitive advantages in the future. Additionally,
the GDPR will harmonize data protection in the EU and will also be binding for non-EU services available to users in the EU. However,
due to the feasibility of automated, comprehensive data analysis (i.e., big data), as well as due to a lack of bargaining power of users, it
has to be noted that the GDPR still leaves room for regulatory scope.
Regulatory models that require the economic participation of users in the course of analyzing their data (data ownership), or ob-
ligations that compel service providers to (also) offer a fee-based, data-minimizing service seem not very meaningful from an economic
perspective, because the envisaged pricing can easily be circumvented (e.g., setting zero or prohibitive prices, respectively). However,
price regulation is apparently no more feasible and desirable. Additionally, there currently is no legal regulation for non-personal data
that arise from the usage of a digital services. Consequently, there might be the need to establish a “data processing law” beyond the
scope of data protection.
With regard to data protection, the question of an appropriate level of duty of care arises. Alternatively, one may call for more self-
regulation (e.g., setting appropriate incentives to protect personal data, e.g., data protection seals or certiﬁcates). This also affects the
role of technical data protection (e.g., privacy-preserving analytic methods), which has been envisaged as an element of the GDPR, but
has been deﬁned only insufﬁciently. Finally, one may consider more profound changes in the regulatory framework which do not only
address the collection and analysis of data, but instead focus on addressing speciﬁc data applications that are deemed unwanted by
society (e.g., insurance tariffs that are based on car data). Similar sector-speciﬁc data protection regulations already exist in the US, e.g.,
with regard to the determination of creditworthiness or in the healthcare sector. If the emphasis of data protection is put on applications,
rather than collection, some of the problems associated with the lack of users’ bargaining power could be addressed more directly.
Furthermore, if the usage (i.e., exploitation) of personal data is forbidden for certain applications, the incentive to collect data might be
reduced in the ﬁrst place, which may strengthen the acceptance of, and trust in those services that are wanted by and useful to society.
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Social logins, such as “Log in with Facebook”, improve a website’s user experience and therefore enjoy great
popularity among content providers (CPs) and users alike. Moreover, they also enable the social network and
the CPs to share data, which individually improves their ability to place targeted advertising. On the basis
of a game-theoretic model that offers a microfoundation for CPs’ competition for advertisements, on the
one hand, and CPs’ competition for users, on the other hand, we demonstrate the strategic effects of social
logins in the online advertising ecosystem. We fully characterize the market conditions under which social
logins are offered and adopted, and when the adoption is actually profitable for the CPs. In particular, we
show across several model extensions that the voluntary adoption of the social login may yield a prisoner’s
dilemma outcome for the CPs.
Key words : social login; advertising markets; targeted advertising; data sharing
1. Introduction
Social logins (Gafni and Nissim 2014, Janrain 2014) allow users to authenticate with third-party
content providers (CPs) through their social network account. They have been established as one
of the most popular instruments to share user and usage data among otherwise unaffiliated online
outlets. The most popular social login1, Log in with Facebook2, allows websites and mobile apps
to access users’ public profile including demographic data, email address and friends as well as to
1 According to LoginRadius (2015) 97% of websites that offer a social login employ Facebook’s login.
2 See https://developers.facebook.com/docs/facebook-login.
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request extended profile properties such as the history of users’ likes or recorded web activities.
On the other hand, Facebook obtains comprehensive data on users’ activities at the third-party
outlet through the programming interfaces of the login service. In fact, in its Platform Policy3
Facebook states that it “can analyze [a third-party’s] app, website, content, and data for any
purpose, including commercial”.
The conditions of unaffiliated CPs to share precious user data via social logins and the resulting
strategic implications have thus far not been studied. In this article, we develop a game-theoretic
model that offers a microfoundation and characterization on how social logins affect CPs’ compe-
tition for users, as well as CPs’ competition in the advertising market, where better user data can
be utilized to place more relevant ads. Thereby, we contribute to the extant literature by explicitly
considering the strategic effects of data access and information sharing among competitors on a
CP’s ability to attract users as well as its ability to generate advertising revenues. Moreover, we
identify factors that impact a CP’s decision to offer access to user data and/or usage data. For
example, we show that a higher competitive intensity between third-party CPs makes information
sharing with a social network provider more likely, even if this is ultimately detrimental to the
CPs, i.e., they may find themselves in a prisoner’s dilemma situation. Furthermore, we identify
market outcomes in which socially inefficient market failures occur, because the social login is not
offered or adopted although it would increase total welfare.
Our main analysis is based on three stylized facts, which we motivate in the following. First,
despite the myriad of CPs that comprise the internet (including web sites, mobile apps, shopping
and product comparison sites, as well as content and media platforms), one can roughly distinguish
between special-interest CPs and general-interest CPs. The special-interest CPs may be thought
of as specialized web sites that offer a narrow range of content in the same domain of interest
(e.g., on celebrities or fishing), whereas the general-interest CP offers a much broader range of
complementary content (e.g., a social networking site where users discuss celebrities and fishing).
Usually, there are several special-interest CPs for each domain of interest and thus, special-interest
CPs are in competition among each other for the same subset of users (e.g., users visit either
hellomagazine.com or ok.co.uk, but not both). By contrast, there exists only a small set of general-
interest CPs, such as Facebook, which have been characterized as gateways to the internet (Rusli
and Efrati 2013, Arakali 2015), because they are used by the vast majority of internet users and
often serve as a starting point for users’ online activity. For example, Facebook served 2.07 billion
monthly active users worldwide at the end of June 2017 (Facebook 2017) and a 69% share of
US online adults in 2016 (Pew Research Center 2017). Thus, for the majority of our analysis, we
3 See https://developers.facebook.com/policy.
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conceive a scenario, where users single-home with a special-interest CP, but split their attention
(i.e., multi-home) between the selected special-interest CP and the general-interest CP.4
Second, although the general-interest CP is not in direct competition for users with the special-
interest CP, all CPs are in competition in the advertising market. In particular, online advertisers
will choose to place advertisements at a given CP based on its ability to target ad relevant users.
Targeting increases advertisers’ profits by reducing wasted impressions to users who are not inter-
ested in an advertiser’s product (Iyer et al. 2005). Empirical studies generally support the notion
that more data on users allows firms to gain “much better information on consumers, their pref-
erences and their media habits” (Iyer et al. 2005, p.461), which in turn increases the effectiveness
of displayed advertisements by means of targeting (Braun and Moe 2013, Goldfarb and Tucker
2011, Urban et al. 2014) and personalization (Ansari and Mela 2003, Bleier and Eisenbeiss 2015,
Tucker 2014).5 In particular, Goldfarb and Tucker (2011) find that targeted ads exhibit a signifi-
cantly higher effectiveness than conventional non-targeted ads. Moreover, in a study of advertising
effectiveness on Facebook, Tucker (2014) finds that personalization of ad impressions in addition to
targeting further increases the likelihood that users click on displayed ads. Social logins allow the
general-interest CP to track their users also at the special-interest CP, which raises their ability for
behavioral targeting, i.e., the ability to select advertisements on the basis of past browsing behavior
and other available information (Chen and Stallaert 2014). However, through the social login also
the targeting ability of the special-interest CP is likely to increase, because it gains access to accu-
rate user data from the general-interest CP. Therefore, the social login facilitates data sharing by
which CPs can (individually) increase their targeting ability and thus improve their competitive
position in the advertising market.
Third, social logins allow special-interest CPs to enhance the user experience of their site in
several ways. For example, the social login allows the user to utilize existing login credentials, which
limits password fatigue and lowers transaction costs of registration. Most importantly, information
sharing enables better personalization and customization of content and better integration of the
services of the special- and general-interest CP. For instance, Spotify and other music streaming
service providers exploit social logins to curate customized content and to allow users to share
personal playlists and current listening activities with their social peers. Of course, there may also
be negative effects on the users’ experience, in particular due to concerns of privacy or a single point
of failure. However, the widespread popularity of social logins indicates that most users value the
4 We relax this assumption in an extension of our model, where users multi-home all CPs.
5 See Tucker (2012) for a discussion of adverse effects on advertising effectiveness if user perceive data collection as
excessive. However, these issues may be resolved by (perceived) user control over disclosure of their personal data as
shown by Tucker (2014).
Winners, Losers, and Facebook: The Role of Social Logins in the Online Advertising Ecosystem
32
benefits of the social login more. Already in 2010, two years after the launch of Facebook’s social
login, 250 million users and two million third-party websites used this feature, with an estimated
growth of 10,000 sites per day (van Grove 2010). Currently, the installed base is estimated at almost
15 million web sites (SimilarTech 2017). According to Janrain (2014) 51% (88%) of consumers have
used (encountered) a social login at least once and more than half of the users (64%) “are more
likely to return to a website that remembers them without a username and password” (p.15). In
this vein, increased user engagement and interaction are often quoted as main reasons for the CPs’
decision to adopt a social login (see, e.g., Gigya 2015). In other words, the social login improves the
user experience derived from using the CP, which can give it a competitive edge in the competition
for users with other special-interest CPs.
2. Related Literature
Social logins have previously been considered in the context of usability of services and user accep-
tance (Egelman 2013, Gafni and Nissim 2014), and from a technical (Ko et al. 2010, Kontaxis et al.
2012) or legal perspective (Van Der Sype and Seigneur 2014), but to the best of our knowledge not
from a strategic (i.e., economic) perspective.
The technical literature views social login services (Ko et al. 2010) in the history of (enter-
prise) single sign-on systems (SSOs), i.e., systems that allow for centralized and federated identity
management across remote and distributed resources (Pashalidis and Mitchell 2003). In essence,
the studies (e.g., Kontaxis et al. 2012, Sun and Beznosov 2012, Wang et al. 2012) suggest that
social logins reduce users’ transaction costs in a distributed (web) context, if technical systems are
designed and implemented securely and with regard to users’ privacy concerns.
With respect to users’ motives to use the social login rather than a CP’s own registration service,
Kontaxis et al. (2012, p.321) point to an additional “social dimension to the browsing experience”
due to users’ ability to share, rate and interact with content. These features require the sharing of
user and usage data between the respective social network and the CP. Based on an exploratory
survey, Gafni and Nissim (2014) identify familiarity and convenience as factors that positively
affect users’ readiness to opt for a social login in a world in which internet users face an increasing
number of websites that require authentication. In such cases, social logins avoid the need for
multiple (different) username and password combinations, evade repetitive registration processes
and minimize the effort to update and maintain accurate information in the case authentication
properties change. Relatedly, access to users’ personal data may invoke a range of privacy issues
that have been examined by a growing strand of theoretical and empirical literature (see Acquisti
et al. 2016, for an extensive survey). With regard to social logins, authors have criticized inter
alia the loss of anonymity, revelation of social information, loss of traceability in cases of a data
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breach, propagation of advertisements, and disclosure of user credentials as potential threats to
users’ privacy (Kontaxis et al. 2012). However, the fact that users deliberately decide to use the
social login opposed to alternative registration options suggests that the positive effect on users’
valuation outweighs potential privacy concerns (Egelman 2013). In other words, if the social login
is chosen over alternative registration options, data sharing occurs actively and voluntarily. Such
user control has been found to be vital for successful marketing campaigns in the context of social
media (Fournier and Avery 2011, Tucker 2014).
Social logins as data sharing mechanisms between otherwise unaffiliated CPs can also be seen as
a form of open access relationship (Boudreau 2010). In this context, the strategic impact of data
sharing on the competition between CPs is a priori unclear: although additional data may increase
the firms’ ability to price discriminate (see Fudenberg and Villas-Boas 2012) and to personalize
(Ansari and Mela 2003), the business stealing effect, due to the competitors’ access to the firm’s
exclusive resources, may outweigh the benefits. In this spirit, Mantovani and Ruiz-Aliseda (2016)
analyze the effects of collaboration between firms producing complementary products, and show
that collaboration may lead to a prisoner’s dilemma outcome. In their model, the prisoner’s dilemma
occurs, because investments increase, while revenues remain constant. In our context, the prisoner’s
dilemma occurs because the relative advantage of the special-interest CP offering (a better user
experience through) the social login is competed away in equilibrium, but at the same time, data
sharing with the general-interest CP worsens its competitive position in the advertising market.
Finally, our study is related to the large strand of literature on online advertising and behavioral
targeting. Above and beyond the empirical studies on targeting and ad effectiveness discussed above,
we do not attempt a complete review here, and instead focus on the presentation of welfare effects
that were identified in the extant literature. Chen and Stallaert (2014) highlight that behavioral
targeting can increase social welfare, but the effect on the advertisers’ profits is ambiguous as
countervailing effects of competition and propensity are present. In economic theory, users benefit
from improved targeting of advertising, because the displayed ads are perceived as more relevant
to their interest and therefore also as more informative (Anand and Shachar 2009, Bergemann and
Bonatti 2011). However, survey based research has also identified potential adverse effects due to
better informed advertising beyond the theoretical literature (Turow et al. 2009).
3. A model of information sharing in the online advertising ecosystem
Competitive setting: We conceive an online advertising ecosystem with two competing special-
interest content providers (CP i, i=A,B), one general-interest content provider (CP G) and one
advertiser (Z). In the context of this paper and the preceding motivation, it will be convenient
to think of CP G as a social network provider (e.g., Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn or GooglePlus),
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although the insights of the model are of course not restricted to this scenario (see Section 7). The
important aspect of the model is that the special-interest CPs operate in the same domain and are
thus competing directly for users, whereas the general-interest CP is already used by all internet
users under consideration. This captures the relevant competitive dynamics of the internet, where,
on the one hand, users split their attention between a general-interest site (e.g., Facebook) and a
particular special-interest site, but, on the other hand, choose to pay attention to only one of the
two comparable special-interest sites. In other words, whereas users multi-home between CP i and
CP G, they single-home between CP A and CP B.
Furthermore, we assume that all CPs offer their content free of charge to internet users and
derive revenues by charging a price, p, for showing display advertisements on their sites. To date,
this is the prevalent business model on the internet (c.f., Anderson 2012) and consequently, this is
the dominant modelling assumption in the related literature (see, e.g., Athey et al. 2016, Kourandi
et al. 2015).6 To fix ideas, we assume that CPs offer advertisement space based on pricing per
impression (CPM model). Although, of course, there exist also other means to sell advertisement
space, in particular based on pricing per click (CPC model) or per transaction on the advertiser’s
site (CPA model), CPM is still widely adopted by large CPs (e.g., Facebook, Google Ad Sense)
and consequently, this is the standard assumption used in the context of display advertisements
markets (see, e.g., Anderson and De Palma 2013, Johnson 2013).7 In particular, CPM pricing
implies that the advertisers’ performance metric is based on view-throughs, i.e., the long-term
effect on users’ purchase decision (Bleier and Eisenbeiss 2015), as opposed to click-throughs, i.e.,
the immediate engagement with the advertisement. Next to potential brand-building effects (Yoo
2009) and long-term impact on users’ decision (Manchanda et al. 2006, Lewis and Reiley 2014),
which are usually neglected by click-based or action-based measures, the academic literature has
identified moral hazard as a potential impediment to the adoption of pricing models associated
with pure click-through measures (Asdemir et al. 2012) or action-based measures (Hu et al. 2016).
View-throughs (which include click-throughs) are therefore commonly considered as the relevant
performance measure in display advertising markets (Hamman and Plomion 2013) and especially
by advertisers in social networks. According to market research (Ross 2015) more than 60% of total
advertising budget spent at Facebook is allocated via optimized CPM (oCPM), a metric where
advertisers are billed on the basis of impressions, while Facebook optimizes bidding for the effective
6 Here, this assumption is mainly made for convenience and clarity, because in fact, it is only required that CPs derive
a significant portion of their total revenues from advertising. We abstract from other revenue streams, because they
are not directly relevant to the analysis of the competitive dynamics of the online advertising market.
7 Moreover, the CPM model allows us to provide an intuitive microfoundation of how advertisement prices are formed
and affected by the competition between CPs. Under a CPC model, results remain qualitatively unaffected as long
as a CP’s advertisement price increases with the attractiveness of that CP to users (which is especially the case for
enhanced targeting, see Athey and Gans 2010).
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Figure 1 The competitive setting of the model.
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Note. Each user chooses exactly one of the two special-interest CPs A and B (single-homing) and splits attention
between the chosen special-interest CP and the general-interest CP G (multi-homing). All CPs are ad-financed and
receive advertisement revenues according to their relative ability to reach ad-relevant users. Due to users single-
homing special-interest CPs, the total advertising market splits into two submarkets, and in each submarket one
special-interest CP and the general-interest CP compete for display advertisements from advertiser Z.
cost per impression according to advertisers’ preferred mix of user interaction (actions, reach, clicks
or social impressions).8 With close to 24% of total revenues in 2014 (eMarketer 2015) and a third
of total display impressions to US internet users in 2011 (comScore 2011), Facebook has become
the clear market leader in display advertising and its share is estimated to grow further over the
coming years (Marshall 2015).
In order to focus on the competition between CPs, we assume that there is a single advertiser, Z,
that wishes to buy advertisement space for a special-interest ad (in the same domain as the special-
interest CPs) at any one of the CPs. As will be described in detail later, CPs differ in their targeting
ability and, due to competition and split attention between CPs, each CP reaches a different subset
of the users at any given point in time. Depending on a CP’s ad price relative to how many view-
throughs can be achieved at this CP, the advertiser will choose at which subset of the CPs to
advertise in order to maximize its profit. Thus, it is important to see that, although the general-
interest CP is not in direct competition for users with any of the special-interest CPs, it is still
in competition with them for users’ attention to ad impressions over time. This basic competitive
set-up of the model is summarized in Figure 1.
Details of the model
We now provide a more detailed description of the ingredients of the model, the strategic variables
of each of the entities involved, as well as of their possible actions.
8 Further information is provided by Facebook’s documentation of pricing models and advertising objectives: https:
//www.facebook.com/business/help/355670007911605.
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Internet users: There is a unit mass of heterogeneous internet users that have a natural preference
for one of the two special-interest CPs. Users’ preference for CPs is denoted by x and assumed
to be uniformly distributed between zero and one (Hotelling 1929). The two special-interest CPs
are horizontally differentiated and located at either end of the users’ preference spectrum, i.e.,
CP A at x= 0 and CP B at x= 1. Thus, a type x consumer derives utility of UA(x) = uA − τx
or UB(x) = uB − τ(1− x), when consuming the content of CP A or CP B, respectively. Thereby,
ui (i=A,B) denotes the utility that is derived from the viewing experience and usability of the
site (e.g., the quality of the content or the hassle of the login procedure), and τ is the degree of
competition between the two special-interest CPs. When τ is large, the users’ innate preference
for the CPs becomes more important, such that competition on the basis of ui becomes weaker. A
user will visit only the special-interest CP which gives her the highest utility. We denote this user
demand for CP i by Di. Furthermore, we assume that ui is large enough, such that the market is
fully covered, i.e., at any time DA +DB = 1.
Next to one of the special-interest CPs, users also visit the general-interest CP. To model how
users split attention between those two CPs, we assume that there are two time periods, indexed
by t = 1,2. In each time period, a user visits the special-interest CP with probability δ and the
general-interest CP with probability 1− δ. We will thus refer to δ and 1− δ as the screen attention
probability of CP i and CP G, respectively. Consequently, in each time period t, a special-interest
CP i expects to be viewed by a total of Di,t =Di δ users, whereas the general-interest CP G expects
a total of DG,t = (DA +DB) (1− δ) = 1− δ viewers per time period.
Content providers: All content providers j =A,B,G receive revenues from selling advertisement
space to the advertiser. Each CP demands a total price for displaying the ads of Z on its site in
both time periods. We normalize the costs of providing content of each CP to zero and assume
that ads can be displayed at zero marginal costs. Moreover, for reasons that will become clear
later, after users have chosen a particular special-interest CP, each CP i is only in competition
with CP G for views.9 Thus, prices will depend on the market share, i.e., the submass of users, Di,
of the CP i that is considered. Therefore, we must differentiate between CP i’s price, denoted by
pi, and CP G’s price for the submarket Di, denoted by pG(i).
Since we do not consider costs, the profit of CP i is Πi = pi, whereas the profit of CP G is
ΠG =
∑
i=A,B pG(i). While a CP seeks to maximize its profit from advertising, pj will depend on
CPs’ ability to reach ad-relevant users, which is influenced by two factors: (i) the number of a CP’s
viewers in time period t, which again depends on competition and screen attention, and (ii) its ad
targeting rate αj ≤ 1. A CP’s targeting rate denotes which fraction of viewers that actually see the
9 In Section 5.3 we also consider the case where users multi-home and, thus, a special-interest CP does not only
compete with CP G in the advertising market, but also with the other special-interest CP.
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ad belong to the advertiser’s target group, i.e., how well a CP can transform views into relevant
advertising impressions (view-throughs).
In this context, we emphasize that our model is set up to analyze the economic effects that arise in
competition for the advertising budget of a particular advertiser targeting a specific special-interest
group. Thus, we restrict attention only to that subset of the online advertisement ecosystem that
is relevant for this advertiser, comprised of special-interest websites (targeted at roughly the same
audience as the advertiser) and general-interest websites. Evidently, the special-interest CPs are
considered by a much smaller number of advertisers (which we approximate by a single advertiser
here) than the general-interest CP, who will display a larger variety of ads. The revenue streams
that may arise for the general-interest CP from these other advertisers are not explicitly modeled
(see instead Athey and Gans 2010, Chen and Stallaert 2014), because they are not relevant for the
economic effects that arise in any given special-interest advertising market.
CP G may choose to offer CP i a social login. If CP i chooses to adopt the social login service
on its site, the two CPs implicitly agree to cooperate by means of sharing data about their users.
Formally, this has two implications: First, we assume that CP i’s utility, ui increases by θ≥ 0, due
to a better user experience at CP i, as motivated above. Consequently,
ui =
{
ubi , if CP i does not adopt the social login,
ubi + θ, if CP i adopts the social login.
Thereby we adopt the convention to denote the baseline value, i.e., a situation without the social
login, with superscript b. For now, we will assume that CPs are symmetric, i.e., ubA = u
b
B = u
b.10
Second, due to information sharing about the user, the targeting rates of CP G and CP i are
increased by a factor of φG ≥ 1 and φi ≥ 1, respectively. Consequently,
αj =
{
αbj, for the mass of users, Di, of CP i that does not use the social login,
min{φj ·αbj,1}, for the mass of users, Di, of CP i that uses the social login.
Advertiser: The advertiser wants to place an informative ad that is targeted at a specific audi-
ence. The goal of the advertiser is to generate attention for its product or service, which, e.g., can
be a visit to its online- or oﬄine-store some time after the ad has been viewed. Thus, effectiveness
of an ad is measured with respect to the rate of effective view-throughs. In particular, we assume
that the value of the first ad impression that is displayed to a user belonging to the target audience
is v = 1. Because the ad is assumed to be informative, all subsequent ad impressions on the same
user are wasted and thus, do not create additional value for the advertiser (for a similar assumption
10 We relax this assumption in Section 5.1.
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see, e.g., Ambrus et al. 2016).11 The objective of the advertiser is to select the subset of CPs at
which to advertise in order to maximize its profit, i.e.,
ΠZ = ΓA (nA− pA) + ΓB (nB − pB) +
∑
i=A,B
ΓG(i) (nG(i)− pG(i)),
where Γi (ΓG(i)) is an indicator function, returning one if an ad is placed for the mass of Di users at
CP i (CP G) and zero otherwise. Moreover, ni (nG(i)) denotes the expected number of ad-relevant
viewers from the total mass of users Di at CP i (CP G) that see the ad for the first time, and thus
have a value of v= 1 for the advertiser. In the following, we refer to n simply as view-throughs.
Structure and timing. We consider the following four-stage game:
Stage 1 General-interest CP G decides whether to offer a social login to both special-interest CPs.
Stage 2 Special-interest CPs i (i = A,B) simultaneously but independently decide whether to
adopt the social login and users decide which CP to use.12
Stage 3 All CPs simultaneously set advertisement prices pj.
Stage 4 The advertiser decides at which CPs to advertise.
4. Competitive effects of the social login and market outcomes
We continue by solving for the subgame perfect equilibrium through backward induction.
Stage 4: Advertiser’s decision. In order to decide at which CPs to advertise, Z calculates the
expected view-throughs per CP, nj. Recall that CP A and CP B do not compete in the advertising
market. In the following, it therefore suffices to consider the advertising competition between CP i
and CP G in a given submarket Di. In the first period every ad impression is, by definition, new to
a visitor, so that CP i expects view-throughs of ni,1 = αi δDi. In reverse, the remaining Di− δDi
users visit CP G in the first period, and thus CP G expects nG(i),1 = αG(i)(Di−δDi) view-throughs
in the first period from the mass of users that multi-home between CP i and CP G. Recall that
CP G’s targeting rate can differ between different masses of users, Di, depending on whether or not
CP i has adopted the social login. We denote this by αG(i). In the second period, only those users
that have not seen the ad in the first period at any of the two CPs are relevant for the advertiser,
i.e., Di−ni,1−nG(i),1. In period two, the mass of users Di again redistributes its attention randomly
between CP i and CP G according to δ, i.e., users that have been targeted at CP i may now visit
CP G, and vice versa. Thus, CP i and CP G expect to generate ni,2 = αiδ(Di−ni,1−nG(i),1) and
11 In fact, we only require that the marginal value of subsequent ads is decreasing (c.f., Anderson and De Palma
2013). Empirical research on advertising effectiveness shows that additional impressions of the same ad are indeed
less valuable for the advertiser (see the survey by Simon and Arndt 1980).
12 As will be seen later, our model exhibits dominant strategy equilibria and therefore, we would attain the same
results if special-interest CPs would decide on the adoption sequentially (see Appendix A.7).
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nG(i),2 = αG(i)(1− δ)(Di − ni,1 − nG(i),1) new view-throughs in the second period, respectively. In
summary, this yields a total number of expected view-throughs by CP j of13
ni = αiδDi︸ ︷︷ ︸
period t = 1
+αiδ(Di−αiδDi−αG(i)(Di− δDi))︸ ︷︷ ︸
period t = 2
, (1)
nG =
∑
i=A,B
αG(i)(Di− δDi)︸ ︷︷ ︸
period t = 1
+αG(i)(1− δ)(Di−αiδDi−αG(i)(Di− δDi))︸ ︷︷ ︸
period t = 2
. (2)
Figure 2 provides an example of a special-interest advertising submarket that we consider and
illustrates how different targeting rates translate into view-throughs. In the example, there is a total
of six relevant users, which in expectation split attention between the special-interest CP and the
general-interest CP evenly (δ= 1/2) in both time periods t= 1,2. We assume that the special-interest
CP can target its users perfectly (αi = 1), so that it is able to achieve expected view-throughs
of ni,1 = 3 in the first period by simply displaying the ad to all its special-interest users. On the
contrary, the general-interest CP faces a larger, more heterogeneous user base (including irrelevant
users as denoted by Figure 2), but can possibly also display ads from various other advertisers,
which are interested in different special-interest groups. In particular, the general-interest outlet
cannot simply display a particular ad to all users, because, in contrast to the special-interest CP,
it is also interested in serving other advertisers (see the demand-side efficiency effect mentioned by
Athey and Gans 2010). Although we do not model this interaction with other advertisers explicitly,
we can nevertheless capture this effect by assuming a lower targeting rate of the general-interest CP
in the example (αG(i) = 1/3), which then translates into lower expected view-throughs of nG(i),1 = 1.
In the second period, relevant users again decide which CP to visit according to probability δ.
Hence, the same expected share of relevant users at CP i and CP G has already seen the ad in
the previous period. Thus, the general-interest CP is able to achieve expected view-throughs of
nG(i),2 = 1/3 in the second period, whereas the special-interest CP can capture the view-throughs
of the one remaining user at its outlet that has not seen the ad before, i.e., nG(i),2 = 1.
It is important to see that nj does not only depend on CP j’s own targeting rate, αj, but, in
t= 2, also on the other CP’s targeting rate. This is the basis for competition between the CPs in
the advertising market. Intuitively, the two time periods are the most parsimonious way to model
the inherent competition between targeting an ad-relevant user now (t = 1) at CP j, or in the
future (t = 2) at some other CP. With regard to the mass of users Di, the advertiser faces the
decision to display advertising either exclusively at CP i or CP G, or at both outlets at the same
13 Note that we have implicitly assumed that the advertiser has chosen to display the ad at all CPs, which is indeed
the equilibrium outcome. Of course, a complete characterization of the model would also require to specify nj in
those cases in which the advertiser chooses only a proper subset of the CPs. It is easy to see that nj can then be
derived by setting αj = 0 for all CPs that are not chosen by the advertiser.
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Figure 2 Illustration of view-throughs per CP.
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Note. In total there are six ad relevant users in the example that split attention evenly between the CPs. The
considered CPs have different targeting rates (αG(i) = 1/3, αi = 1) in the special-interest advertising submarket Di.
The advertiser Z buys three impressions per period from each CP.
time. Obviously, the latter option maximizes view-throughs n= nG(i) +ni. However, the advertiser
maximizes profit Γi(ni − pi) + ΓG(i)(nG(i) − pG(i)) and may decide to switch exclusively to a CP
if it can gain a higher net benefit through a lower price p for the view-throughs. For example,
the advertiser will decide to reach the mass of Di users exclusively through CP i if n
e
i − pi >
nG(i) − pG(i) + ni − pi. Thereby nei , which denotes the total view-throughs at i when CP i is the
advertiser’s exclusive outlet, is larger than CP i’s total view-throughs when CP i is not exclusive.
This is because CP i can generate more view-throughs in the second period, because the same
ad has not been displayed to users at CP G already in the first period. The advertiser’s decision
where to advertise will thus depend on view-throughs, as identified above, and CPs’ prices, which
are determined next.
Stage 3: CPs’ ad pricing. A CP j chooses its advertising price pj by taking into account its com-
petitors’ prices and the ensuing allocation decision by the advertiser. Thus, CPs’ pricing decision
is constrained by the competition for selection by advertiser Z. The best response function of a
CP is then given by choosing the maximum price that ensures that the advertiser still decides to
display advertising at that CP. In other words, a CP sets its own price such that the advertiser is
indifferent between displaying ads at both CPs and displaying ads exclusively at the competitor.
This yields Condition (3) for the special-interest CP, and Condition (4) for the general-interest CP.
nG(i)− p∗G(i) +ni− p∗i = neG(i)− p∗G(i), (3)
nG(i)− p∗G(i) +ni− p∗i = nei − p∗i . (4)
As shown in Appendix A.1, solving this set of conditions yields a unique advertising pricing equi-
librium. Because CPs do not incur any costs, each special-interest CP i obtains profit Π∗i = p
∗
i ,
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while the general-interest CP obtains profit Π∗G = p
∗
G(A) +p
∗
G(B) in equilibrium (see Appendix A.2).
Note that it is easy to verify that in equilibrium indeed neither CP has a unilateral incentive to
deviate from its price. On the one hand, a unilateral price increase by any CP would yield a lower
(zero) profit for that CP, because the advertiser would then prefer to show advertising exclusively
at the competing CP. On the other hand, a price decrease would also yield a lower profit, because
it would not affect the advertiser’s allocation decision and the CP would simply make less revenue.
See that equilibrium prices p∗j (and thus CPs’ equilibrium profit) behave intuitively with respect
to changes in the targeting rate. For example, in line with Athey and Gans (2010), a higher targeting
rate, which in turn yields more view-throughs, allows CPs to demand a higher equilibrium price p∗j
and thus yields a higher profit, i.e.,
∂pi∗j
∂αj
> 0. Moreover, due to the competition between CPs in the
advertising market, an increase in the rival CP’s targeting ability reduces the equilibrium profit,
i.e.,
∂pi∗i
∂αG(i)
< 0, and
∂pi∗G(i)
∂αi
< 0, respectively.
Note that we assume that the CPs set the same, static price in both time periods. This is
necessary so that (intertemporal) competition between CPs in the advertising market can unfold.
If instead we assume that CPs can choose different prices in each period, then this competition will
break down, and each CP would set its monopoly price pj,t = nj,t (see Appendix A.6). Consequently,
the static pricing scheme that we assume here confers the pricing power upon the advertiser and
therefore constitutes a lower bound on advertising prices. By contrast, a dynamic pricing scheme
would confer the pricing power upon the CPs, as if the advertiser were in perfect competition, and
therefore it would constitute an upper bound on advertising prices. Nevertheless, under dynamic
pricing the comparative statics of equilibrium prices and profits with respect to targeting rates,
identified in the previous paragraph, remain intact. In consequence, the market outcomes derived
under static pricing do not change qualitatively in a setting with dynamic pricing.
Stage 2: Special-interest CPs’ social login adoption. Provided the social login is offered by CP G,
each CP i decides independently whether to adopt the social login. Thereby, each CP i considers,
given the adoption decision of the rival special-interest CP, how the adoption of the social login
would affect its advertising profit Π∗i (i) through an increase in targeting rates αj, affecting its
competitive position in the advertising market, and (ii) through an increase in the user experience
by θ, affecting its market share Di and consequently its competitive position in the user market.
In summary, four different adoption scenarios can be distinguished, which are highlighted in the
normal form game depicted by Table 1. The corresponding profits are derived in Appendix A.3.
In the following, it is shown that if special-interest CPs are symmetric, either both or none adopt
the social login. Thereby, CP i considers the net effect of the social login on its anticipated profit,
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Table 1 Normal form game representing special-interest CPs’
social login adoption decision.
CP B
Social Login (l) No Login (b)
CP A Social Login (l) (Πl,lA ,Π
l,l
B ) (Π
l,b
A ,Π
b,l
B )
No Login (b) (Πb,lA ,Π
l,b
B ) (Π
b,b
A ,Π
b,b
B )
given its rival’s decision. CP i adopts the social login, given that its rival does not adopt it, iff
Πl,bi −Πb,bi ≥ 0, which is satisfied if its increase in targeting rate is above the critical threshold Φa
′
:
φi ≥Φa′ := 1
δ αbi (τ + θ)
·
((
αbG (δ− 1) (τ + θ)φG + τ + θ
)
−
(
[
(
(φGα
b
G (δ− 1))2 + 2αbG(δ− 1)
· (φG− δαbi) + (δαbi − 1)2
)
τ + θ(τ + θ)(1 +φGα
b
G(δ− 1))2] (τ + θ)
)1/2)
. (5)
On the other hand, CP i adopts the social login, given that its rival also adopts it, iff Πl,li −Πb,li ≥ 0,
which is satisfied if
φi ≥Φa′′ := 1
δαbiτ
·
((
αbG(δ− 1)τφG + τ
)
−
(
[τ(φGα
b
G(δ− 1))2 + 2(δ− 1)
· (αbG(τφG− δ(τ − θ)αbi) + (δ+αbi)2(τ − θ)− 2δ(τ − θ)αbi + τ)]τ
)1/2)
. (6)
Formally, Φa
′
> Φa
′′
and therefore, if φi is large enough so that a special-interest CP finds its
attractive to adopt the login unilaterally, then φi is always large enough so that the CP would also
adopt the social login jointly. Due to the symmetry of special-interest CPs, it follows immediately
that each CP has a dominant strategy to adopt the social login for φi ≥Φa′ and to not adopt the
login for φi < Φ
a′ , such that in equilibrium either both or none of the special-interest CPs adopt
the login. We therefore denote Φa
′
in Equation (5) as the adoption threshold of the social login.
Notice that, in any case, CPs’ adoption decision coincides, such that neither eventually gains a
competitive advantage in the user market, i.e., Di = 1/2. Therefore, even though it is each special-
interest CP’s dominant strategy to adopt the social login if φi ≥ Φa′ , each may indeed receive a
lower profit than if both CPs would not have adopted the login. In other words, special-interest
CPs may find themselves in a prisoner’s dilemma situation, where none can commit not to adopt
the login to improve its user experience by θ and gain a competitive advantage in the user market,
but as each CP adopts the login, this competitive advantage vanishes. In reverse, adoption of
the social login may intensify competition in the advertising market with CP G, because CP G’s
targeting rate may improve relatively more due to the information shared via the social login than
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CP i’s own targeting rate. The prisoner’s dilemma situation arises if the social login is adopted
and Πl,li −Πb,bi < 0, which is satisfied if
Φa
′ ≤ φi <Φap := 1
δ αbi
·
((
αbG (δ− 1)φG + 1
)
−
(
(φGα
b
G (δ− 1))2 + 2(δ− 1)αbG (φG− δαbi) + (δαbi − 1)2
)1/2)
. (7)
We therefore denote Φap as the adoption profitability threshold at which special-interest CPs are
actually better off by (jointly) adopting the social login. It can be shown that Φap >Φa
′
for θ > 0,
such that the prisoner’s dilemma outcome always exists when θ > 0 and the social login is offered.
Stage 1: General-interest CP’s social login offer. Anticipating special-interest CPs’ adoption
decision and ensuing effects on advertising prices, CP G decides whether or not to offer the social
login. To this end, CP G weighs the positive effect on its own targeting ability against the negative
effect of CP i’s improved targeting ability, both of which will affect competition in the advertising
market. In general, CP G is willing to offer the social login iff Πl,lG −Πb,bG ≥ 0, anticipating that
symmetric special-interest CPs always coincide in their adoption decision (see Appendix A.4 for a
full characterization of CP G’s profits). This is satisfied if
φi ≤Φo := α
b
G (φ
2
G− 1) (δ− 1) + 2(δαbG +φG− 1)
2 δ φGαbi
. (8)
Consequently, Φo is denoted as the offer threshold at which the general-interest CP offers the social
login to both special-interest CPs.
Market outcomes and comparative statics. Based on the previous analysis and the therein derived
thresholds, we are now able to fully characterize the possible market outcomes that may arise. As
special-interest CPs are symmetric, it will generally suffice to consider any submarket Di to discuss
the possible market outcomes. Thereby, it is possible to delineate the different market outcomes
in terms of CP i’s and CP G’s increase in targeting rate φj due to the social login. In particular,
the market outcomes are determined by the adoption threshold (Φa
′
), the adoption profitability
threshold (Φap) and the offer threshold (Φo). In total, there are six possible market outcomes, which
are illustrated in Figure 3. In particular, see that there exists and intermediate range Φo ≥ φi ≥Φa′ ,
where the social login is offered and adopted (market outcome I and II), whereas in all other
regions the social login would either not be offered (market outcomes III and V ), or it would
not be adopted (market outcome IV ), or both (market outcome V I). Moreover, note that the
prisoner’s dilemma occurs in market outcome II leaving special-interest CPs worse off with the
social login, whereas in market outcome I, the social login improves the profit of all CPs.
To provide more insights under which conditions the social login is offered, adopted, and prof-
itable to the special-interest CPs, respectively, we investigate how the critical thresholds Φa
′
, Φap
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Figure 3 Illustration of possible market outcomes.
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Note. The social login is offered in outcomes I, II and IV , and not offered otherwise. It is adopted in outcomes I
and II, and not adopted in outcome IV . In outcome I special-interest CPs are better off and in outcome II they are
worse off by adopting the social login. The figure is derived for αbi = 0.5, α
b
G = 0.5, τ = 0.5, θ= 0.1, δ = 0.5. Numerical
values are chosen such that all six market regions exist. For other values, some regions may not exist, but otherwise,
the properties of the regions remain qualitatively the same.
and Φo change ceteris paribus in response to a change in one of the model’s parameters. While
the details of the comparative statics are relegated to Appendix A.5, the main insights from this
analysis are summarized as follows:
First, parameters τ and θ, which both relate exclusively to the horizontal competition for users
between special-interest CPs, only have an impact on the adoption threshold Φa
′
. This is because
Φa
′
is derived under the condition that exactly one special-interest CP adopts the social login.
In this case, τ and θ determine the competitive advantage (in terms of market share increase)
of the special-interest CP that adopts the social login exclusively. However, we have shown that,
in equilibrium, special-interest CPs will indeed always act symmetrically, that is, either both or
none adopt the social login, and thus neither special-interest CP can gain a competitive advantage
over the other (both have the same market share). Therefore, the offer and adoption profitability
thresholds Φo and Φap, which have both been derived under the condition that special-interest CPs
act symmetrically, are not affected by changes in τ and θ. In reverse, this means that parameters
αbi , α
b
G and δ, which relate to the vertical competition in the advertising market, and not exclusively
to the horizontal competition between special-interest CPs, have an effect on all three thresholds.
In particular, they have qualitatively the same effect on Φap and Φa
′
.
Second, the offer threshold Φo increases, thus making it more likely that the general-interest
CP offers a social login if, everything else equal, (i) the special-interest CP’s baseline targeting
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rate, αbi , decreases (∂Φ
o
/∂αbi < 0), (ii) the general-interest CP’s baseline targeting rate, α
b
G, decreases
(∂Φ
o
/∂αbG < 0), (iii) the special-interest CP’s screen attention probability, δ, decreases (∂Φ
o
/∂δ < 0),
and (iv) the general-interest CP’s improvement in targeting rate, φG, increases (∂Φ
o
/∂φG > 0).
Third, the adoption threshold Φa
′
decreases, thus making it more likely that the special-interest
CPs adopt a social login if, everything else equal, (i) the special-interest CP’s baseline targeting
rate, αbi , decreases (∂Φ
a′
/∂αbi > 0), (ii) the general-interest CPs baseline targeting rate, α
b
G, decreases
(∂Φ
a′
/∂αbG > 0), (iii) the special-interest CP’s screen attention probability, δ, increases (∂Φ
a′
/∂δ< 0),
(iv) the general-interest CP’s improvement in targeting rate, φG, decreases (∂Φ
a′
/∂φG > 0), (v) the
special-interest CPs’ utility increase due to the social login, θ, increases (∂Φ
a′
/∂θ < 0), and (vi)
competition for users between special-interest CPs increases, i.e., when τ decreases (∂Φ
a′
/∂τ > 0).
We can therefore characterize the market conditions under which a social login would be offered
and adopted as follows:
Proposition 1 (Offer and adoption of the social login). (a) The social login is only
offered and adopted (market outcomes I and II) if the resulting improvement in the special-interest
CP’s targeting rate is intermediate, i.e., Φo ≥ φi ≥ Φa′, with Φa′ and Φo given by Equations (5)
and (8), respectively.
(b) Everything else equal, an increase in any one of the CP’s baseline targeting rate, αbi or α
b
G,
makes it less likely that the social login is adopted, and that it is offered. Moreover, (i) an increase
in the screen attention probability of the special-interest CP, δ, or (ii) an increase in improvement
of the targeting rate of the special-interest CP, φi, or (iii) a decrease in the improvement of the
targeting rate of the general-interest CP, φG, respectively, make it more likely that the social login
is adopted, but less likely that it is offered.
Moreover, with the help of comparative statics, we can derive two more important insights with
respect to the profitability of the social login for special-interest CPs. First, adoption of the social
login is less likely to be profitable for special-interest CPs if αbi is high, because an increase in α
b
i
diminishes market region I due to the fact that ∂Φ
o
/∂αbi < 0 and ∂Φ
ap
/∂αbi > 0. Second, an increase
in the competition for users between special-interest CPs (either through a decrease in τ or an
increase in θ) makes the occurrence of a prisoner’s dilemma outcome more likely, because market
region II is increased due to the fact that ∂Φ
a′
/∂θ< 0 and ∂Φ
a′
/∂τ > 0, but ∂Φ
ap
/∂θ = ∂Φ
ap
/∂τ = 0.
We can therefore characterize the market conditions for which the adoption of the social login
is profitable for special-interest CPs as follows:
Proposition 2 (Profitability of the social login for special-interest CPs). (a)
Adoption of the social login may yield a prisoner’s dilemma for special-interest CPs (market
outcome II), i.e., after the voluntary adoption of the social login, special-interest CPs may be
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worse off than if they had not adopted the social login. This occurs for Φap > φi ≥ Φa′, with Φa′
and Φap given by Equations (5) and (7), respectively.
(b) Everything else equal, adoption of the social login is less likely to be profitable for a special-
interest CP (market region I) when its baseline targeting rate, αbi , increases.
(c) The prisoner’s dilemma (market outcome II) becomes more likely when either the CPs’
improvement of user experience due to the social login, θ, increases, or when the competition for
users between special-interest CPs increases (τ decreases).
Illustrative market scenarios. To conclude our main analysis, we highlight two specific market
scenarios that are illustrative as they represent extrema of the feasible spectrum of possibilities.
First, consider the case where the special-interest CPs have already attained a high targeting rate
and thus only the general-interest CP will be able to increase its targeting rate through information
sharing via the social login, i.e., φG > φi ≡ 1. In this case, the special-interest CP cannot gain a
competitive advantage in the advertising market from adopting the social login. Therefore, it will
base its adoption decision solely on the expected impact of the social login on the competition for
users, provided θ > 0. From Figure 3 it is evident that at φi = 1 only two market outcomes are
feasible. The general-interest CP will always offer the social login and either both special-interest
CPs adopt it and are worse off (outcome II if φG is low), or they do not adopt it (outcome IV if
φG is high). Consequently, if CPs adopt the social login, they are always in a prisoner’s dilemma.
Second, consider the polar case where the social login does not offer any improvement in user
experience, i.e., θ= 0. In this case the special-interest CPs will base their decision whether or not
to adopt the social login solely on the effect in the advertising market. This means that Φa
′
and
Φap coincide in this (and only in this) case, because special-interest CPs adopt the social login if
and only if it is eventually profitable for them. Thus, market outcomes II and III do not exist
and the prisoner’s dilemma situation never arises here.
5. Model Extensions
In the following, we explore several extensions of the base model, which will show that our main
insights from Propositions 1 and 2 are robust, and which offer more nuanced insights. The exten-
sions considered in Sections 5.1 to 5.3 alter the competitive market structure and are summarized
by Figure 4. In addition, in Section 5.4 we endogenize φj by allowing the CPs to invest in the
improvement of their targeting ability that results from the social login.
5.1. Asymmetric special-interest CPs
First, we extend our analysis to the case where special-interest CPs are asymmetric with respect to
the utility that they offer to users, i.e., CPs differ vertically in quality. For example, the website of
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Figure 4 Comparison of market structures considered in the various model extensions.
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an established media organization may differ significantly in size and thus in the amount of content
that they can offer to users, relative to, e.g., other news blogs. Without loss of generality, we assume
that users derive a higher baseline utility when consuming content of CP A, i.e., ubA = u
b
B + ν with
ν > 0. Market outcomes are derived as described in Section 3, but market shares (see Panel 2 in
Figure 4) and thus profits of CP A and CP B as well as their relative benefit from the social
login now differ. Consequently, the adoption thresholds of CP A and CP B generally differ, and
are therefore denoted by ΦaA and Φ
a
B, respectively (see Appendix B.1 for the derivation of these
thresholds). In fact, CP B, as the lower quality firm, has a greater incentive to adopt the social
login because it benefits relatively more from the increase in consumer valuation θ than its higher
quality rival CP A. Formally, Φa
′
A >Φ
a′
B and Φ
a′′
A >Φ
a′′
B for any ν > 0, given θ > 0. In contrast, the
profitability threshold Φap is identical for both CPs, irrespective of ν, and also the same as in the
base model, and thus given by Equation (7). Similarly, CP G’s rationale to offer the social login is
unaffected by the asymmetry of special-interest CPs and thus Φo is given by Equation (8). For a
complete analysis see Appendix B.2.
With asymmetric special-interest CPs the market outcomes identified in Proposition 1 and 2
continue to hold. In particular, the area of market outcome I wherein all CPs are better off is
identical. However, under asymmetry also two additional market outcomes may arise (see market
outcomes V II and V III in Panel 2 in Figure 5). When CP A’s quality advantage is large enough
relative to the additional quality gain that is possible through adopting the social login (i.e., when
ν > 1
2
θ), CP A will not adopt the social login if CP B adopts it (market outcome V II). Formally,
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Figure 5 Illustration of possible market outcomes in the various model extensions.
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Note. For reference, Panel 1 shows the six feasible equilibrium market outcomes of our base model. The other
panels show the market outcomes in model extensions considered in Sections 5.1 to 5.3. Panel 2 assumes asymmetric
special-interest CPs (Section 5.1) and highlights the asymmetric adoption in market outcome V II. Panel 3 assumes
competing general-interest CPs (Section 5.2), which may lead to an additional prisoner’s dilemma for general-interest
CPs (market outcome IX) and can even yield a market outcome in which all CPs worse off (market outcome X).
Panel 4 assumes users multi-home at all available CPs (Section 5.3). Here, only one of the ex-ante symmetric special-
interest CPs may adopt the social login (market outcome XII). All figures are derived for αbi = 0.5, α
b
G = 0.5, τ =
0.5, θ= 0.1, δ= 0.5, ν = 0.125. Not all market outcomes may exist for all feasible parameter constellations.
for ν > 1
2
θ: Φa
′′
A >Φ
a′
B and Φ
a′
i >Φ
a′′
i for each CP i. In these cases CP B’s profit is increased whereas
CP A’s profit is reduced relative to the baseline where both would not adopt the social login.
More specifically, we can investigate how the degree of asymmetry affects the CPs’ social login
adoption decisions, everything else being equal. An increase in asymmetry, ν, makes it less likely
for CP A to adopt the social login (∂Φ
a′
A/∂ν > 0 and ∂Φ
a′′
A /∂ν > 0), and makes it more likely for CP
B to adopt the social login (∂Φ
a′
B/∂ν < 0 and ∂Φ
a′′
B /∂ν < 0). The effects of the remaining exogenous
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parameters are in line with the effects observed in the base model (see Appendix B.3). The insights
from this extension are summarized as follows.
Proposition 3. When special-interest CPs differ in quality, the social login may be adopted by
one of the two special-interest CPs exclusively. In these cases, the social login is adopted by the
lower quality CP, and never adopted exclusively by the higher quality CP. Otherwise Propositions 1
and 2 continue to hold.
5.2. Competition between general-interest CPs
Although the social login by Facebook is clearly the most widespread single sign-on solution among
users and content providers, there exist alternative social logins, e.g., by Google, Twitter, or
LinkedIn. Therefore, special-interest CPs can choose between different login providers, or they may
even multi-home with regard to different login providers. In this model extension, we assume that
there are two general-interest CPs k, k= F,G, who are in competition for users. Hence, users choose
to register either at CP F or at CP G. However, after having chosen a specific general-interest CP
and special-interest CP, users multi-home between those two CPs, as in the base model.
Like the special-interest CPs, general-interest CPs are assumed to be horizontally differentiated,
and users’ preferences for CP k, denoted by y, are uniformly distributed between zero and one. As
general-interest CPs are located at either end of the users’ preference spectrum, a type y consumer
derives utility of UF (y) = uF − τy or UG(y) = uG− τ(1− y), when consuming the content of CP F
or CP G, respectively. Preferences for general-interest and special-interest CPs are uncorrelated.
Therefore, users are evenly distributed in the unit square with mass one. According to the users’ CP
choices, four submarkets Dik, with ik ∈ {AF,BF,AG,BG} emerge (see Panel 3 in Figure 4). We
assume general-interest CPs to be symmetric in quality, i.e., uF = uG = u
b
k and now the adoption
of the social login not only increases users’ experience at the chosen special-interest CP, but also
at the general-interest CP by θ. The timing of the game is as follows:
Stage 1 General-interest CPs k (k = F,G) simultaneously but independently decide whether to
offer a social login to both special-interest CPs i. Users decide which general-interest CP to use.
Stage 2 Special-interest CPs i (i = A,B) simultaneously but independently decide whether to
adopt the social login of general-interest CP k. Users decide which special-interest CP to use.
Stage 3 All CPs simultaneously set advertisement prices pikj .
Stage 4 The advertiser decides at which CPs to advertise.
In line with the analysis for a monopolistic provider of the social login, the allocation of advertis-
ing and advertising prices can be derived based on the number of view-throughs nikj and the market
share Dik, which again depends on users’ adoption pattern and users’ choices of CPs. In particular,
in stage two, each CP i has four options: (i) to choose both logins (FG), (ii) to adopt only login F ,
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Figure 6 Market shares for different social login adoption patterns.
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Note. In Panel 1 market shares are symmetric, i.e., either no login is adopted, or both social logins (F and G) are
adopted by each CP i. In Panel 2 CP A adopts both logins (F and G), while CP B adopts none. Panel 3 denotes the
situation where CP A only adopts CP F , but CP B does not adopt a login. Finally, in Panel 4 CP A adopts both
social logins (F and G), but CP B only adopts CP F . We assume θ > 0 for this illustration.
(iii) to adopt only login G, or (iv) to adopt no login. Consequently, there are 4x4=16 possible
adoption patterns by special-interest CPs. Figure 6 illustrates the impact of different adoption
patterns on the ensuing market shares Dik, which are represented by the size of the respective area
in the unit square.
Next, we argue that of the 16 possible adoption patterns only four, namely those where the adop-
tion decisions of the special-interest CPs coincide, can arise in equilibrium. To see this, suppose it
would be profitable for special-interest CPs to adopt a different social login provider each. Then,
because the special-interest CPs are symmetric, each special-interest CP could always increase its
profit by additionally adopting the social login of the other provider as well. The precise adop-
tion and profitability thresholds for special-interest CPs in this model extension are derived in
Appendix C. In particular, note that competition between general-interest CPs does not resolve
the possible prisoner’s dilemma situation for the special-interest CPs. In fact, as we will see next,
an additional prisoner’s dilemma situation may arise for the general-interest CPs in this case.
Anticipating special-interest CPs’ adoption decisions, the general-interest CPs decide in the first
stage whether or not to offer the social login. However, in the presence of a second social login
provider, this decision now depends also on the other general-interest CP’s decision. Let Φo
′
denote
the highest φi for which CP k would still offer the login, provided that the other general-interest
CP does not offer the social login, and Φo
′′
the corresponding offer threshold, provided the other
general-interest CP does offer the social login. As shown in Appendix C, Φo
′
< Φo
′′
and thus,
because general-interest CPs are symmetric, either none (when φi >Φ
o′) or both (when φi ≤Φo′)
offer a social login. Moreover, the same logic as for the adoption decision of the special-interest
CPs now also applies for the offer of the general-interest CPs. The competition for users induces
general-interest CPs to offer a social login more often relative to the base model with a monopolistic
general-interest CP, i.e., threshold Φo
′
is shifted upwards. However, as the other general-interest
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CP also offers a social login, this means that general-interest CPs may eventually be worse off than
if they had both not offered the login. This occurs if φi >Φ
op (see Appendix C), which gives rise
to a new offer profitability threshold Φop and two additional market outcomes IX and X in which
the social login is offered and adopted, but not profitable for the general-interest CPs (see Panel 3
in Figure 5). Remarkably, in market outcome X all CPs make less profit than in the case without
a social login, although they voluntarily offer and adopt it. By contrast, in market outcome IX
the special-interest CPs actually benefit from adopting both social logins.
Proposition 4. When general-interest CPs offering a social login compete for market shares,
social logins are offered more often than with a monopolistic general-interest CP. Competing
general-interest CPs may find themselves in a prisoner’s dilemma (outcomes IX and X), when
Φo
′ ≥ φi >max{Φop,Φa′}, with Φa′, Φo′ and Φop given in Appendix C by Equations (9), (11) and
(13), respectively. When min{Φo′ ,Φap}>φi >max{Φop,Φa′} (market outcome X), all CPs are in a
prisoner’s dilemma and worse off by offering and adopting the social login. Otherwise Propositions
1 to 2 continue to hold.
5.3. Users multi-homing special-interest CPs
Until now we have assumed that users single-home special-interest CPs, and, in Section 5.2, also
general-interest CPs. Here, we explore an extension of the base model where users multi-home
all available CPs (A, B, and G) and thus, neither special-interest nor general-interest CPs are
in competition for users. Yet, it is important to see that CPs still compete for advertising (see
Panel 4 in Figure 4). In fact, all three CPs are in competition with each other in the advertising
market now. Single-homing and multi-homing mark the extremes of the possible spectrum of CPs’
competition for users and thus provide insightful benchmarks for all intermediate cases.
We model users’ multi-homing between special-interest CPs in the same way that we have
previously modeled multi-homing between CP i and CP G. That is, we assume that if users visit
a special-interest CP, then they visit CP A with probability ρ and CP B with probability 1− ρ.
In particular, to be able to compare results with the base model, we assume that special-interest
CPs are symmetric, i.e., ρ= 1/2. Moreover, we maintain the assumption that in each time period
users visit a special-interest CP with probability δ and a general-interest CP with probability 1−δ.
Consequently, the symmetric special-interest CPs both expect to be viewed by a total of Di,t = 1/2 δ
viewers in period t, whereas the general-interest CP expects the same number of viewers as in the
base model, i.e., DG,t = 1− δ. The timing is the same as in the base model.
Furthermore, multi-homing between special-interest CPs renders a single advertising market
with a mass of D = 1 users, in which all three CPs compete with each other for selection by
the advertiser. Thus, in contrast to single-homing, we cannot restrict our analysis to a particular
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advertising submarket in which CP G competes with a given CP i only for the mass of Di users.
This has two implications: First, instead of the submarket-specific targeting rate of CP G, αG(i), we
now consider CP G’s expected targeting rate in the joint market, i.e., αG = (αG(A)+αG(B))/2. Second,
we must now derive view-throughs and equilibrium prices considering the interaction between all
three CPs simultaneously. Still, this does not change the intuition that in equilibrium each CP sets
its price such that the advertiser is indifferent between advertising at that CP or choosing only the
other CPs (see Appendix D.1). In consequence, a CP’s profit now depends on the targeting rates
of all three CPs, but equilibrium profits (i.e., prices) still show the same properties with respect to
targeting rates as in the base model.
Based on equilibrium profits, we can derive the critical thresholds at which level of φi a CP i
would adopt the social login either unilaterally (Φa
′
) or jointly (Φa
′′
). While our analysis (see
Appendix D.2) shows that the general insights obtained in the base model remain intact, there
are several additional features that can be observed. This is best explained by means of Panel 4 in
Figure 5, which depicts all relevant thresholds and the possible market outcomes.
First, notice that the functional form of Φa
′′
is more complex than under single-homing, such
that for a given φG in the feasible parameter range, now two critical values for φi can exist, which
represent the respective upper and lower bound in which φi must lie (e.g., for φG = 1.75 in Panel 3 in
Figure 5). The additional upper bound exists because special-interest CPs are now in competition
with each other in the advertising market. As a result, special-interest CPs may not adopt the
social login jointly if the increase in their common targeting rate, i.e., φi = φA = φB, is too high.
As φi increases, the targeting rates of both special-interest CPs increases and thus, adopting the
social login may intensify the competition in the advertising market so much, that special-interest
CPs do not adopt the social login (particularly if φG is relatively high as well). By contrast, if only
one of the special-interest CPs would benefit from an increase in its targeting rate due to the social
login, then an increase in φi would always benefit that CP and make the adoption more likely, such
that an upper bound on φi would not exist (see Appendix D.5).
Second, in contrast to the base model, it may now be that Φa
′′
> Φa
′
, such that there exist
parameter ranges in which only exactly one of the special-interest CPs would adopt the social
login. Consequently, despite being symmetric ex-ante, under multi-homing special-interest CPs
may be asymmetric ex-post with respect to their social login adoption decision. Note that this
is qualitatively different than the asymmetric market outcome identified in Section 5.1, where
special-interest CPs were already asymmetric ex-ante. When users multi-home special-interest CPs,
asymmetric market adoption outcomes may occur, because the adoption of the social login by one
special-interest CP, say A, has ramifications for the whole mass of users, D= 1, and is not confined
to the submarket DA, as under single-homing. In particular, if CP A adopts the social login, but
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CP B does not, then the targeting rates of A and G increase, which immediately reduces the
equilibrium prices and profits of B in the advertising market. Now B must trade off whether it
wants to adopt the social login as well, which would not only increase its own targeting rate, but
also further increase the targeting rate of CP G. Consequently, if φG is relatively high compared
to φi, CP B will not adopt the social login as well (see outcome XII).
Third, when CP G decides whether to offer the social login, it will anticipate CP i’s adoption
decision and thus, also consider a possible asymmetry in adoption of the social login. Hence, there
now exist two different offer thresholds: (i) For φi ≤ Φo, CP G offers the social login when both
special-interest CPs will adopt the social login. Threshold Φo is identical to the offer threshold in
the base model, i.e., CP G’s incentive to offer a social login is unaffected by users single-homing or
multi-homing between special-interest CPs for cases in which both special-interest CPs will adopt
the social login. (ii) For φi ≤ Φo˜, CP G offers the social login when exactly one of the special-
interest CPs will adopt it. Notice that Φo˜ > Φo and thus, when users multi-home special-interest
CPs, CP G is willing to offer the social login in more parameter regions than in the base model
(see Appendix D.3).
Fourth, in the base model a prisoner’s dilemma outcome for special-interest CPs could arise,
because these CPs were in direct competition for users and market shares (see Proposition 2c).
Through the unilateral adoption of the social login, a special-interest CP could gain a competitive
advantage in the user market, which, however, was competed away if the other CP adopted the
social login as well. Interestingly, when users multi-home special-interest CPs, i.e., in the absence of
any competition for users, a prisoner’s dilemma outcome may still arise. This is due to the fact that
special-interest CPs are now in competition in the advertising market. In particular, the prisoner’s
dilemma arises, because for sufficiently high φi, each CP i has a unilateral incentive to adopt
the social login, which now provides a relative advantage in the advertising market. When both
special-interest CPs adopt the social login, this competitive advantage is competed away, whereas
CP G profits even more so, due to a further increase in its targeting rate. Consequently, if the
social login is adopted jointly, and φG is relatively large (market outcome II), then special-interest
CPs are worse off than without the login. Otherwise, if the social login is adopted jointly and φG
is relatively small (market outcome I), special-interest CPs may nevertheless profit from adoption.
However, market outcome I emerges in fewer cases than in the base model (see Appendix D.4).
Thus, adoption is less often beneficial for special-interest CPs when users multi-home rather than
single-home special-interest CPs. For intermediate cases in which some users single-home, whereas
others multi-home, the prisoner’s dilemma can arise from two different sources, which amplifies the
risk for special-interest CPs, and further corroborates the general insight of Proposition 2a.
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Finally, comparative statics results obtained in the base model and reported in Proposition 1b
and Proposition 2b by and large also hold under multi-homing (see Appendix D.5). One difference
is that for high φi = φA = φB an increase in the screen attention probability of special-interest
CPs, δ, makes it less likely that the social login is adopted by both special-interest CPs.14
Proposition 5. When users multi-home special-interest CPs, the same market outcomes as
under single-homing can arise. In addition, new market outcomes may arise, as only one of the
ex-ante symmetric special-interest CPs may adopt the social login in equilibrium. Despite not being
in competition for users, special-interest CPs may still find themselves in a prisoner’s dilemma,
because they are now in competition with each other in the advertising market. Otherwise Proposi-
tions 1 to 2 continue to hold qualitatively.
5.4. Investments in targeting rate improvement
In the following, we relax the assumption that the increase in targeting rate φj is exogenous and
allow CPs to invest in their individual level of φj. To this end, we modify the base model in two
ways. First, we introduce a Stage 0 that precedes the other stages of the base game, in which
CPs simultaneously decide on their optimal investment level of φj, anticipating the effect of their
choice on subsequent stages and market outcomes. Second, we assume that an increase in targeting
rate by φj > 1 incurs a fixed costs of C(Kj) := Kj(φj − 1)2 and thus a CP’s profit is given by
Πj = pj − C(Kj). Notice that the marginal costs of improving φj are increasing, which reflects
that it becomes increasingly difficult for the CPs to further exploit the additional user data made
available through the social login.
We consider two model variants. First, only the special-interest CPs must invest in φi and incur
costs, whereas φG is still considered to be exogenous and costless. Such a scenario is conceivable
when the general-interest CP can build on existing know-how and infrastructure when offering the
social login and harnessing the obtained data. This assumption is then relaxed in the second model
variant, in which CP G also has to invest in φG. In the following, we characterize the equilibrium
market outcomes for each model variant, whereas the complete analysis is relegated to Appendix E.
Only special-interest CPs invest in φi. By the logic of backward induction, we can immediately
analyze CP i’s investment decision in Stage 0, as we have already derived the equilibrium outcomes
of the subsequent stages. Recall that we consider again an extension to the base model, such that
users single-home special-interest CPs, and therefore, special-interest CPs are not in competition
with each other in the advertising market. Consequently, a CP’s investment decision does not
depend on the targeting rate of the other special-interest CP, but only on whether that CP adopts
the social login or not. Of course, a special-interest CP does care about the targeting rate of the
14 This is because there now exists an upper bound for φi in the CPs’ adoption threshold Φ
a′′
i , as explained above.
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general-interest CP in its advertising submarket, i.e., αG(i). In this first model variant, CP i takes
CP G’s increase in targeting rate after adoption of the social login, φG, as exogeneously given when
choosing its own φi. Let φi(φG) be the unconstrained investment level that would maximize Π
l,l
i ,
i.e., CP i’s profit in case that both special-interest CPs will adopt the social login. Now three cases
can be differentiated: (i) φi <Φ
a′ , (ii) Φa
′ ≤ φi ≤Φo, and (iii) φi >Φo, where Φa′ and Φo represent
the adoption and offer thresholds, respectively.15 In case (i), even if CP i could set the investment
level that maximizes its profit, it would still choose not to adopt the social login. Therefore, in
this case it is optimal for CP i not to invest in an increase in targeting rate at all, i.e., φ∗i = 0.
In case (ii), it is optimal for CP i to choose φ∗i = φi, because at this investment level the social
login will indeed be offered and adopted. In case (iii), if CP i would choose φi, the social login
would then not be offered by CP G. In this case CP i faces two possible options. Either it accepts
that the social login will not be offered and therefore does not invest at all, as in case (i), or it
strategically reduces its investment to φ∗i = Φ
o, so that CP G will just be willing to offer the social
login. In Appendix E.2, it is shown that each special-interest CP has an incentive to choose the
latter option.
The optimal investment level of φi and the ensuing market outcomes are illustrated by the bold
line in Panel 1 in Figure 7 for varying (exogenous) levels of φG. At low levels of φG, case (iii) occurs
and CP i will strategically reduce its investment level to Φo. At intermediate levels of φG, case (ii)
occurs and CP i can set φi to the unconstrained optimal level.
16 For high levels of φG, case (i)
occurs and CP i will not invest at all.
Two important insights can be derived from this analysis. First, the social login will be offered
and adopted more often when φi is determined endogenously, because the special-interest CPs will
strategically reduce φi in cases in which the social login would not be offered otherwise. Second,
when special-interest CPs choose their optimal increase in targeting rate, then this does not prevent
them to encounter a prisoner’s dilemma market outcome (see the outcomes denoted by the bold
line between Φa
′
and Φap in Panel 1 in Figure 7). In Stage 0, no special-interest CP can commit
not to invest in φi (anticipating the ensuing adoption decisions in subsequent stages), provided
that the other special-interest CP does not invest. Thus, Proposition 2a continues to hold.
Special-interest and general-interest CPs invest in φj. In the second model variant, we assume
that both, φi and φG are determined endogenously and simultaneously in Stage 0 according to
the same cost function. In order to constitute an equilibrium, the chosen investment levels must
15 These thresholds are derived in the same way as in Equations (5) and (8). However, because a CP’s profit func-
tion now includes a cost term, these thresholds are different than their respective counterparts in the base model.
Nevertheless, we use the same notation as before to denote these thresholds.
16 For completeness, we note that for some parameter constellations, case (ii) may not exist. For details we refer to
Appendix E.2.
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be best responses to each other. That is, the equilibrium is given by the tupel (φ∗G, φ
∗
i ), where
the best response functions φ∗i (φG) and φ
∗
G(φi) intersect. Recall that the best response function of
CP i, φ∗i (φG), has been readily derived in the previous model variant and is depicted in Panel 1 in
Figure 7. Now, let φG(φi) denote the unconstrained investment function of CP G, provided that
the social login is indeed used and
(
φ+G, φ
+
i
)
denote the point, where the unconstrained investment
functions of CP i, φi(φG), and CP G would intersect. Again, three cases must be differentiated:
(i) φ+i < Φ
a′(φ+G), (ii) Φ
a′(φ+G) ≤ φ+i ≤ Φo(φ+G), and (iii) φ+i > Φo(φ+G). The corresponding best
response functions and equilibrium investment levels, (φ∗G, φ
∗
i ) are depicted in Panel 2-4 in Figure 7,
respectively. Note that the best response function of CP G can be derived according to the same
reasoning as above, i.e., for low values of φi, CP G would strategically reduce its unconstrained
investment level just enough that CP i would adopt the social login, and for high values of φi,
CP G would not offer the social login and therefore does not invest. It can be seen from Figure 7
that in each of the three cases there exists a unique intersection of the best response functions that
marks the equilibrium outcome.
Two main insights can be derived from this extended analysis. First, when both types of CPs
choose their increase in targeting rate endogenously, the social login will be offered and adopted
in any case, because each type of CP is willing to strategically reduce its targeting rate in order
to induce the other type of CP to offer or adopt the social login. Second, the prisoner’s dilemma
outcome is still feasible in equilibrium (see Panel 3 in Figure 7.)
Proposition 6. When CPs can choose the increase in their respective targeting rate, φj, strate-
gically according to a convex cost function, then the social login is offered and adopted more often
in equilibrium. This is because CPs can strategically reduce their increase in targeting rate to reach
a mutual agreement. However, for special-interest CPs, a prisoner’s dilemma market outcome can
nevertheless emerge.
6. Welfare and Policy Implications
Based on the equilibrium analysis provided above, we now conduct a normative analysis of the
effects of social logins from which we can then deduce policy implications. We adopt a total welfare
standard, i.e., efficient market outcomes are those where the sum of users’, CPs’ and the advertiser’s
surplus is maximized. It can readily be shown that adoption of the social login is always (weakly)
welfare improving in case there are no costs for offering or adopting it.17 First, adoption improves
the user experience (θ≥ 0) and thus, the social login is always (weakly) increasing users’ surplus.
17 This is the case for the base model and the extensions in Section 5.1 to 5.3. In the extension in Section 5.4, offering
and/or adopting the social login is costly, and consequently, for high values of Kj , and low values of θ adoption of the
social login may not be efficient. However, it can be shown that in equilibrium, the social login will not be adopted
if it is not efficient to do so.
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Figure 7 Illustration of equilibrium market outcomes with endogenous investments.
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Note. Best response functions are depicted as a bold black line for special-interest CPs and as a bold grey line for the
general-interest CP. In Panel 1, only the special-interest CPs invest in φi. Here, the best response function denotes
the equilibrium market outcome for each φG. In Panels 2-4, the special- and general-interest CPs invest in φj . Here,
the equilibrium market outcome is given by the point (φ∗G, φ
∗
i ) at which the best response functions intersect. All
figures are drawn for αbi = 0.5, α
b
G = 0.5, τ = 0.5, θ= 0.1, δ= 0.5.
Second, adoption of the social login (weakly) increases the CPs’ targeting ability (φj ≥ 1), which
allows them to generate more view-throughs that are valuable to the advertiser Z. Therefore, the
social login increases the sum of the advertiser’s and CPs’ profit.18 Taken together, total welfare
must therefore increase with the adoption of the social login.
Proposition 7. If there are no additional costs for adopting or offering the social login, it
is socially efficient to use it. Therefore, market outcomes I and II are the only efficient market
outcomes. In all other cases the underprovisioning of the social login creates market failures.
18 Note that advertising prices, pj , simply represent welfare neutral profit transfers between the advertiser Z and the
respective CP, and thus, they do not affect total welfare.
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Generally, our model suggests that there is scope for policy interventions, as efficient market
outcomes occur only in some of the possible cases. Based on the insights derived above, two kinds
of policy interventions are worth discussing. First, any type of policy that stimulates competition
between CPs will increase the offer or adoption of social logins (see Proposition 1c and 4) and
thereby increases welfare. While this is true within the scope of our model, it also needs to be
mentioned that there may well exist countervailing welfare effects that come along with an increase
in competition. Most importantly, if one were to consider network effects, then, everything else
being equal, a single, monopolistic general-interest CP could yield a higher social welfare. Of course,
as we will argue next, monopoly power gives rise to a new host of policy issues.
Second, it is important to see that even if there is competition among general-interest CPs in
offering a social login, once a special-interest CP has chosen and adopted a particular login service,
it is likely to become reliant on this service, which then grants the general-interest CP considerable
market power. In the present context, it is therefore particularly problematic if the general-interest
CP chooses to revoke the social login service from a special-interest CP after adoption, because
this endangers the special-interest CP’s customer relationship that is mediated by the social login.
In the light of our analysis, the general-interest CP has incentives to revoke the social login if the
special-interest CP has since improved its targeting rate, such that it now exceeds the threshold
Φo. Indeed, although Facebook generally allows every CP to employ the social login, it lays out
in its platform policy quite vaguely that it may “enforce against [a] [...] website if [Facebook]
concludes that [it] violates [its] terms or is negatively impacting the platform” and that in this
case it “may or may not notify [the website] in advance”.19 Alternatively, the general-interest CP
may just renegotiate the conditions under which the special-interest CP may use the social login.
For example, it may require that the special-interest CPs reveals more data to the general-interest
CP through the social login, which in turn would increase the targeting rate of the general-interest
CP. If revocation or renegotiation of the social login is in fact triggered by an improved targeting
ability of the special-interest CP, then this would likely qualify as an abuse of market power, which
should be penalized by authorities. In order to prevent such abusive behavior in the first place, an
appropriate policy instrument can be to impose a non-discrimination obligation on general-interest
CPs offering a social login. This means that if the general-interest CP chooses to offer the social
login, it has to offer it to all CPs under equal conditions. Such a non-discrimination obligation
may lead to more or less offers of the social login, because the general-interest CP then has to
weigh profitable and unprofitable offers across special-interest markets. In addition, when users
multi-home special-interest CPs, a non-discrimination rule affects the general-interest CP’s offer
19 See https://developers.facebook.com/policy, “Things you should know”, number 6.
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threshold already within a particular special-interest market. More specifically, in Appendix D.6 it
is shown that a non-discrimination rule makes the offer of a social login more likely if φi is relatively
small, but less likely if φi is relatively large.
Finally, it is highlighted that social logins can be seen as a means to circumvent other policy
interventions that are aimed at protecting personal data. For example, in the consultation on the
European ePrivacy Directive, several stakeholders have called for a stricter regulatory approach
which discourages and limits CPs’ use of cookies and so-called tracking walls (c.f., Article 29 Data
Protection Working Party 2017). Social logins, however, are not targeted by this regulation as they
already require users’ informed consent. Yet, the continued tracking and sharing of users’ data may
possibly call for additional transparency obligations.
7. Managerial Implications
Our analysis bears several important managerial implications. First, our analysis shows very
robustly across all model variants that special-interest CPs can be in a prisoner’s dilemma situation
when deciding whether to adopt the social login. This is particularly likely (i) when the social login
enables a large improvement in the user experience, and (ii) when special-interest CPs compete
fiercely, either for (single-homing) users directly, or for targeted advertisements to multi-homing
users (view-throughs), or both. The prisoner’s dilemma situation arises, as each special-interest
CP is unilaterally willing to adopt the social login and thereby to share data with the general-
interest CP in order to gain an immediate competitive advantage (either in the user market or the
advertising market) over the other special-interest CP. However, in so doing, the targeting rate
of the general-interest CP is also improved, granting it a better competitive position relative to
the adopting special-interest CP in the advertising market. When the other special-interest CP
also adopts the social login in order to catch up with its rival special-interest CP, the immediate
competitive advantage in the user market vanishes, but the competitive disadvantage with respect
to the general-interest CP in the advertising market remains. Therefore, our analysis highlights
that special-interest CPs, who intend to adopt a social login, should carefully weigh the positive
short term effects in the direct competition with other special-interest CPs against the potentially
negative long run effects in the indirect competition in the advertising market with the general-
interest CP. Of course, in practice the assessment will depend on a number of factors, only the
most important of which we have explicitly modelled here. However, our analysis suggests that
managers should not make themselves dependent on the service provided by the social login and
reevaluate the adoption decision after some time. If the social login did really provide a sustained
competitive advantage with respect to competing CPs, or if it improved the CP’s targeting ability
significantly, then it should be continued. Otherwise, the prisoner’s dilemma outcome is very likely
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and CPs should find ways in which they can reduce the information shared with the social login
provider without reducing the users’ experience.
Second, we characterized the industry conditions under which the adoption (and offer) of a social
login is most likely. More specifically, we showed that adoption and offer of the social login is less
likely for mature CPs, who (i) have already achieved high targeting rates without the social login
and (ii) already provide high user experience and have stable market shares. However, if mature
CPs adopt the social login nevertheless, then a prisoner’s dilemma outcome is indeed very likely.
In reverse, start-up CPs, who currently have low targeting rates or low market shares and provide
lower user experience than their immediate competitors, are particularly prone to adopting the
social login, but as discussed above, they should do so very carefully.
Third, in order to prevent a prisoner’s dilemma situation, CPs could also try to revert to login
solutions of CPs that are not immediately competing in the same advertising market, or, alterna-
tively, try to become a login provider themselves. On the one hand, large CPs with well-established
customer relationships may find it attractive to offer a social login themselves, instead of relying on
the login service of another provider. This is, for example, what Google, LinkedIn or Twitter have
done in response to Facebook’s social login. However, as we have highlighted in our analysis, if the
providers that offer the login service are themselves in competition for the same set of users, then
they merely jumped out of the frying pan into the fire, as the prisoner’s dilemma situation can
also arise among competing general-interest CPs. On the other hand, more and more traditional
companies with well-established customer relationships that are not in immediate competition with
large internet companies are currently trying to establish themselves as trusted intermediaries that
offer a login service. For example, in Germany an alliance formed by car manufacturer Daimler
Benz, banks Deutsche Bank and Postbank, Axel Spinger media group and Allianz insurance, among
others, has recently announced that they want to launch a joint platform for online registration as
a “European response to the international platform economy” (Daimler AG 2017). Similarly, the
European telecom provider Telefo´nica is currently pursuing a strategy whereby it seeks to develop
its established customer relationship further in order to become a trusted data intermediary (Gor-
don 2017). While it yet has to be seen whether these approaches prove to be successful, our analysis
confirms that there might indeed be a need for such services, provided by old economy market
players.
8. Conclusions, Outlook and Limitations
Individual user data is precious in the data-driven internet economy, because it allows CPs to
improve their content and services (e.g., through personalization), and to improve their ability
to place targeted advertisements. While better content is relevant for the competition for website
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visitors or app users, a better targeting rate is relevant for the competition in the advertising
market. In this article, we have investigated the strategic effects on both types of competition when
a social networking site (i.e., a general-interest CP) and a special-interest CP voluntarily agree to
share their user data by means of a social login, and identified the winners and losers in the various
market outcomes that may arise.
Whereas our exposition was framed in the context of data sharing through a social login, we
note that our insights should also apply to other settings where a third-party provider offers a
“free” service that improves the user experience, but which also allows it to attain data about
the customers of the providers that use this service. For example, Amazon offers a Fulfillment
by Amazon (FBA) service to its marketplace sellers, whereby the sellers’ products are shipped
to Amazon’s warehouse first and then, the shipping of customer orders is handled by Amazon.
Through FBA, sellers’ products become eligible for free shipping through Amazon’s popular Prime
program, which gives these sellers a distinct competitive advantage (Ali 2016). Amazon offers
FBA also for sales that are placed on the sellers’ own website or through other marketplaces like
eBay (Amazon.com, Inc. 2017). Evidently, this allows Amazon to gain valuable information about
the FBA sellers’ businesses, such as the origin of its products (which are delivered directly to
Amazon’s warehouse), product popularity and the customers that have bought these products,
even outside of Amazon’s marketplace. Of course, thereby sellers run the risk that its popular
products are soon being sold by Amazon directly and that its customer data is fed into Amazon’s
recommender system. In other words, adopting FBA improves Amazon’s ability to generate sales,
possibly yielding a prisoner’s dilemma for marketplace sellers.
Another example is given by Google’s Accelerated Mobile Pages (AMP) project20, which offers
CPs that adopt this technology a competitive advantage through faster loading landing pages and
a prominent placement in Google’s search results. In order to use AMP, CPs have to embed a
script from Google’s servers in their respective websites, thereby enabling Google to access the
websites’ connection data. Moreover, the websites’ contents are cached on Google’s servers, such
that customers that click on an AMP accelerated link do not even reach the respective CP’s
own server anymore. In addition, AMP limits the CPs advertising ability and website analytics
(Grybniak 2017). In terms of our model, this means that the special-interest CP’s increase in
targeting rate after adoption, φi, may not increase or even decrease. In turn, our model would
predict that special-interest CPs adopting AMP always end up in a prisoner’s dilemma situation.
Although our main insights have proven to be very robust across several model variants, in
closing, we wish to point out some limitations of our analysis that call for future research. First,
20 See https://www.ampproject.org.
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throughout our analysis we have assumed that the user market is covered, i.e., that an increase in
market share of one CP will inevitably result in a decrease in market share of the competing CP.
Instead, one could assume that there exists some additional latent demand from new users, which
could be tapped by increasing the user experience through the social login. This could possibly
mitigate the likelihood of a prisoner’s dilemma outcome. Second, some of the model parameters
that are currently treated as independent and exogenous may in fact be correlated and partially
endogenous. For example, the screen attention may depend on the user experience that a CP
offers, or a CP’s targeting rate may depend on its demand. This will likely amplify the already
observed effects. Third, we have assumed that users perceive the increase in content value higher
than potential privacy concerns due to the social login. If instead, privacy concerns predominate
(see, e.g., Kontaxis et al. 2012), the prisoner’s dilemma would be reversed in the sense that special-
interest CPs may not adopt the social login although it would eventually be beneficial to them. In
reality, users will be heterogeneous with respect to their privacy preference and thus, both cases
exist simultaneously. The overall trade-off will thus be determined by the idiosyncratic privacy
profile of the CP’s target audience. Fourth, there are also additional strategic threats due to the
commitment that special-interest CPs incur when adopting a social login, which we have not
explicitly modeled here. For example, commitment occurs, because once data has been shared, it
cannot be taken back anymore. Moreover, after adopting the social login a technological lock-in
may occur, so that the proper functioning of the special-interest CP’s own service may strongly
depend on the provision and functioning of the social login itself, which is controlled by a third
party. This may give rise to the well-known hold-up problem. And fifth, there are also legal risks
to be considered when using a social login (Van Der Sype and Seigneur 2014), which could give
rise to additional fixed costs for adopting the social login (see Appendix E.1 for a corresponding
analysis). This may in fact yield asymmetric adoption of the social login, mitigating the risk of a
prisoner’s dilemma outcome.
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Appendix A: Users single-homing symmetric special-interest CPs
A.1. Existence of a unique advertising pricing equilibrium in pure strategies
In Stage 3 of the main model there are two advertising submarkets given by Di. In each submarket, the
general-interest CP G and the special-interest CP i compete for advertising by setting prices pi and pG(i),
respectively. These prices are the total prices that CPs charge for displaying ads of advertiser Z.
In Stage 4 the advertiser can choose whether it wants to advertise at CP G exclusively, at CP i exclusively,
or at both CPs. It will do so in order to maximize the difference between the sum of view-throughs that are
generated from the ads minus the sum of advertising prices that Z has to pay. As highlighted in Equations (1)
and (2), the view-throughs that are generated by a given CP depend on the targeting rate of the other CP.
In particular, if advertiser Z would choose not to display advertisements at a given CP, say CP G, then
the view-throughs that are generated by the other CP, say CP i, would increase. However, the total sum of
view-throughs at CP G and CP i would decrease. View-throughs nei and n
e
G(i) can be derived by setting the
missing targeting rate of the respective other CP to zero. Then the following conditions hold: (i) ni < n
e
i ,
(ii) nG(i) <n
e
G(i), (iii) ni +nG(i) >n
e
i , (iv) ni +nG(i) >n
e
G(i).
The CPs’ pricing equilibrium is constituted by a set of prices p∗i , p
∗
G(i) from which none of the two CPs has
an incentive to deviate unilaterally, i.e., from which none of the two CPs can increase its profit by setting a
different price, holding the price of the other CP constant. Now suppose that CP i chooses a price that is so
high that the advertiser would choose only to advertise at CP G in a given submarket. Then the advertiser
Z would make a profit of neG(i)− pG(i), CP G would make a profit of pG(i) and CP i would make a profit of
zero in that submarket. Clearly, this situation cannot constitute an equilibrium, because CP i could make a
larger profit if it would reduce its price so that advertiser Z would choose to advertise at CP i as well. If Z
advertises at both CPs, then Z makes a profit of ni− pi +nG(i)− pG(i).
In order to be selected by Z, CP i would be willing to reduce its price just enough that advertiser Z is
indifferent between choosing CP i and CP G jointly, or remaining exclusively with CP G. This price must
therefore fulfill the following condition neG(i) − pG(i) = nG(i) − pG(i) + ni − pi. This is exactly the condition
that is given by Equation (3). Reducing the price any further has no immediate benefit for CP i, because, as
long as both CPs are selected by Z, any reduction in price will immediately reduce its revenue. Of course,
the same logic also applies to CP G, and therefore, it will also choose a price just low enough that it will be
chosen by Z (as opposed to exclusive advertising at CP i), but not any lower. This gives the corresponding
condition nei − pi = nG(i)− pG(i) +ni− pi which is exactly Equation (4). Consequently, in equilibrium, both
conditions have to be satisfied simultaneously, and the two equilibrium prices can be determined by solving
the system of equations for the two unknown prices. As will be shown in Appendix A.2, the linear system of
equations has a unique solution and thus, there exists a unique equilibrium in pure strategies.
Indeed, following the reasoning above, in equilibrium both conditions have to be binding. If the advertiser
would prefer to choose one CP exclusively, then the excluded CP would have an incentive to lower its price
until it is chosen. In reverse, if a CP is chosen by the advertiser, then is has an incentive to increase the
price as much as possible, as long as this does not induce the advertiser to switch to the competing CP
exclusively. This is precisely the logic that is embedded in Equations (3) and (4) for the special-interest CP
Winners, Losers, and Facebook: The Role of Social Logins in the Online Advertising Ecosystem
68
and the general-interest CP, respectively.
Note that this logic readily extends to an arbitrary number of CPs, say n. The equilibrium price of each
CP j is constrained from above by the fact that the advertiser Z must just be indifferent in choosing to
advertise at all n CPs, or advertising at just n− 1 CPs, i.e., at all CPs but CP j. Thus, for n CPs, a system
of n equations must be solved to derive the equilibrium prices. We solve the pricing equilibrium with three
CPs in Section 5.3 and Appendix D.1 when we consider users multi-homing special-interest CPs. Clearly,
as n approaches infinity, equilibrium prices will approach zero, as the impact of each CP in the advertiser’s
decision becomes arbitrarily small.
A.2. Equilibrium prices and comparative statics
Simultaneously solving Equations (3) and (4) yields the following equilibrium prices:
p∗A =−
δαA(−uB + τ +uA)((αA− 2αG(A))δ+ 2αG(A)− 2)
2τ
p∗B =−
δαB(uB + τ −uA)((αB − 2αG(B))δ+ 2αG(B)− 2)
2τ
p∗G(A) =
(−1 + δ)((αA−αG(A)/2)δ+αG(A)/2− 1)(−uB + τ +uA)αG(A)
τ
p∗G(B) =
(−1 + δ)((αB −αG(B)/2)δ+αG(B)/2− 1)(uB + τ −uA)αG(B)
τ
Note that the parameters uA, uB and τ determine the subset of relevant users Di (c.f., Section 3). Conse-
quently, equilibrium prices can also be written as follows:
p∗i =−αiδ((αi− 2αG(i))δ+ 2αG(i)− 2)Di
p∗G(i) = 2αG(i)(−1 + δ)((αi−αG(i)/2)δ+αG(i)/2− 1)Di
Next, we conduct comparative statics to identify the effects of changing the model’s exogenous parameters.
In doing so, we use the just derived equilibrium prices depending on Di to show the effects of changing a
CP’s market share. The market share Di itself is affected by changes of special-interest CPs’ base utility and
the competitive intensity as follows: ∂Di
∂ui
> 0, ∂Di
∂u−i
< 0 and ∂Di
∂τ
> 0 for u−i >ui, whereas
∂Di
∂τ
< 0 for ui >u−i.
Comparative statics on p∗i of the special-interest CP i.
CP i’s targeting rate αi:
∂p∗i
∂αi
= −2((αi−αG(i))δ+αG(i)− 1)δDi > 0.
CP G’s targeting rate αG(i):
∂p∗i
∂αG(i)
= 2αiδ(δ− 1)Di < 0.
Screen attention δ:
∂p∗i
∂δ
= −2((αi− 2αG(i))δ+αG(i)− 1)αiDi > 0.
CP i’s market share Di:
∂p∗i
∂Di
= −αiδ((αi− 2αG(i))δ+ 2αG(i)− 2)> 0.
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Comparative statics on p∗G(i) of the general-interest CP G.
CP i’s targeting rate αi:
∂p∗G(i)
∂αi
= 2αG(i)δ(δ− 1)Di < 0.
CP G’s targeting rate αG(i):
∂p∗G(i)
∂αG(i)
= 2((αi−αG(i))δ+αG(i)− 1)(δ− 1)Di > 0.
Screen attention δ:
∂p∗G(i)
∂δ
= 2(2αiδ− δαG(i)−αi +αG(i)− 1)αG(i)Di < 0.
CP i’s market share Di:
∂p∗G(i)
∂Di
= 2αG(i)(δ− 1)((αi−αG(i)/2)δ+αG(i)/2− 1)> 0.
A.3. Special-interest CPs’ adoption decision (Stage 2)
In summary, four different scenarios can be distinguished: Either both special-interest CPs adopt (scenario
l, l) or do not adopt (scenario b, b) the social login, or only one CP adopts the social login (scenarios l, b
and b, l). On the one hand, the unilateral adoption of the social login increases a special-interest CP’s utility
by θ, which generates a competitive advantage over the other special-interest CP and results in an increase
of its market share from Db,bi to D
l,b
i . However, if the rival CP also adopts the social login, then both CPs
offer a higher, but identical utility and thus, market shares are equal again, i.e., Db,bi =D
l,l
i . Moreover, the
social login may increase the special-interest CP’s targeting rate based on the additional information over
its users and therefore increases its advertising effectiveness, i.e., αi = φiα
b
i . On the other hand, data sharing
may also improve the general-interest CP’s targeting rate, i.e., αG(i) = φGα
b
G, which negatively affects the
special-interest CP’s advertising revenues.
Case (b,b): None of the CPs adopt the social login. In this case, market shares are given by DbA =
DbB =
1
2
and profits, which equal prices, are obtained by simultaneously solving Equations (3) and (4). Note
that view-throughs under exclusive advertising (nei and n
e
G(i)) can be calculated by assuming a rival CP with
targeting rate αG(i) = 0 or αi = 0, respectively. Thus, for the baseline scenario (b,b), Conditions (3) and (4)
can be stated as
nG(i)(D
b
i , δ,α
b
i , α
b
G)− pb,bG(i)(·) +ni(Dbi , δ,αbi , αbG)− pb,bi (·) = neG(i)(Dbi , δ,0, αbG)− pb,bG(i)(·)
nG(i)(D
b
i , δ,α
b
i , α
b
G)− pb,bG(i)(·) +ni(Dbi , δ,αbi , αbG)− pb,bi (·) = nei (Dbi , δ,αbi ,0)− pb,bi (·).
Solving simultaneously yields the special-interest CP i’s price and, as we assume zero marginal costs, also
profit
Πb,bi = p
b,b
i =
1
2
δ αbi · (2 (1−αbG) + δ (2αbG−αbi)).
Note that case (b, b) represents our benchmark case. Our analyses in Section 4 will thus compare the resulting
profits in the case that CPs adopt the social login to this case where no special-interest CP adopts the social
login.
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Case (l,b): CP i adopts the social login, but the other special-interest CP does not. If CP i adopts
the social login, but its special-interest rival−i does not, it gains a relative advantage with regard to the utility
that users derive from consuming its services, i.e., ui = u
b + θ with θ≥ 0 (see Chapter 3). In consequence, it
is able to increase its market share, as demand is now given by Dli =
τ+θ
2τ
, whereas its rival has a demand of
Dl−i =
τ−θ
2τ
. Moreover, CP i’s targeting rate is increased to αi = min{φiαbi ,1} with φi ≥ 1. However, adoption
of the social login also increases the targeting rate of CP G for the mass of users that consume services of
CP i, i.e., αG(i) = min{φGαbG,1} with φG ≥ 1. Note that the targeting rate of CP G with respect to users
that consume services of the rival CP −i is unaffected, i.e., αG(−i) = αbG(−i). Solving Equations (3) and (4)
analogously to the case (b, b) yields a price and profit of
Πl,bi = p
l,b
i =
δ αbiφi (τ + θ)
2 τ
· (2− δ αbiφi− 2αbGφG (1− δ)).
Case (b,l): CP i does not adopt the social login, but the other special-interest CP does. This case
is symmetric to case (l, b), but CP i is now put at a disadvantage with regard to competition for users as its
special-interest rival benefits from users’ increased valuation for that CP’s services due to the adoption of
the social login. Whereas this diminishes CP i’s market share to Dli =
τ−θ
2τ
, its own advertising rate as well
as the targeting rate of the general-interest CP for its mass of users Di is the same as in the baseline case,
i.e., αi = α
b
i and αG(i) = α
b
G. Solving Equations (3) and (4) analogously to the previous cases yields a price
and profit of
Πb,li = p
b,l
i =
δ αbi (τ − θ)
2 τ
· (2 (1−αbG)− δ (αbi − 2αbG)).
Case (l,l): Both CPs adopt the social login. If both CPs adopt the social login, users of both outlets
benefit from an increased utility when consuming the services of their respective CP, i.e., ui = u
b+θ. However,
due to symmetry, CPs do not gain any competitive advantage and the surplus is appropriated exclusively
by users. Thus, market shares are symmetric and identical to the baseline case (b, b), Dli =D
b
i =
1
2
. On the
contrary, the impact of the social login on targeting rates is still effective, i.e., αi = φiα
b
i for both i=A,B
and αG(A) = αG(B) = φGα
b
G. Solving Equations (3) and (4) analogously to the previous cases yields a price
and profit of
Πl,li = p
l,l
i =
1
2
δ αbiφi · (2 (1−αbGφG) + δ (2αbGφG−αbiφi)).
A.4. General-interest CP’s offer decision (Stage 1)
Case (b,b): None of the special-interest CPs adopt the social login. If none of the CPs adopt the
social login, the targeting rates that determine the general-interest CP’s advertising profit are given by the
baseline targeting rates of special-interest CPs A and B, i.e., αbA = α
b
B = α
b
i , and by the general-interest
CP’s own baseline targeting rate αbG(A) = α
b
G(B) = α
b
G for users of both CP A and B. Solving Equations (3)
and (4), as shown for the profit-maximization of special-interest CPs, yields CP G’s price
pb,b
G(i) = α
b
G (1− δ) · (1−
1
2
αbG− δ (αbi −
1
2
αbG),
resulting in a total profit of Πb,bG = 2 · pb,bG(i). Please note that Case (b, b) represents our benchmark case. Our
analyses in Section 4 will thus compare the resulting profits with the offer of the social login to this case
where no special-interest (general-interest) CP adopts (offers) the social login.
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Cases (l,b) and (b,l): One special-interest CP adopts the login, but the other special-interest CP
does not. If one special-interest CP adopts the social login, say CP A, whereas the other special-interest CP
does not, say CP B, targeting rates are asymmetrically affected by the social login. The mass of users DA,
i.e., users that choose to visit CP A, can now be targeted at both outlets CP A and CP G with targeting rates
αA = φiα
b
i and αG(A) = φGα
b
G, respectively. In contrast, the targeting ability does not change with regard to
DB, i.e., users that choose to visit CP B. Thus CP B and CP G can target these users according to their
baseline targeting rates αB = α
b
i and αG(B) = α
b
G, respectively. Solving Equations (3) and (4), as shown for
the profit-maximization of special-interest CPs, yields CP G’s price
pl,b
G(A) = p
b,l
G(B) =
−(τ + θ)(δ− 1)(αbGφG(φG(δ− 1)αbG− 2δφiαbi + 2)
2τ
,
pl,b
G(B) = p
b,l
G(A) =
αbG(τ − θ)((αbG− 2αbi)δ−αbG + 2)(δ− 1)
2τ
,
and (assuming symmetric special-interest CPs) a total profit of
Πl,bG = Π
b,l
G =
1
t
αbG (δ− 1) (−
1
2
(δ− 1) (φ2G τ +φ2G θ+ τ − θ)αbG + ((φi φG + 1) τ+
θ (φi φG− 1))αbi δ+ t(−φG− 1) τ − θ (φG− 1)).
Case (l,l): Both special-interest CPs adopt the social login. If both special-interest CPs adopt the
social login, targeting rates are again symmetric for CP A and CP B, but are now increased by φi for
special-interest CPs and by φG for the general-interest CP, respectively. Consequently, targeting rates in this
case are given by αA = αB = αi = φiα
b
i and αG(i) = φGα
b
G. Solving Equations (3) and (4) as shown for the
profit-maximization of special-interest CPs yields CP G’s price
pl,l
G(i) = (1− δ)φGαbG ·
(
1− δ φiαbi −
1
2
(1− δ)φGαbG
)
,
resulting in a total profit of Πl,lG = 2 · pl,lG(i).
A.5. Comparative statics on adoption, offer and profitability thresholds
Adoption threshold (CP i): Given CP i’s rationale to adopt the social login ∆l,b−b,b = Πl,bi −Πb,bi ≥ 0,
comparative statics with respect to the exogenous model parameters exhibit the following effects. Note that
a positive effect on ∆l,b−b,b makes the adoption of the social login more likely. Consequently, the adoption
threshold Φa
′
decreases if the effect on ∆l,b−b,b is positive, and vice versa.
CP G’s targeting rate αbG:
∂∆l,b−b,b
∂αbG
=
1
2τ
· (((φG φi− 1)τ + θ φG φi)(δ− 1)δ αbi)< 0 ⇒ ∂Φa′∂αbG > 0.
CP G’s increase in targeting rate φG:
∂∆l,b−b,b
∂φG
=
1
τ
· (αbGαbi (τ + θ)δ (δ− 1)φi)< 0 ⇒ ∂Φa′∂φG > 0.
CP i’s targeting rate αbi :
∂∆l,b−b,b
∂αbi
=
1
τ
· (δ ((−αbi φi2δ+ (δ φGαbG−φGαbG + 1)φi
+ (−αbG +αbi)δ+αbG− 1)τ + θ φi (δ φGαbG−φiαbi δ−φGαbG + 1))
)
,
∂Φa
′
∂αbi
> 0
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To show that the above condition is satisfied, we first show that the derivative ∂Φ
a′
∂αb
i
is strictly monotone
within the feasible parameter range, and second, demonstrate that it is positive within that range. For the
first part, we assume that the derivative is not strictly monotone. Then, there must exist an αbG in the
feasible parameter range that solves ∂Φ
a′
∂αb
i
= 0. The unique root of this equation with respect to αbG > 0 is
given by αbG,0 :=
−
√
τ (φG−1)2(τ+θ)−(τ+θ)φG+τ
(δ−1)((τ+θ)φ2
G
−τ) . Notice that the effect of δ on α
b
G,0 is positive. Therefore, δ = 0
constitutes a lower bound for αbG,0. Within the feasible parameter range, it must hold that the targeting rate
αG(i) = α
b
G ·φG < 1 and τ > 0. However, even for the lower bound αbG,0, any τ > 0 yields αG(i) = αbG ·φG > 1,
which contradicts the assumption that the derivative is not strictly monotone. The second part is easy to
show by means of an numerical example.
CP i’s increase in targeting rate φi:
∂∆l,b−b,b
∂φi
=
1
τ
· (δ αbi (τ + θ)(φG δ αbG− δ αbi φi−φGαbG + 1))> 0.
CP i’s increase in base utility θ:
∂∆l,b−b,b
∂θ
=
1
2τ
· (δ φiαbi (2φG δ αbG− δ αbi φi− 2φGαbG + 2))> 0 ⇒ ∂Φa′∂θ < 0.
Screen attention δ:
∂∆l,b−b,b
∂δ
=
2
τ
· (((−1/2αbi φi2δ+ (1/2 +φG (δ− 1/2)αbG)φi + (−δ+ 1/2)αbG
+ 1/2αbi δ− 1/2)τ + θ (−1/2φiαbi δ+ 1/2 +φG (δ− 1/2)αbG)φi)αbi
)
,
∂Φa
′
∂δ
< 0.
To show that the above condition is satisfied, solve ∂Φ
a′
∂δ
= 0 and reorder with respect to τ . The sign of the
derivative changes twice: first at τ = 0, second at τ < 0 as long as αbi < 2
φG α
b
G−1
φG α
b
G
+αb
G
−2 , which is always satisfied
given the assumption φG > 1.
Competitive intensity τ :
∂∆l,b−b,b
∂τ
=− 1
2τ2
· (δφiαbiθ(2δφGαbG−φiδαbi − 2φGαbG + 2))< 0 ⇒ ∂Φa′∂τ > 0.
To show that the condition above is satisfied, solve ∂∆
l,b−b,b
∂τ
= 0 and reorder with respect to θ. The derivative
changes its sign at θ= 0. Thus, the effect of increasing τ is strictly monotone and by means of a numerical
example it can be shown that the effect is negative. If θ = 0, τ has no effect, which is in line with the
comparative statics on threshold ∆l,l−b,b, as shown below.
Offer threshold (CP G): Given CP G’s rationale to offer the social login Ωl,l−b,b = Πl,lG − Πb,bG ≥ 0,
comparative statics yield that parameters θ and τ do not affect CP G’s profit. The effects of the remaining
parameters are as follows. Note that a positive effect on Ωl,l−b,b makes the offer of the social login more likely.
Consequently, the offer threshold Φo increases if the effect on Ωl,l−b,b is positive, and vice versa.
CP G’s targeting rate αbG:
∂Ωl,l−b,b
∂αbG
=−2 ((αbG φG2−φi φGαbi +αbi −αbG)δ−αbG φG2 +φG +αbG− 1) (δ− 1),
∂Φo
∂αbG
< 0.
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To show that the above condition is satisfied, determine ∂Φ
o
∂αb
G
. It is then easy to see that the derivative is
negative given the assumption φG > 1⇔ φ2G− 1> 0.
CP G’s increase in targeting rate φG:
∂Ωl,l−b,b
∂φG
=−2 ((δ− 1)φGαbG−φiαbi δ+ 1) (δ− 1)αbG > 0 ⇒
∂Φo
∂φG
> 0.
CP i’s targeting rate αbi :
∂Ωl,l−b,b
∂αbi
= 2αbG (δ− 1) (φi φG− 1)δ,
∂Φo
∂αbi
< 0.
To show that the above condition is satisfied, solve ∂Φ
o
∂αb
i
= 0 and reorder with respect to αbG. Given the
assumptions αG(i) < 1 and φG > 1, the unique root is outside of the relevant parameter range. Consequently,
the effect of αbi is strictly monotone and by means of a numerical example it is easy to show that it is
negative.
CP i’s increase in targeting rate φi:
∂Ωl,l−b,b
∂φi
= 2αbG (δ− 1)αbi δ φG < 0 ⇒
∂Φo
∂φi
< 0.
Screen attention δ:
∂Ωl,l−b,b
∂δ
=−2 ((φG2 (δ− 1)− δ+ 1)αbG
+ (1 + (−2φi δ+φi)αbi)φG− 1 + (2 δ− 1)αbi)αbG < 0 ⇒
∂Φo
∂δ
< 0.
The above condition is satisfied given the assumption φG > 1.
Adoption profitability threshold (CP i): Given CP i’s condition for profitability ∆l,l−b,b = Πl,li −Πb,bi ≥ 0,
comparative statics yield qualitatively the same effects as the comparative statics on CP i’s rationale to
adopt the social login (with the exceptions of θ and τ) as the threshold for profitability is a special case of the
latter. Parameters θ and τ do not have an impact on profitability. The effects of the remaining parameters
are as follows. Note that a positive effect on ∆l,l−b,b makes the profitability of the social login more likely.
Consequently, the adoption profitability threshold Φap decreases if the effect on ∆l,l−b,b is positive, and vice
versa.
CP G’s targeting rate αbG:
∂∆l,l−b,b
∂αbG
= αbi δ (φG φi− 1)(δ− 1)< 0 ⇒
∂Φap
∂αbG
> 0.
CP G’s increase in targeting rate φG:
∂∆l,l−b,b
∂φG
= αbG (δ− 1)αbi φi δ < 0 ⇒
∂Φap
∂φG
> 0.
CP s’s targeting rate αbi :
∂∆l,l−b,b
∂αbi
= δ (−αbi φi2 +φGαbG φi +αbi −αbGδ−φGαbG φi +φi +αbG− 1)< 0 ⇒
∂Φap
∂αbi
> 0.
CP i’s increase in targeting rate φi:
∂∆l,l−b,b
∂φi
= δ αbi (φG δ α
b
G−φiαbi δ−φGαbG + 1)> 0.
Screen attention δ:
∂∆l,l−b,b
∂δ
= 2 ((φG φi− 1)(δ− 1
2
)αbG−
1
2
(φi− 1)(αbi δ φi +αbi δ− 1))αbi > 0 ⇒
∂Φap
∂δ
< 0.
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A.6. Dynamic Pricing
In the main model, we have assumed that CPs cannot change their prices in period t = 1 and t = 2. This
assumption will be relaxed in the following. Yet, we will show that our results are robust.
To capture price changes over time, the adapted timing of the model includes the following additional and
modified stages: In Stage 3, CPs simultaneously set advertisement prices for the first period pj,1. Subsequently,
in Stage 4, the advertiser decides at which CPs to display advertising in this first period. In Stages 5 and 6,
these decisions are repeated for the second period t= 2 and prices pj,2.
Separating firms’ decisions for the two considered periods has important consequences for the competitive
intensity between CPs. To show this formally, we solve the extended game through backward induction. In
Stage 6, the advertiser is willing to display advertising at a CP as long as its valuation for the obtained
view-throughs at this CP in period t= 2 is greater or equal than the price pj,2 set by the respective CP j.
Given that the share of users that visit a particular CP cannot be targeted by the advertiser anywhere else
in the future, the CP can exercise monopoly pricing over this share of users. Therefore, a CP will set its
price pj,2 equal to the number of expected view-throughs achieved in the second period (i.e., nj,2), because
this is the maximum price the advertiser will accept (as each view-through is valued at v= 1, see Section 3).
In consequence, the advertiser will make zero profit in the second period.
Then, in stage 4, the advertiser decides at which CP to advertise in period t= 1, but is, in equilibrium,
again faced with offers pj,1 that equal precisely the expected number of view-throughs at a particular CP j
and thus, equal the advertiser’s reservation price. To see that CPs can exercise monopoly power over their
respective (expected) visitors not only in period t= 2, but also in period t= 1, consider the consequences if
a CP would deviate from the monopoly price which equals view-throughs. If a CP increases its price further,
the advertiser would decide to not display any advertising at all at this respective CP, thus leading to zero
profit. On the other hand, if a CP decreases its price, the advertiser’s profit would increase, but this would
not change the advertiser’s decision where to display advertising. Therefore, a CP has no incentive to deviate
from the monopoly price.
In summary, dynamic pricing leads to a collapse of competition between CPs in the advertising market and
leaves the advertiser with zero pricing power. In fact, it is precisely the intertemporal dependence of view-
throughs in our base model with static prices which drives down prices from the monopoly level. With static
prices, the advertiser is able to commit credibly to not display advertising at a specific CP, if this CP raises
its price too much, because it can still target a share of those users at the other CPs in the remaining period
(recall that nej >nj). However, if pricing is conducted on a per-period basis, this intertemporal competition
vanishes, because the advertiser cannot credibly commit in period t= 1 to not display any advertising at a
specific CP in period t= 2. Therefore, equilibrium prices are higher than with static prices. However, notice
that prices are still constrained from above by the number of view-throughs that a CP generates, which
again depends on the model parameters like screen attention, δ, and targeting rates, αj . Consequently, the
comparative statics properties of the equilibrium prices are not affected and therefore also the qualitative
properties of our model are not affected when introducing dynamic pricing. Hence, we find the same set of
market outcomes as under static pricing (see Figure 3), although the absolute thresholds may be different.
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Figure 8 Illustration of possible market outcomes with dynamic pricing.
𝜙G
𝜙i
Φ# Φ$% Φ$&
Dynamic pricing
Static pricing
Φ# Φ$% Φ$&
Note. Thresholds with dynamic pricing are illustrated in black, whereas thresholds with static pricing are illustrated
in gray. As an identical increase in a CP’s targeting rate corresponds to a proportionally higher increase in advertising
profit, the set of outcomes where the social login is offered and adopted increases. The figure is derived for αbi =
0.5, αbG = 0.5, τ = 0.5, θ= 0.1, δ= 0.5.
More precisely, ceteris paribus, the set of outcomes where the social login is offered and adopted increases, as
an identical increase in a CP’s targeting rate corresponds to a proportionally higher increase in advertising
profit. Figure 8 illustrates the thresholds for the very same parameter set (αbi = α
b
G = 0.5, τ = 0.5, θ= 0.1, δ=
0.5) for static pricing (gray curves) and dynamic pricing (black curves).
The results under static pricing and the results under dynamic pricing can therefore be viewed as two
extremes with respect to the degree of competition between advertisers. Whereas we assume a monopolistic
advertiser (with maximal pricing power) in the base model, dynamic pricing leaves the advertiser with zero
pricing power, as if it were in perfect competition with other advertisers. This additional insight further
confirms the robustness of our results.
A.7. Sequential adoption decisions
In the main model, we have assumed that special-interest CPs simultaneously decide whether to adopt
the social login. In this extension, we consider special-interest CPs deciding sequentially whether to adopt
the social login. In doing so, we are able to show that the order of decision making is not relevant for
the equilibrium outcome because, in the main model, firms pursue a dominant strategy. Consequently, the
prisoner’s dilemma situation leading to special-interest CPs ending up in an inferior outcome, prevails even
if sequential decision making is assumed.
To show this result, assume that special-interest CPs were to decide sequentially on whether to adopt the
social login or not and assume, without loss of generality, that CP A moves before CP B. By the logic of
backward induction, first consider the decision of CP B, given the adoption decision of CP A. As we have
shown above (c.f., Section 4 as well as Appendix A.3), if CP A did not adopt the social login, CP B would
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adopt the social login if φi ≥ Φa′ . In reverse, if CP A did adopt the social login, CP B would also adopt
the social login if φi ≥Φa′′ . Moreover, we can show that Φa′ >Φa′′ , i.e., if φi is large enough so that CP B
would adopt the social login unilaterally, then φi is also large enough so that CP B would adopt the social
login jointly. Anticipating this optimal response of CP B, CP A can now decide as the first-mover whether
it wants to adopt the social login or not.
In case φi ≥Φa′ , CP A knows that CP B would adopt the social login in any case, irrespective of its own
decision. Therefore, it is best for CP A to adopt the social login as well if Πl,lA ≥Πb,lA . This is true if and only
if φi ≥Φa′′ (see Equation 6). Since we know that Φa′ >Φa′′ , CP A and CP B will both adopt the social login
in this case. Note that this is the same outcome as in the simultaneous move game.
In case Φa
′
> φi ≥Φa′′ , CP B will only adopt the social login if CP A has also adopted the social login.
Consequently, CP A compares the profit in case both CPs do not adopt the login Πb,bA with the profit in
case both CPs adopt the login Πl,lA . As highlighted in Section 4 and by Equation 7, Π
l,l
A ≥Πb,bA if and only
if φi ≥ Φap > Φa′ . This, however, is never the case, because we assumed that Φa′ > φi holds in this case.
Likewise, it is evident that both CPs will never adopt the social login if φi <Φ
a′′ . Consequently, neither CP
will adopt the social login if φi < Φ
a′ . Notice again, that this is the same outcome as in the simultaneous
move game.
In conclusion, the outcomes in the sequential move and simultaneous move game are exactly the same and
the prisoner’s dilemma situation arises in exactly the same cases, i.e., for Φap >φi ≥Φa′ .
Appendix B: Asymmetric special-interest CPs and single-homing users
We now assume special-interest CPs to be asymmetric with respect to their base utility. Without loss of
generality, we assume CP A having a higher base utility than CP B. Formally, uA = uB+ν. Thus, uA = u
b+ν
and uB = u
b if the social login is not adopted and uA = u
b + ν + θ and uB = u
b + θ if the social login is
adopted by the respective special-interest CP.
B.1. Special-interest CPs’ adoption decision (Stage 2)
The prices p
di,d−i
i and profits pi
di,d−i
i of special-interest CPs below are indexed by the four adoption scenarios
as introduced in Section 4 (see Table 1). Hereby, di = {l, b} denotes a special-interest’s own decision, and
d−i = {l, b} denotes the decision of its special-interest competitor.
Prices and profits of CP A.
pb,bA = Π
b,b
A =−
1
2τ
(τ + ν) δ
((
αbi − 2αbG
)
δ+ 2αbG− 2
)
αbi .
pl,bA = Π
l,b
A =−
1
2τ
αbi δ φi
(
φi δ α
b
i − 2φG δ αbG + 2φGαbG− 2
)
(τ + ν+ θ) .
pb,lA = Π
b,l
A =−
1
2τ
(τ + ν− θ)αbi
((
αbi − 2αbG
)
δ+ 2αbG− 2
)
δ.
pl,lA = Π
l,l
A =−
1
2τ
αbi (τ + ν) δ φi
(
φi δ α
b
i − 2φG δ αbG + 2φGαbG− 2
)
.
Prices and profits of CP B.
pb,bB = Π
b,b
B =−
1
2τ
(τ − ν) δ ((αbi − 2αbG) δ+ 2αbG− 2)αbi .
pl,bB = Π
l,b
B =−
1
2τ
αbi (τ − ν+ θ) δ φi
(
φi δ α
b
i − 2φG δ αbG + 2φGαbG− 2
)
.
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pb,lB = Π
b,l
B =−
1
2τ
αbi (τ − ν− θ)
((
αbi − 2αbG
)
δ+ 2αbG− 2
)
δ.
pl,lB = Π
l,l
B =−
1
2τ
αbi δ φi (τ − ν)
(
φi δ α
b
i − 2φG δ αbG + 2φGαbG− 2
)
.
Adoption and profitability thresholds. CP A has a unilateral incentive to adopt the social login, assum-
ing that CP B does not, iff ∆l,b−b,bA = Π
l,b
A −Πb,bA ≥ 0. This condition is satisfied if
φA ≥Φa′A :=
1
δ αbi (τ + ν+ θ)
(− ((φG2(δ− 1)2(τ + ν+ θ)αbG2
+ 2 (−αbi (τ + ν)δ+φG (τ + ν+ θ))(δ− 1)αbG
+αbi
2
(τ + ν)δ2− 2αbi (τ + ν)δ+ τ + ν+ θ)(τ + ν+ θ))1/2
+ ((τ + ν+ θ)δ− τ − ν− θ)φGαbG + τ + ν+ θ
)
.
CP B has a unilateral incentive to adopt the social login, assuming that CP A does not, if ∆l,b−b,bB =
Πl,bB −Πb,bB ≥ 0. This condition is satisfied if
φB ≥Φa′B :=
1
δ αbi (τ − ν+ θ)
(− ((φG2(δ− 1)2(τ − ν+ θ)αbG2
+ 2(−δ αbi (τ − ν) +φG (τ − ν+ θ))(δ− 1)αbG
+αbi
2
(τ − ν)δ2− 2 δ αbi (τ − ν) + τ − ν+ θ)(τ − ν+ θ))1/2
+ ((τ − ν+ θ)δ− τ + ν− θ)φGαbG + τ − ν+ θ.
CP A adopts the social login, assuming CP B adopts the login, if ∆l,l−b,lA = Π
l,l
A −Πb,lA ≥ 0. This condition is
satisfied if
φA ≥Φa′′A :=
1
αbi (τ + ν)δ
(− (((φG2(τ + ν)αbG2
− 2αbi (τ + ν− θ)αbG +αbi2(τ + ν− θ))δ2
+ (2 (αbG− 1)(τ + ν− θ)αbi
− 2φGαbG (φGαbG− 1)(τ + ν))δ
+ (φGα
b
G− 1)2(τ + ν))(τ + ν))1/2
+ ((δ− 1)τ + (δ− 1)ν)φGαbG + τ + ν
)
.
CP B adopts the social login, assuming CP A adopts the login, if ∆l,l−b,lB = Π
l,l
B −Πb,lB ≥ 0. This condition is
satisfied if
φB ≥Φa′′B :=
1
δ αbi (τ − ν)
(
φG (δ− 1)(τ − ν)αbG
− (((φG2(τ − ν)αbG2− 2αbi (τ − ν− θ)αbG
+αbi
2
(τ − ν− θ))δ2 + (2 (αbG− 1)(τ − ν− θ)αbi
− 2φGαbG (φGαbG− 1)(τ − ν))δ
+ (φGα
b
G− 1)2(τ − ν))(τ − ν))1/2 + τ − ν
)
.
One can easily show that, for any non-negative θ, Φa
′
i >Φ
a′′
i for any CP i as well as Φ
a′
A >Φ
a′
B and Φ
a′′
A >Φ
a′′
B .
Moreover, Φa
′′
A > Φ
a′
B iff ν >
1
2
θ, which constitutes a necessary condition for asymmetric adoption market
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outcomes, in which CP B adopts the social login, but CP A does not.
Special-interest CPs are in a prisoner’s dilemma situation if their respective profit under joint adoption
is below their profit without adoption, i.e., Πl,lA −Πb,bA < 0 and Πl,lB −Πb,bB < 0 at the same time. Given that
Πl,lA −Πb,bA = Πl,lB −Πb,bB , the thresholds for CP A and CP B coincide. Thus, joint adoption is unprofitable, if
φi <Φ
ap :=
1
δ αbi
(− (φG2(δ− 1)2αbG2 + 2(δ− 1)(−δ αbi +φG)αbG + (δ αbi − 1)2)1/2
+ 1 + (φG δ−φG)αbG
)
.
B.2. General-interest CP’s offer decision (Stage 1)
Prices pdA,dBG and Profits Π
dA,dB
G(i) of the general-interest CP stated below are indexed by the best response
decisions of both special-interest CPs A and B in Stage 2 with di = l if CP i would adopt the social login,
and di = b if it would not adopt the login. We obtain the following prices of CP G for the various adoption
cases with asymmetric special-interest CPs:
pb,b
G(A) =
1
τ
(δ− 1) (τ + ν)αbG
((
αbi −αbG/2
)
δ+αbG/2− 1
)
,
pb,b
G(B) =
1
τ
(δ− 1) (τ − ν)αbG
((
αbi −αbG/2
)
δ+αbG/2− 1
)
.
pl,b
G(A) =
1
τ
(δ− 1) (τ + ν+ θ)φGαbG
(−1/2φG (δ− 1)αbG +φi δ αbi − 1) ,
pl,b
G(B) =
1
τ
(δ− 1) (τ − ν− θ)αbG
((
αbi −αbG/2
)
δ+αbG/2− 1
)
.
pb,l
G(A) =
1
τ
(δ− 1) (τ + ν− θ)αbG
((
αbi −αbG/2
)
δ+αbG/2− 1
)
,
pb,l
G(B) =
1
τ
(δ− 1) (τ − ν+ θ)φGαbG
(−1/2φG (δ− 1)αbG +φi δ αbi − 1) .
pl,l
G(A) =
1
τ
(δ− 1) (τ + ν)αbG φG
(−1/2φG (δ− 1)αbG +φi δ αbi − 1) ,
pl,l
G(B) =
1
τ
(δ− 1) (τ − ν)αbG φG
(−1/2φG (δ− 1)αbG +φi δ αbi − 1) .
Total profit of CP G is then given by ΠdA,dBG = p
dA,dB
G(A) + p
dA,dB
G(B) . For example, if both special-interest CPs do
not adopt the login, CP G’s profit is
Πb,bG = p
b,b
G(A) + p
b,b
G(B) = 2 (δ− 1)αbG
((
αbi −αbG/2
)
δ+αbG/2− 1
)
.
If both special-interest CPs would adopt the social login in Stage 2, CP G considers Ωl,l−b,b = Πl,lG −Πb,bG
in its offer decision. If only CP B would adopt the social login, CP G considers Ωb,l−b,b = Πb,lG −Πb,bG . In both
cases, the social login is offered by CP G if
φi ≤Φo := 1
2φG δ αbi
(
(φG
2δ−φG2− δ+ 1)αbG + 2 δ αbi + 2φG− 2
)
.
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B.3. Comparative statics on adoption, offer and profitability thresholds
Adoption threshold (CP i): Comparative statics on asymmetric special-interest CPs’ incentives to adopt
the social login yield effects which are in line with those identified for symmetric special-interest CPs with
regard to the parameters scrutinized in Appendix A.5.
The effect of the newly introduced parameter ν is examined in the following. We therefore differentiate
∆l,b−b,bi and ∆
l,l−b,l
i with respect to ν for both special-interest CPs (i=A,B). For the special-interest CP with
a higher base utility (i.e., CP A), the derivatives of both profit comparisons coincide, i.e.,
∂∆l,b−b,b
A
∂ν
=
∂∆l,l−b,l
A
∂ν
.
The single conversion of the derivative is outside of the relevant parameter range, which can be shown by
considering the corresponding thresholds Φa
′
and Φa
′′
: The conversion is at αbi =
2·(δ αbG−αbG+1)
δ
which is larger
than one, and thus, unfeasible. Thus, the effect of ν is strictly monotone in the relevant parameter range,
i.e.,
∂∆l,b−b,b
A
∂ν
=
∂∆l,l−b,l
A
∂ν
=− 1
2τ
(
((αbi φi
2 − 2φGαbG φi − αbi + 2αbG)δ + 2φGαbG φi − 2φi − 2αbG + 2)δ αbi
)
< 0⇒
∂Φa
′
A
∂ν
> 0,
∂Φa
′′
A
∂ν
> 0.
With regard to the lower-quality CP (i.e., CP B), derivatives of profit comparisons also coincide, i.e.,
∂∆l,b−b,b
B
∂ν
=
∂∆l,l−b,l
B
∂ν
. Moreover, the derivatives are equal to the ones of the larger CP in absolute terms, but
with a negative sign. Due to symmetry, we can conclude
∂∆l,b−b,b
B
∂ν
=
∂∆l,l−b,l
B
∂ν
= 1
2τ
(
((αbi φi
2−2φGαbG φi−αbi +
2αbG)δ+ 2φGα
b
G φi− 2φi− 2αbG + 2)δ αbi
)
> 0⇒ ∂Φa
′
B
∂ν
< 0,
∂Φa
′′
B
∂ν
< 0.
Adoption profitability threshold (CP i):. The parameter ν does not have an effect on CP i’s profitability
threshold Φap. Thus, the effects of all parameters are in line with those stated in Appendix A.5.
Offer threshold (CP G): The parameter ν does not have an effect on CP G’s offer threshold Φo. Thus,
the effects of all parameter are in line with those stated in Appendix A.5.
Appendix C: Competition between general-interest CPs
In the following, we assume that both special-interest CPs A and B, as well as both general-interest CPs F
and G, are symmetric.
Special-interest CPs’ adoption decision (Stage 2): Assuming that general-interest CP k offers a social
login, a special-interest CP i has an incentive to adopt the social login, iff ∆k,∅−∅,∅i = Π
k,∅
i −Π∅,∅i ≥ 0. Hereby,
the superscript k,∅ indicates that special-interest CP i adopts the social login offered by CP k, whereas the
competing special-interest CP −i does not adopt a social login (∅). This condition is satisfied, if
φi ≥Φa′ := 1
αbi δ (τ + θ)
·
(
φk (δ− 1)(τ + θ)αbk
− (((φk2(δ− 1)2αbk2− 2 (δ− 1)(δ αbi −φk)αbk
+ (δ αbi − 1)2)t+ θ (1 + (δ− 1)φk αbk)2)(τ + θ) + t+ θ)1/2
)
, (9)
with
Π∅,∅i =−
1
2
αbi ((α
b
i − 2αbk)δ+ 2αbk− 2)δ,
Πk,∅i =−
1
4 τ2
·
(
δ ((δ φi
2αbi + (−2φk αbk δ+ 2φk αbk− 2)φi
+ (αbi − 2αbk)δ+ 2αbk− 2)τ2 + 2θ (δ φi2αbi
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+ (−2φk αbk δ+ 2φk αbk− 2)φi + (−αbi/2 +αbk)δ
−αbk + 1)τ +φi θ2(αbi δ φi− 2φk αbk δ+ 2φk αbk− 2))αbi
)
.
If the above condition holds, the competing special-interest CP also adopts the social login due to symmetry
as shown in the base model. Moreover, the adoption decision with respect to the social login offered by CP
F is thereby independent of the adoption decision with respect to the social login offered by CP G.
Although special-interest CP may have a unilateral incentive to adopt the login, they are (again) not
necessarily better off, if the other special-interest CP also adopts the social login. In line with the analysis
in the base model, special-interest CPs may find themselves in a prisoner’s dilemma situation, if they adopt
the login and ∆FG,FG−∅,∅i = Π
FG,FG
i −Π∅,∅i < 0, which is satisfied if
Φa
′ ≤ φi <Φap := 1
δ αbi
·
(
− (φk2(δ− 1)2αbk2− 2 (δ− 1)(δ αbi −φk)αbk
+ (δ αbi − 1)2)1/2 + 1 + (δ φk−φk)αbk
)
, (10)
with
ΠFG,FGi =−
1
2
αbi ((α
b
i − 2αbk)δ+ 2αbk− 2)δ.
General-interest CP’s offer decision (Stage 1): Anticipating special-interest CPs’ adoption decision,
both general-interest CPs decide whether to offer their social login simultaneously, but independently. CP k
offers its social login if it is adopted by both special-interest CPs A and B, iff ΩAB,∅−∅,∅k = Π
AB,∅
k −Π∅,∅k ≥ 0.
Hereby, the superscript AB,∅ indicates that general-interest CP k offers a social login and both special-
interest CPs adopt it, whereas the competing general-interest CP −k does not offer a social login (∅). This
inequality is satisfied if
φi ≤Φo′ := 1
2αbi δ (τ + θ)φk
·
(
(αbk (δ− 1)φk2 + 2φk
+ (1− δ)αbk + 2 δ αbi − 2)t+ (2 + (δ− 1)φk αbk)θ φk
)
, (11)
with
Π∅,∅k = (δ− 1)((αbi −αbk/2)δ+αbk/2− 1)αbk,
Πk,∅k =
1
2 τ2
·
(
((τ(φi φk α
b
i − 1/2φk2αbk +αbi −αbk/2)δ
+ 1/2φk
2αbk−φk +αbk/2− 1)τ2 + 2θ ((φi φk αbi
− 1/2φk2αbk−αbi/2 +αbk/4)δ+ 1/2φk2αbk−φk−αbk/4 + 1/2)τ
+ θ2φk ((α
b
i φi− 1/2φk αbk)δ+ 1/2φk αbk− 1))αbk (δ− 1)
)
.
As we will show next, the competing general-interest CP also offers the social login, whenever the other
general-interest CP has a unilateral incentive to offer the social login, i.e., when the above condition is
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satisfied. Given that its general-interest competitor offers a social login, CP k offers its own social login iff
ΩAB,AB−∅,ABk = Π
AB,AB
k −Π∅,ABk ≥ 0. This inequality is satisfied if
φi ≤Φo′′ := 1
2αbi δ τφk
·
(
((φk
2δ−φk2− δ+ 1)αbk + 2αbi δ+ 2φk− 2)t
− 2θ (αbk (−δ/2 + 1/2) +αbi δ− 1)
)
. (12)
Because Φo
′
< Φo
′′
within the feasible parameter range, there is no equilibrium market outcome, in which
only a single general-interest CP would find it profitable to offer the login. Therefore, either none (if φi >Φ
o′)
or both general-interest CPs (if φi ≤Φo′) offer the social login.
In contrast to the base model with a monopolistic social login provider, a prisoner’s dilemma situation
may now also arise for general-interest CPs. This is the case if the social login is offered and ΩFG,FG−∅,∅k =
ΠFG,FGk −Π∅,∅k < 0, which is satisfied if
Φo
′ ≥ φi >Φop := 1
2δ φk αbi
·
(
(φk
2δ−φk2− δ+ 1)αbk + 2 δ αbi + 2φk− 2
)
, (13)
with
ΠFG,FGk = (δ− 1)((αbi −αbk/2)δ+αbk/2− 1)αbk.
Note that this offer profitability threshold Φop is identical to the offer threshold Φo (which is also the offer
profitability threshold in that case) in the base model given by Equation (8).
Appendix D: Users multi-homing special-interest CPs
D.1. View-throughs and equilibrium prices with users multi-homing special-interest CPs
In period t, special-interest CP A expects to be viewed by a total of DmhA,t = ρ · δ, whereas CP B expects
DmhB,t = (1−ρ) ·δ viewers. At the same time, general-interest CP G expects DmhG,t = ρ ·(1−δ)+(1−ρ) ·(1−δ) =
(1− δ) =DG,t viewers. We refer to Section 3 for the timing of the game, which remains unchanged to the
base model. However, with users multi-homing special-interest CPs, each CP must now take into account
the effects resulting from the pricing decisions taken by the two competing CPs. Due to multi-homing, there
is no competition for users between special-interest CPs, and thus, there exists no submarket Di anymore.
As in the base case we assume special-interest CPs to be symmetric and thus users visit both special-interest
CPs with the same probability (i.e., ρ= 1/2, and also αbi ≡ αbA = αbB, φi ≡ φA = φB).
In Stage 4, the advertiser chooses at which CPs to display its advertising. To this end, the advertiser
calculates the expected view-throughs per CP, nmhj , by taking into account the expected amount of users
visiting that CP per period (Dmhj,t ), the expected mass of users that has already seen the advertisement
previously at any CP (this mass is affected by the targeting rate of all CPs), and that CP’s own targeting
rate (αj). View-throughs after two periods can then be calculated as
nmhA = αAρδ︸ ︷︷ ︸
period t = 1
+αAρδ(1−αAρδ−αB(1− ρ)δ−αG(1− δ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
period t = 2
,
nmhB =αB(1− ρ)δ︸ ︷︷ ︸
period t = 1
+αB(1− ρ)δ(1−αAρδ−αB(1− ρ)δ−αG(1− δ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
period t = 2
,
nmhG = αGδ︸︷︷︸
period t = 1
+αG(1− δ)(1−αAρδ−αB(1− ρ)δ−αG(1− δ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
period t = 2
.
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In Stage 3, CPs simultaneously set their advertising prices based on their own and their competitors’
expected view-throughs. Equilibrium advertising prices are derived based to the same rationale as in the
base model, but now each CP must take into account all special-interest and general-interest CPs in the
advertising market, and not only a single competitor in a particular submarket. Thus, each CP maximizes
its advertising profit by setting its price such that the advertiser is just indifferent between advertising at
all CPs (including the CP itself) and advertising only at the other two CPs. Again, a CP cannot profitably
deviate from such a price configuration: Lowering prices would not change the allocation decision of the
advertiser in Stage 4 and thus would result in lower profit. Increasing prices would make it more profitable for
the advertiser to switch to the other two CPs exclusively, and thus would result in zero profit. Consequently,
equilibrium prices can be derived by solving the following system of equations simultaneously
nmhA − pmhA +nmhB − pmhB +nmhG − pmhG = nmh,BGB − pmhB +nmh,BGG − pmhG ,
nmhA − pmhA +nmhB − pmhB +nmhG − pmhG = nmh,AGA − pmhA +nmh,AGG − pmhG ,
nmhA − pmhA +nmhB − pmhB +nmhG − pmhG = nmh,ABA − pmhA +nmh,ABB − pmhB ,
where nmh,xy denotes the expected view-throughs if the advertiser chooses to advertise only at a subset xy
of CPs, with xy=AB,AG,BG.
Equilibrium prices are then derived as
p∗|mhi =−1/4δ((αi + 2α−i− 4αG)δ+ 4αG− 4)αi,
p∗|mhG = ((αi +α−i−αG)δ+αG− 2)αG(δ− 1),
where we use −i to index the special-interest CP competitor of CP i. Thus, −i=B in the case of i=A, and
vice versa.
Comparative statics on the equilibrium price p∗|mhi of special-interest CP i.
CP i’s targeting rate αi:
∂p∗|mhi
∂αi
=−1/2((αi +α−i− 2αG)δ+ 2αG− 2)δ > 0.
CP −i’s targeting rate α−i:
∂p∗|mhi
∂α−i
=−1/2αiδ2 < 0.
CP G’s targeting rate αG:
∂p∗|mhi
∂αG
= δ(δ− 1)αi < 0.
Screen attention δ:
∂p∗|mhi
∂δ
=−1/2αi((αi + 2α−i− 4αG)δ+ 2αG− 2).
The derivative can either be positive or negative within the feasible parameter range. For αi <
(−2α−i+4αG)δ−2αG+2
δ
, the derivative is positive. Thus, the derivative is only negative within the feasible
parameter range if αi and α−i are both close to one.
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Comparative statics on the equilibrium price p∗|mhG of the general-interest CP G.
CP i’s targeting rate αi:
∂p∗|mhG
∂αi
= δαG(δ− 1)< 0.
CP −i’s targeting rate α−i:
∂p∗|mhG
∂α−i
= δαG(δ− 1)< 0.
CP G’s targeting rate αG:
∂p∗|mhG
∂αG
= (δ− 1)((αi +α−i− 2αG)δ+ 2αG− 2)> 0.
Screen attention δ:
∂p∗|mhG
∂δ
= 2((−δ+ 1)αG + (αi +α−i)δ−αi/2−α−i/2− 1)αG < 0.
D.2. Adoption thresholds with users multi-homing special-interest CPs (Stage 2)
CP i adopts the social login, given that its special-interest competitor does not, iff ∆mhl,b−b,b = Π
mh|l,b
i −
Πmh|b,bi ≥ 0. This condition is satisfied if
φi ≥Φa′ := − 1
δαbi
((
(φG + 1)
2(δ− 1)2αbG2− 2(δ− 1)(αbi(φG + 3)δ− 2φG− 2)αbG
+ 4(δαbi − 1)2
)1/2
+ ((φG + 1)δ−φG− 1)αbG− δαbi + 2
)
.
CP i adopts the social login, given that its special-interest rival also adopts the social login, iff ∆mhl,l−b,l =
Πmh|l,li −Πmh|b,li ≥ 0. This condition is satisfied, if
φi ≥Φa′′ := − 1
3δαbi
((
4φG
2(δ− 1)2αbG2− 2(δ− 1)(αbi(φG + 3)δ− 4φG)αbG
+ 4(δαbi − 1)2
)1/2
+ (2φGα
b
G +α
b
i)δ− 2φGαbG + 2
)
,
and, at the same time,
φi ≤Φa′′ := 1
3δ αbi
((
4φG
2(δ− 1)2αbG2− 2(δ− 1)(αbi(φG + 3)δ− 4φG)αbG
+ 4(δαbi − 1)2
)1/2
+ (2φGα
b
G +αi)δ− 2φGαbG + 2
)
.
For simplicity we refer to Φa
′′
and implicitly assume φi ∈ [Φa′′ ,Φa′′ ].
In cases where both special-interest CPs adopt the social login, they find themselves in a prisoner’s
dilemma, if they adopt the login and ∆mhl,l−b,b = Π
mh|l,l
i −Πmh|b,bi < 0. This condition is satisfied, if
Φa
′′ ≥ φi >Φap := 1
3δαbi
((
4φ2G(δ− 1)2αbG2− 12(δ− 1)(δαbi − 2/3φG)αbG
+ 9(δαbi − 2/3)2
)1/2
+ 2 + (2δφG− 2φG)αbG(i)
)
. (14)
and, at the same time,
Φa
′′ ≤ φi <Φap := − 1
3δαbi
((
4φG
2(δ− 1)2αbG2− 12(δ− 1)(δαbi − 2/3φG)αbG
+ 9(δαbi − 2/3)2
)1/2
+ 2 + (2δφG− 2φG)αbG
)
. (15)
For simplicity we refer to Φap and implicitly assume φi ∈ [Φap,Φap]).
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D.3. Offer threshold with users multi-homing special-interest CPs (Stage 1)
If both special-interest CPs adopt the social login, the general-interest CP is willing to offer the social login
iff Ωmhl,l−b,b = Π
mh|l,l
G −Πmh|b,bG ≥ 0. This condition is satisfied if
φi ≤Φo := α
b
G (φ
2
G− 1) (δ− 1) + 2(δαbG +φG− 1)
2δφGαbi
.
If only one special-interest CP will adopt the social login (i.e., φi ≥ Φa′ and φi 6∈ [Φa′′ ,Φa′′ ]), the general-
interest CP is willing to offer the social login iff Ωmhl,b−b,b = Π
mh|l,b
G −Πmh|b,bG ≥ 0. This condition is satisfied
if
φi ≤Φo˜ := 1
2αbiδ(φG + 1)
·
(
αbG(δ− 1)φG2 + ((2δ− 2)αbG− 2δαbi + 4)φG
+ (−3δ+ 3)αbG + 6δαbi − 4
)
.
For δ ∈ (0,1), CP G is willing to offer the social login in more cases, if only one special-interest CP will
adopt the login than if both special-interest CPs will adopt the social login, i.e., Φo˜ ≥Φo within the feasible
parameter range.
D.4. Comparison of users single-homing and multi-homing special-interest CPs
To show that market outcome I emerges in fewer cases when users multi-home special-interest CPs, consider
the adoption profitability threshold in the case of single-homing, given by Equation (7), and the lower as
well as the upper adoption profitability threshold in the case of multi-homing users, given by Equations (14)
and (15), respectively.
We calculate the intersection of the single-homing threshold Φap with the multi-homing thresholds Φap
and Φap, and rearrange with respect to φG. The thresholds intersect twice, but both intersections are outside
the feasible parameter range, which can be seen by considering the necessary condition αbG ·φG ≤ 1. By the
means of a numerical example, it is then straightforward to show that the adoption profitability thresholds in
the case of multi-homing users are always above the adoption profitability threshold when users single-home.
Therefore, the area wherein adoption is profitable when users multi-home is a subset of the area wherein
adoption is profitable when users single-home. Because CP G’s offer threshold is identical in both scenarios,
the adoption of the social login is less often profitable for special-interest CPs when users multi-home special-
interest CPs.
D.5. Comparative statics on offer- and adoption-thresholds with users multi-homing
special-interest CPs
With respect to comparative statics on the adoption threshold Φa
′
, all the effects derived for the base model
hold likewise for the case with users multi-homing special-interest CPs as shown in Subsection D.5.1.
With regard to the adoption threshold Φa
′′
and the adoption profitability threshold Φap, several effects
from the base model carry over to the extension with users multi-homing special-interest CPs. In summary,
joint adoption and profitable adoption are less likely if the targeting rate without the social login of any
CP (αbi , α
b
−i, α
b
G) increases due to direct advertising competition between all CPs. In contrast to the base
model, this now includes the special-interest CP competitor −i, which had no effect in the case of users
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single-homing special-interest CPs. Joint adoption is also less likely if the increase in targeting rate of any
competitor (φ−i, φG) is high, but more likely if the own increase in targeting rate is high (φi). The impact
of the screen attention probability is more nuanced and can either be positive or negative as highlighted in
Subsections D.5.2 and D.5.3, respectively.
When the general-interest CP expects both special-interest CPs to adopt the social login, the offer thresh-
old, Φo, and thus comparative statics are identical to the base model. Moreover, the effects of the exogenous
parameters are the same for the offer threshold Φo˜, i.e., in the case that CP G expects only a single special-
interest CP to adopt the login. In particular, the social login is offered in less cases if the targeting rate
without the social login of any CP (αbi , α
b
G) increases, if a special-interest CPs’ increase in targeting rate
(φi) rises, or if users visit special-interest CPs more often (δ). In contrast, the social login is offered in more
cases if CP G’s increase in targeting rate (φG) rises (see Subsections D.5.4 and D.5.5, respectively).
D.5.1. Critical threshold for unilateral adoption of the social login (CP i): Comparative statics
on CP i’s critical threshold to adopt the login, given that its special-interest competitor CP −i does not
adopt it, ∆mhl,b−b,b = Π
mh|l,b
i −Πmh|b,bi ≥ 0, demonstrate the following effects.
CP i’s targeting rate αbi :
∂∆mhl,b−b,b
∂αbi
=−1/2δ((αbiφi2 + ((−φG− 1)αbG +αb−i)φi−αbi −αb−i + 2αbG)δ
+ (−2 + (φG + 1)αbG)φi− 2αbG + 2),
∂Φa
′
∂αbi
> 0.
To show that the condition above is satisfied, solve Φ
a′
∂αb
i
= 0 with respect to αb−i, which yields α
b
−i,0 =
δφGαG+3δαG−φGαG−3αG+4
2δ
. Within the feasible parameter it must hold that αb−i < 1, which is violated by
αb−i,0 > 1. Thus, the derivative
Φa
′
∂αb
i
must be strictly monotone within the feasible parameter range. By the
means of a numerical example, it is easy to show that the derivative is positive in that range.
Competing CP i’s targeting rate αb−i:
∂∆mhl,b−b,b
∂αb−i
=−1/2αbiδ2(φi− 1)< 0 ⇒
∂Φa
′
∂αb−i
> 0.
CP G’s targeting rate αbG:
∂∆mhl,b−b,b
∂αbG
= 1/2(δ− 1)αbiδ(−2 + (φG + 1)φi)< 0 ⇒
∂Φa
′
∂αbG
> 0.
CP i’s increase in targeting rate φi:
∂∆mhl,b−b,b
∂φi
=−1/2αbiδ(((−φG− 1)αbG +αbiφi +αb−i)δ− 2 + (φG + 1)αbG)> 0.
Competing CP −i’s increase in targeting rate φ−i:
∂∆mhl,b−b,b
∂φ−i
= 0 ⇒ ∂Φ
a′
∂φ−i
= 0.
CP G’s increase in targeting rate φG:
∂∆mhl,b−b,b
∂φG
= 1/2δαbiα
b
G(δ− 1)φi < 0 ⇒
∂Φa
′
∂φG
> 0.
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Screen attention δ:
∂∆mhl,b−b,b
∂δ
=−1/2αbi((αbiφi2 + ((−2φG− 2)αbG + 2αb−i)φi
−αbi − 2αb−i + 4αbG)δ+ (−2 + (φG + 1)αbG)φi− 2αbG + 2),
∂Φa
′
∂δ
< 0.
To show that the condition above is satisfied, solve ∂Φ
a′
∂δ
= 0 with respect to αb−i, which yields α−i,0 =
−αGφGαi+3αGαi−4φGαG−4αi−4αG+8
2(φGαG+αG−2) . Within the feasible parameter range it must hold that α
b
−i < 1, which is
violated by α−i,0 > 1. Thus, the derivative
∂Φa
′
∂δ
is strictly monotone within the feasible parameter range. By
means of a numerical example, it is easy to show that the derivative is negative within that range.
D.5.2. Critical threshold for joint adoption of the social login (CP i): Comparative statics on
CP i’s critical threshold to adopt the social login, given that its special-interest competitor CP −i also adopts
the login, ∆mhl,l−b,l = Π
mh|l,l
i −Πmh|b,li ≥ 0, demonstrate the following effects.
CP i’s targeting rate αbi :
∂∆mhl,l−b,l
∂αbi
=−1/2δ(((−2φiφG +φG + 1)αbG
+ (φi− 1)(αbiφi +αb−iφ−i +αbi))δ+ (2φiφG−φG− 1)αbG− 2φi + 2),
∂Φa
′′
∂αbi
> 0,
∂Φa
′′
∂αbi
< 0.
To show that the condition above is satisfied and thus the effect of αbi is strictly monotone, we solve
∂Φa
′′
∂αb
i
= 0
and ∂Φ
a′′
∂αb
i
= 0 with respect to φ−i. Subject to the condition φ−i · αb−i < 1, the unique root is outside of the
feasible parameter range for the upper threshold Φa
′′
and the lower threshold Φa
′′
, respectively.
Competing CP i’s targeting rate αb−i:
∂∆mhl,l−b,l
∂αb−i
=−1/2δ2φ−i(φi− 1)αbi < 0 ⇒
∂Φa
′′
∂αb−i
> 0,
∂Φa
′′
∂αb−i
< 0.
CP G’s targeting rate αbG:
∂∆mhl,l−b,l
∂αbG
= 1/2(δ− 1)αbi(2φiφG−φG− 1)δ < 0 ⇒
∂Φa
′′
∂αbG
> 0,
∂Φa
′′
∂αbG
< 0.
CP i’s increase in targeting rate φi:
∂∆mhl,l−b,l
∂φi
=−1/2((αbiφi +αb−iφ−i− 2αbGφG)δ+ 2αbGφG− 2)δαbi > 0.
Competing CP −i’s increase in targeting rate φ−i:
∂∆mhl,l−b,l
∂φ−i
=−1/2δ2αb−i(φi− 1)αbi < 0 ⇒
∂Φa
′′
∂φ−i
> 0,
∂Φa
′′
∂φ−i
< 0.
CP G’s increase in targeting rate φG:
∂∆mhl,l−b,l
∂φG
= αbi(δ− 1)αbGδ(φi− 1/2)< 0 ⇒
∂Φa
′′
∂φG
> 0,
∂Φa
′′
∂φG
< 0.
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Screen attention δ:
∂∆mhl,l−b,l
∂δ
=−1/2αbi(((−4φiφG + 2φG + 2)αbG + (φi− 1)(αbiφi + 2αb−iφ−i +αbi))δ
+ (2φiφG−φG− 1)αbG− 2φi + 2),
∂Φa
′′
∂δ
< 0,
∂Φa
′′
∂δ
> 0.
The derivative
∂∆mhl,l−b,l
∂δ
can either be positive or negative within the feasible parameter range. This is because
∂Φa
′′
∂δ
< 0 and ∂Φ
a′′
∂δ
< 0. Thus, the effect of increasing δ on joint adoption is positive if φi is relatively small,
and negative if φi is relatively large.
D.5.3. Critical threshold for profitable adoption of the social login (CP i): Comparative statics
on CP i’s critical threshold for adoption profitability ∆mhl,l−b,b = Π
mh|l,l
i −Πmh|b,bi ≥ 0, demonstrate the following
effects.
CP i’s targeting rate αbi :
∂∆mhl,l−b,b
∂αbi
=−1/2δ((αbiφi2 + (αb−iφ−i− 2αbGφG)φi
−αbi −αb−i + 2αbG)δ+ 2αbGφGφi− 2φi− 2αbG + 2),
∂Φap
∂αbi
> 0,
∂Φap
∂αbi
< 0.
To show that the condition above is satisfied, we solve ∂Φ
ap
∂αb
i
= 0 and ∂Φ
ap
∂αb
i
= 0 with respect to αb−i. Subject to
the condition φ−i ·αb−i < 1, the root is outside of the feasible parameter range for both the upper threshold
Φap and the lower threshold Φap, respectively.
Competing CP i’s targeting rate αb−i:
∂∆mhl,l−b,b
∂αb−i
=−1/2(φiφ−i− 1)δ2αbi < 0 ⇒
∂Φap
∂αb−i
> 0,
∂Φap
∂αb−i
< 0.
CP G’s targeting rate αbG:
∂∆mhl,l−b,b
∂αbG
= (φiφG− 1)(δ− 1)αbiδ < 0 ⇒
∂Φap
∂αbG
> 0,
∂Φap
∂αbG
< 0.
CP i’s increase in targeting rate φi:
∂∆mhl,l−b,b
∂φi
=−1/2((αbiφi +αb−iφ−i− 2αbGφG)δ+ 2αbGφG− 2)δαbi > 0.
Competing CP −i’s increase in targeting rate φ−i:
∂∆mhl,l−b,b
∂φ−i
=−1/2αb−iδ2φiαbi < 0 ⇒
∂Φap
∂φ−i
> 0,
∂Φap
∂φ−i
< 0.
CP G’s increase in targeting rate φG:
∂∆mhl,l−b,b
∂φG
= δαbiα
b
G(δ− 1)φi < 0 ⇒
∂Φap
∂φG
> 0,
∂Φap
∂φG
< 0.
Screen attention δ:
∂∆mhl,l−b,b
∂δ
=− 1/2((αbiφi2 + (2αb−iφ−i− 4αbGφG)φi−αbi − 2αb−i + 4αbG)δ+ 2αbGφGφi− 2φi2αbG + 2)αbi .
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The derivative can either be positive or negative within the feasible parameter range. To see this, we derive
∂Φa
′′
∂δ
and ∂Φ
a′′
∂δ
. For αbi < α̂i :=
2(αbGφG−1)(((−αb−i+2)φG+αb−iφ−i−2)αbG−αb−i(φ−i−1))
αb
G(αbGφG2−αbG−2φG+2)
, the effect on the lower thresh-
old is negative, i.e., ∂Φ
a′′
∂δ
> 0, whereas it is positive on the upper threshold, i.e., ∂Φ
a′′
∂δ
> 0. Conversely, for
αbi > α̂i:
∂Φa
′′
∂δ
< 0 and ∂Φ
a′′
∂δ
< 0. In summary, a larger δ makes profitable adoption more likely if either (i)
φi is large and α
b
i is small, or φ−i is small, or φG is large or (ii) φi is small and α
b
i is small, φ−i is small, or
φG is large.
D.5.4. Offer threshold if both special-interest CPs adopt the social login (CP G): CP G’s
critical condition to offer the login to both special-interest CPs, Ωmhl,l−b,b = Π
mh|l,l
G −Πmh|b,bG ≥ 0, is identical to
the offer threshold in the base model. Consequently, comparative statics with respect to the exogenous model
parameters demonstrate the same effects as in the case of single-homing users, derived in Appendix A.5.
D.5.5. Offer threshold if only one special-interest CP adopts the social login (CP G): When
only one special-interest CP will adopt the login, CP G offers the social login if Ωmhl,b−b,b = Π
mh|l,b
G −Πmh|b,bG ≥ 0.
Comparative statics on this critical threshold demonstrate the following effects.
CP i’s targeting rate αbi :
∂Ωmhl,b−b,b
∂αbi
=1/2(δ− 1)αbGδ(−2 + (φG + 1)φi)< 0 ⇒
∂Φo˜
∂αbi
< 0.
Competing CP i’s targeting rate αb−i:
∂Ωmhl,b−b,b
∂αb−i
= 1/2(φG− 1)δαbG(δ− 1)< 0 ⇒
∂Φo˜
∂αb−i
< 0.
CP G’s targeting rate αbG:
∂Ωmhl,b−b,b
∂αbG
= 1/2(δ− 1)((−φGφG2 + (φiφi +φ−i− 2φG)φG
+ 3φG + (φi− 2)φi−φ−i)δ+ (φG− 1)(φGφG + 3φG− 2)),
∂Φo˜
∂αbG
< 0.
To show that the condition above is satisfied, we consider ∂Φ
o˜
∂αb
G
= (φG−1)(φG+3)(δ−1)
2φi(φG+1)δ
, which is negative within
the feasible parameter range.
CP i’s increase in targeting rate φi:
∂Ωmhl,b−b,b
∂φi
= 1/2αbi(φG + 1)δα
b
i(δ− 1)< 0.
Competing CP −i’s increase in targeting rate φ−i:
∂Ωmhl,b−b,b
∂φ−i
= 0 ⇒ ∂Φ
o˜
∂αbφ−i
= 0.
CP G’s increase in targeting rate φG:
∂Ωmhl,b−b,b
∂φG
= 1/2(δ− 1)αbG(−(φG + 1)(δ− 1αbG− 2 + (αbiφi +αb−i)δ)> 0 ⇒
∂Φo˜
∂φG
> 0.
To see that the condition above is satisfied, recall that the equilibrium price of CP G rises if the increase
in targeting rate rises, i.e.,
∂p
∗|mh
G
∂αG
(see Subsection D.1). As we compare the case where the social login is
adopted by one special-interest CP to the baseline without adoption of the social login, i.e., case (l, b) vs.
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case (b, b), the effect of an increase of the targeting rate φG on Ω
mh
l,b−b,b, ceteris paribus, must be identical to
the previously described effect on the equilibrium price p∗|mhG . This is because with φG > 1, CP G’s profit in
the case where one special-interest CP adopts the social login increases, whereas its profit in case without
the social login case does not.
Screen attention δ:
∂Ωmhl,b−b,b
∂δ
=
(
(−1/2αbG(δ− 1)φG2 + ((αiφi +αb−i−αbG)δ− 1/2αbiφi−αb−i/2 +αbG− 1)φG
+ (3/2αbG + (φi− 2)αbi −αb−i)δ− 3/2αbG + (−φi/2 + 1)αbi +αb−i/2 + 1
)
αbG,
∂Φo˜
∂δ
< 0.
To show that the condition above is satisfied, consider ∂Φ
o˜
∂δ
=
(−4+(φG+3)αbG)(φG−1)
2αb
i
(φG+1)δ2
, which is negative within
the feasible parameter range.
D.6. Non-discrimination obligation under multi-homing
Irrespective of whether users single-home or multi-home special-interest CPs, we have shown that a monop-
olistic general-interest CP never regrets its social login offer, i.e., CP G’s equilibirum profit when it offers
the social login is at least as high as in the situation without the social login.
Moreover, when users single-home, the general-interest CP is willing to offer the social login to both
special-interest CPs in exactly the same cases (that is, if and only if) it is willing to offer the social login to
a single special-interest CP. In other words, there is no incentive to offer the social login exclusively, if users
single-home special-interest CPs due to the division of the total advertising market into two submarkets
Di. Formally, this can be seen by solving Ω
l,l−b,b ≥ 0,Ωl,b−b,b ≥ 0 and Ωl,l−l,b ≥ 0 independently, which yields
identical offer thresholds for all three conditions.
However, when users multi-home, we have already seen that offer thresholds differ depending on whether
CP G expects both special-interest CPs or only one special-interest CP to adopt the login (see Subsec-
tion D.3). Formally, we have solved Ωmhl,l−b,b = Π
mh|l,l
G − Πmh|b,bG ≥ 0 to obtain Φo, and Ωmhl,b−b,b = Πmh|l,bG −
Πmh|b,bG ≥ 0 to obtain Φo˜. We have then shown that Φo˜ > Φo, i.e., the general-interest CP offers the social
login in more cases if only one special-interest CP adopts the social login than if both special-interest CPs
adopt the social login.
Thus, with users multi-homing special-interest CPs, the question arises whether the general-interest CP
has an incentive to offer its social login exclusively, even in cases where both special-interest CPs would
be willing to adopt the social login. From a technical point of view, necessary measures to implement such
exclusive offers are of course readily available in practice. Moreover, from a legal point of view, social login
providers already reserve themselves the right to (arbitrarily) exclude specific CPs. For example, Facebook
may exclude a website that “violates [their] terms or is negatively impacting the Platform” (Platform Policy,
No. 6(15)), Google states that it has “the right to terminate the Terms [...] for any reason and at any time
without liability or other obligation” (APIs Terms of Service, No. 8(a)), and also Amazon states “we may
terminate this Login with Amazon Agreement at any time, with or without cause” (Login with Amazon
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Figure 9 Illustration of possible market outcomes with multi-homing users and discriminatory offers
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Note. Areas shaded in light (dark) gray represent the market reduction (expansion) effect of a non-discrimination
obligation. The figure is derived for αbi = 0.5, α
b
G = 0.5, ρ = 0.5, δ = 0.5. Not all market outcomes may exist for all
feasible parameter constellations.
Services Agreement, No. 11).21
If CP G is allowed to make exclusive offers and thus to discriminate between special-interest CPs with
respect to its offer decision, it will weigh such an exclusive offer against a mutual offer to both special-interest
CPs. A mutual offer is relatively more profitable if and only if Ωmhl,l−l,b = Π
mh|l,l
G −Πmh|l,bG ≥ 0. This condition
is satisfied if
φi ≤Φô := 1
2αbi(3φG− 1)δ
·
(
3αbG(δ− 1)φG2 + ((−2δ+ 2)αbG + 2αbiδ+ 4)φG
+ (−δ+ 1)αbG + 2αbiδ− 4
)
. (16)
The offer thresholds then can be ranked as Φo˜ >Φo >Φô, which allows us to identify the impact of a non-
discrimination obligation that would prohibit exclusive offers. If the general-interest CP could discriminate
between special-interest CPs, CP G would offer the social login more often than under a non-discrimination
obligation, but then only exclusively to one special-interest CP (because Φo˜ >Φo). On the other hand, CP G
would offer the social login less often to both special-interest CPs than under a non-discrimination obligation
(because Φo >Φô).
Figure 9 illustrates the three offer thresholds for a numerical example and depicts the effects of a non-
discrimination obligation relative to a situation where the general-interest CP can make discriminatory, i.e.,
21 The terms and conditions can be retrieved from https://developers.facebook.com/policy/,
https://developers.google.com/terms/, and https://login.amazon.com/services-agreement, respectively.
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exclusive, offers. Based on the order of the offer thresholds, we can conclude that, first, a non-discrimination
obligation can lead to a market reduction effect (indicated by areas shaded in light gray in Figure 9). Because
a non-discrimination obligation rules out offers to a single special-interest CP, the general-interest CP is
willing to offer the social login in less cases. As indicated by the offer thresholds, this is the case if the increase
in targeting rate of the special-interest CP φi is relatively high. Second, a non-discrimination obligation can
also induce a market expansion effect (indicated by areas shaded in dark gray in Figure 9), because it forces
the general-interest CP to offer the social login to both special-interest CPs in cases where CP G would
prefer to offer the social login exclusively, but a mutual offer would also be profitable. This is the case if
the increase in targeting rate of the special-interest CP φi is relatively low. Both effects directly impact
the availability of the social login and point to the important welfare implications of a non-discrimination
obligation if users multi-home special-interest CPs.
Appendix E: Fixed costs and investments in targeting rate improvement
E.1. Exogenous fixed costs for social login offer and adoption
In this subsection, we consider exogenous fixed costs in the form of a lump sum Fj . The profit function of
CP j is then given by Πj = pj − Fj , where pj is the CP’s advertising price, FG denotes the fixed cost for
offering the social login (in the case of the general-interest CP), and Fi denotes the fixed cost for adopting
the social login (in the case of special-interest CPs). Critical thresholds for CPs’ strategic offer and adoption
decisions can then be derived analogously to Section 4 (and Appendix A).
Stage 2: Given that its special-interest competitor does not adopt the social login, CP i is willing to
adopt the social login, iff ∆l,b−b,b = Πl,bi −Πb,bi ≥ 0. This condition is satisfied if
φi ≥Φa′ := 1
αbiδ(τ + θ)
(
−
(
− 2
((− 1
2
φG
2(δ− 1)2αbG2 + (δ− 1)(αiδ−φG)αbG−
1
2
δ2αbi
2
+αbiδ+Fi−
1
2
)
τ
− 1
2
(
1 +φG(δ− 1)αbG
)2
θ
)
(τ + θ)
) 1
2
+
(
(δ− 1)θ+ (δ− 1)τ
)
φGα
b
G + τ + θ
)
.
Given that its special-interest competitor does adopt the social login, CP i is willing to adopt the social
login, iff ∆l,l−b,l = Πl,li −Πb,li ≥ 0. This condition is satisfied if
φi ≥Φa′′ := 1
τδαbi
(
−
(
− 2(((αbGαbi − αbi +φG2αbG22 )δ2 + (φG2αbG2− (φG +αbi)αbG +αbi)δ− φG2αbG
2
2
+Fi− 1
2
+φGα
b
G
)
τ − θ((αbG− αbi2 )δ−αbG + 1)αbiδ)τ) 12 + (1 + (δφG−φG)αbG)τ
)
.
A prisoner’s dilemma market outcome occurs, if the social login is adopted and ∆l,l−b,b = Πl,li −Πb,bi < 0.
This condition is satisfied if
φa
′
i ≤ φi <Φap :=
−
√
φG
2(δ− 1)2αbG2− 2(δ− 1)(αiδ−φG)αbG + δ2αbi2− 2αbiδ− 2Fi + 1 + 1 + (δφG−φG)αbG
δαbi
.
Stage 1: Given that both special-interest CPs adopt the social login, CP G is willing to offer the social
login iff Ωl,l−b,b = Πl,lG −Πb,bG ≥ 0. This condition is satisfied if
φi ≤Φo := 1
2
(φG− 1)(φG + 1)(δ− 1)2αbG2 + 2(δ− 1)(αbiδ+φG− 1)αbG + 2FG
(δ− 1)αiφGδαbG
.
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Figure 10 Illustration of market outcomes with exogenous lump sum fixed costs.
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Note. The figure is derived for the following parameter values: αbi = 0.25, α
b
G = 0.25, τ = 0.5, θ = 0.1, δ = 0.5, Fi =
0.05, FG = 0.05. Asymmetric adoption equilbria are denoted by the shaded area.
Given that only one special-interest CP adopts the social login, CP G is willing to offer the social login iff
Ωl,b−b,b = Πl,bG −Πb,bG ≥ 0. With fixed costs this condition is satisfied if
φi ≤Φo˜ := 1
2
(
(φG
2− 1)τ +φG2θ
)
(δ− 1)2αbG2 + 2
(
(αbiδ+φG− 1)τ +φGθ
)
(δ− 1)αbG + 2FGτ
φGαbGα
b
iδ(τ + θ)(δ− 1)
.
In contrast, to the base model it is now possible that asymmetric adoption equilibria emerge, i.e., one
special-interest CP adopts the social login, whereas the other special-interest CP does not. Those asymmetric
equilibria are unique in the sense that they never coexist with a joint adoption equilibrium. Figure 10
illustrates asymmetric adoption market outcomes, depicted by the shaded areas, for a numerical example.
Given that CP G is willing to offer the social login, asymmetric equlibria emerge, if and only if Φa
′ ≤ φi <
Φa
′′
, i.e., a single special-interest CP prefers adoption, whereas the other special-interest CP foregoes the
social login offer and, φi ≤ Φo˜, i.e., the general-interest CP prefers exclusive adoption over joint adoption.
Therefore, asymmetric equilibria can only arise if Φa
′
<Φa
′′
, which is satisfied if
Fi > F̂ :=
1
2τ
αbiδθ(2α
b
Gδ−αbiδ− 2αbG + 2). (17)
Although, in an asymmetric adoption equilbirum, the special-interest CP without the social login is worse
off than in a situation where neither CP would have adopted the social login, joint adoption is even less
profitable. Note that in all asymmetric adoption outcomes, there are two feasible equilibrium outcomes as
long as special-interest CPs decide simultaneously, due to symmetry: either CP A adopts the login, but CP B
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does not, or vice versa. If a setting with sequential adoption decisions is considered, it is obvious that only
the first mover will adopt the login and thus will obtain a competitive advantage, in both the consumer and
the advertising market.
E.2. Endogenous investments by special-interest CPs
We now introduce an additional investment stage (Stage 0) prior to the Stages 1 to 4 of the base model,
in which special-interest CPs choose their φi, which is associated with costs C(φi,Ki) :=Ki(φi− 1)2. Thus,
special-interest CPs maximize their profit function Πi = pi−C(φi,Ki) in this stage, anticipating the market
outcomes in the subsequent stages as shown in Section 4. In particular, symmetric special-interest CPs that
do not incur a lump sum fixed cost will always coincide in their adoption decision, i.e., either both CPs
adopt the social login or none does, because Φa
′
>Φa
′′
. Therefore, if one of the special-interest CPs has an
incentive to adopt, and thus to invest, in the social login, the competing special-interest CP will likewise
adopt and invest.
Anticipating an equilibrium in which both special-interest CPs will adopt the social login, CP i chooses its
investment according to the first order condition
∂Πl,l
i
φi
= 0, which yields the optimal unconstrained investment
level and the respective increase in targeting rate
φi =
δ(αbGδφG−αbGφG + 1)αbi + 2Ki
(αbi
2
δ2 + 2Ki)
.
Symmetric investment levels φ∗i constitute an equilibrium if there is no alternative investment that would
make a special-interest CP better off.
Now let ΦminG denote the threshold that determines whether CP G is willing to offer the social login (for
φG ≥ΦminG ) or not (for φG <ΦminG ), given special-interest CPs’ unconstrained investment level φi. To derive
ΦminG we solve φi = Φ
o and obtain
ΦminG =
1
αbG(δ− 1)(−δ2αbi2 + 2Ki)
(
2Kiα
b
iδ− 2Ki +
(
−αbGαbi4(αbG− 2αbi)δ6 + 2αbGαbi4(αbG−αbi − 1)δ5
−αbGαbi4(−2 +αbG)δ4 + 4K2i (αbG−αbi)2δ2− 8K2i (αbG− 1)(αbG−αbi)δ+ 4K2i (αbG− 1)2
) 1
2
)
.
Furthermore, let ΦmaxG denote the threshold that determines whether special-interest CPs are willing to
adopt the social login (for φG ≤ΦmaxG ) or not (for φG >ΦmaxG ), given the unconstrained investment level φi.
To derive ΦmaxG we solve φi = Φ
a′ and obtain
ΦmaxG =
1
2
1
αbGδ(δ− 1)αbi( 12δ2(τ + θ)αbi2 +Ki(τ + 2θ))
(
4
(
(
1
2
αbi
2
δ2 +Ki)
2(−1
4
τδ4(τ + θ)αbi
4
+
1
2
τδ3(αbGδ−αbG + 1)(τ + θ)αbi3−
1
2
αbi
2
δ2Kiτθ+Kiτδ(α
b
Gδ−αbG + 1)(τ + 2θ)αbi
+K2i (τ + θ)
2)
) 1
2
+ (−τ − θ)αbi3δ3− 2τδ2αbi2Ki + (−2τ − 4θ)Kiαbiδ+ (−4τ − 4θ)K2i
)
.
To characterize equilibrium market outcomes, we first assume that ΦminG ≤ΦmaxG :
Case (i): Zero investment. For φG >Φ
max
G , a special-interest CP prefers to forego the social login offer rather
than to adopt the social login, given its unconstrained investment level φi. Because φi <Φ
a′ , CP i cannot
gain an advantage by adopting the social login. By definition of Φa
′
, the unilateral adoption of the social
login would decrease its profit, i.e., Πl,bi <Π
b,b
i . Thus, each special-interest CP chooses φ
∗
i = 0 as the unique
equilibrium in the investment stage and profits are then given by Πb,bj = p
b,b
j .
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Case (ii): Unconstrained investment. For ΦminG ≤ φG ≤ΦmaxG , the social login will, by definition of ΦminG and
ΦmaxG , be offered and adopted given the special-interest CPs’ unconstrained investment level φi. The equi-
librium investment level is then given by φ∗i = φi. Moreover, the following two subcases can be considered:
Subcase (iia): Profitable adoption. For Φo ≥ φi ≥ Φap, both special-interest CPs adopt the social login,
and in consequence, they are better off than without the login (or at least make the same profit in case
φi = Φ
ap). Because, by definition, φi maximizes CP i’s profit in the case of joint adoption, no other
investment level could unilaterally increase its profit.
Subcase (iib): Prisoner’s dilemma. For Φap > φi ≥ Φa′ , both special-interest CPs adopt the social login,
but are worse off than without the social login. Although both special-interest CPs would be better off
if neither of them would adopt the social login, adoption and the respective investment level φi is still
the best response available to a special-interest CP. To see this, assume that one special-interest CP,
say CP A, would not adopt the social login. Then, by definition of Φa
′
, it is profitable for CP B to
adopt the social login. In consequence, CP A would be worse off than under joint adoption, due to a
decrease in market share (irrespective of the choice of φA). Thus, the prisoner’s dilemma now carries
over to the investment phase. Given that both special-interest CPs will adopt the login, and the login
will be offered by CP G, the optimal investment is given by φi.
Case (iii): Strategic investment reduction. For φG <Φ
min
G , special-interest CPs would maximize their profits
by choosing φi and jointly adopting the social login. But then the general-interest CP G would not offer
the social login, because φi > Φ
o. Thus, a special-interest CP has a strategic incentive to decrease its
investment level from φi to Φ
o such that CP G would still offer the social login as long as Πl,bi (φi)≥Πb,b.
The latter condition is always satisfied for ΦminG ≤ ΦmaxG , because by the definition of those thresholds
Φo ≥Φa′ for all φG <ΦminG . In consequence, a reduced investment level φ∗i = Φo and adoption of the social
login is always unilaterally profitable for a special-interest CP relative to non-adoption. Moreover, a CP i
cannot gain an advantage by a unilateral deviation to non-adoption, because Φa
′
> Φa
′′
. In conclusion,
φ∗i = Φ
o constitutes the unique investment equilibrium in this case.
Taken together, the above cases constitute the equilibrium market outcomes, depicted in Panel 1 in Figure 7,
with special-interest CP i’s optimal choice of φi given by
φ∗i =

Φo, if φG <Φ
min
G
φi =
δ(αbGδφG−αbGφG+1)αbi+2Ki
(αb
i
2
δ2+2Ki)
, if ΦminG ≤ φG ≤ΦmaxG
0, if φG >Φ
max
G .
Furthermore, we consider the cases in which the above assumption ΦminG ≤ ΦmaxG does not hold. i.e.,
ΦminG > Φ
max
G or Φ
min
G does not exist. Then, let Φ
threshold
G denote the threshold that determines whether
special-interest CPs are willing to adopt the social login (for φG ≤ ΦthresholdG ) or not (for φG > ΦthresholdG ),
given a strategically reduced investment level φi = Φ
o.
Obviously, if ΦminG ≤ ΦmaxG is violated, the unconstrained investment level cannot be an equilibrium out-
come, because either (i) CP i is not willing to adopt the social login or (ii) CP G is not willing to offer the
social login. In the latter case, it may again be unilaterally profitable for a special-interest CP to strategically
reduce its investment level to Φo. This is now the case for φG ≤ΦthresholdG , because by definition, it is precisely
Winners, Losers, and Facebook: The Role of Social Logins in the Online Advertising Ecosystem
95
Figure 11 Illustration of market outcomes with investments by special-interest CPs, if ΦminG >Φ
max
G .
𝜙G
𝜙i
Φ# 𝜙$Φ%& Φ%'
Note. The figure is derived for the following parameter values: αbi = 0.5, α
b
G = 0.5, τ = 0.5, θ= 0.03, δ= 0.5,Ki = 0.025.
The equilibrium market outcome for each φG is depicted by the bold black line.
in those cases, that unilateral adoption is profitable (Πl,bi ≥ Πb,b), given φi = Φo. Conversely, in all other
cases (φG >Φ
threshold
G ), investment and adoption is not profitable, and thus special-interest CPs choose not
to invest at all.
Thus, the special-interest CP’s equilibrium investment choice in cases where the condition ΦminG ≤ΦmaxG is
violated can be characterized as
φ∗i =
{
Φo, if φG ≤ΦthresholdG
0, if φG >Φ
threshold
G .
Figure 11 provides a numerical example for ΦminG > Φ
max
G and illustrates optimal investment levels and
equilibrium market outcomes in bold.
E.3. Endogenous investments by general-interest and special-interest CPs
In the following, we assume that both special-interest CPs as well as the general-interest CP simultaneously
choose their respective increase in targeting rate φj in a stage prior to the stages considered in Section 4.
Special-interest CPs incur symmetric costs C(φi,Ki) :=Ki(φi−1)2 and the general-interest CP incurs costs
C(φG,KG) :=KG(φG− 1)2. Profits are thus given by Πi = pi−C(φi,Ki) and ΠG = pG−C(φG,KG), respec-
tively. Again, with symmetric special-interest CPs and without lump-sum fixed costs, CPs anticipate that
either both special-interest CPs adopt the social login or none does. In the latter case, profits are given by
Πj = Π
b,b
j = p
b,b
j with φ
∗
j = 0 and thus C(φj ,Kj) = 0. In the former case, each CP i solves
∂Πl,l
i
∂φi
= 0, and CP G
solves
∂Πl,l
G
∂φG
= 0. Solving this set of first order conditions yields the optimal unconstrained investment levels
φj of each CP j, given that the social login is offered and jointly adopted by both special-interest CPs. Thus,
we obtain the unconstrained investment functions
φG =
φG(δ− 1)2αbG2 + (δ− 1)αbG +KG(φG− 1)
αbiα
b
Gδ(δ− 1)
,
φi =
δ(δφGα
b
G−φGαbG + 1)αbi + 2Ki
αbi
2
δ2 + 2Ki
.
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Figure 12 Illustration of market outcomes with unconstrained endogenous investments.
𝜙G
𝜙i
𝜙G
𝜙i (𝜙#∗ ,𝜙&∗) 𝜙&(𝜙#∗ ,𝜙&∗) 𝜙&
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Φ)*Φ)+Φ,
Note. The left panel is drawn for αbi = 0.4, α
b
G = 0.4, τ = 0.5, θ = 0.1, δ = 0.5,K = 0.1. The right panel is drawn for
αbi =
1
3
, αbG = 0.5, τ = 0.5, θ= 0.1, δ= 0.5,K = 0.05. The equilibrium market outcome is given by point (φ
∗
G, φ
∗
i ).
Let (φ+G , φ
+
i ) denote the point where the unconstrained investment function φi of a special-interest CP i
and the unconstrained investment function φG of CP G intersect. We obtain
φ+G =
(2(δ− 1)(δαbi − 1)αbG + 2KG)Ki +KGαbi2δ2
(2(δ− 1)2αbG2 + 2KG)Ki +αbi2δ2KG
,
φ+i =
2Ki(δ− 1)2αbG2 +KGδαbi(δ− 1)αbG + 2( 12δαbi +Ki)KG
2Ki(δ− 1)2αbG2 + 2KG( 12δ2αbi2 +Ki)
.
Unconstrained investments (φ+G , φ
+
i ) constitute an equilibrium outcome (φ
∗
G, φ
∗
i ), if, given those investment
levels, CP G is indeed willing to offer the social login (φ+i ≤Φo(φ+G)) and CP i is willing to adopt the social
login (φ+i ≥ Φa′(φ+G)). As illustrated for two numerical cases in Figure 12, unconstrained investment levels
may lead to an equilibrium market outcome with profitable adoption (see left Panel in Figure 12) or a
prisoner’s dilemma market outcome (see right Panel in Figure 12). Formally, a prisoner’s dilemma market
outcome occurs if Φap(φ+G)>φ
+
i ≥Φa′(φ+G).
If unconstrained investment levels, given by (φ+G , φ
+
i ), are outside of CPs’ offer and adoption thresholds,
they obviously do not constitute an equilibrium outcome, because at least one CP could improve its situation
unilaterally by reducing its investments to zero and not offering or not adopting the social login, respectively.
In those situations, three further cases can be differentiated:
In cases where the unconstrained investment level of CP i exceeds the offer threshold, i.e., φ+i >Φ
o(φ+G),
but is above the adoption threshold, i.e., φ+i ≥ Φa′(φ+G), the special-interest CP reduces its investment
level strategically as seen in the previous Subsection E.2. The equilibrium (φ∗G, φ
∗
i ) is then derived by the
intersection of CP i’s and CP G’s best response function. Based on the preceding analysis, we know that CP i
is willing to strategically reduce investments to φi = Φ
o for φG ≤ΦmaxG (or φG ≤ΦthresholdG , depending on the
case; see Subsection E.2). In analogy to a special-interest CP, and in particular to case (i) of Subsection E.2,
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Figure 13 Illustration of a market outcome where both CPs reduce investments strategically.
𝜙G
𝜙i
(𝜙#∗ , 𝜙&∗) (𝜙#( ,𝜙&() 𝜙&
𝜙#
Φ* Φ+,
Note. The figure is drawn for αbi =
2
3
, αbG = 0.4, τ = 0.5, θ= 0.1, δ= 0.15,K = 0.16. Best response functions are depicted
as a bold black line for the special-interest CP and as a bold grey line for the general-interest CP.
CPG’s best response for φi >Φ
o is an investment level of zero, i.e., φG = 0. But, for Φ
a′ ≤ φi ≤Φo, CPG’s best
response is its unconstrained investment level φG (in analgoy to case (ii) of Subsection E.2). The intersection
of CPs’ best response functions and thus the equilibrium outcome is therefore given by the intersection of
CP G’s unconstrained investment function φG and CP i’s function for a strategically reduced investment,
i.e., the offer threshold Φo. The above market outcome together with CPs’ best response functions and the
equilibrium investments are illustrated in Panel 4 in Figure 7.
In cases where the unconstrained investment level of CP i is below the adoption threshold, i.e., φ+i <
Φa
′
(φ+G), but also below the offer threshold, i.e., φ
+
i ≤Φo(φ+G), it is now the general-interest CP, who reduces
its investment level strategically. Based on the same rationale as in the previous case, but with reversed roles,
CP G is willing to reduce its investment level to a point on the adoption threshold Φa
′
, which guarantees
adoption of the social login by CP i. Best responses of CP G and CP i then intersect at the intersection
of CP i’s unconstrained investment function φi and CP G’s function for a strategically reduced investment,
i.e., the adoption threshold Φa
′
. Panel 2 in Figure 7 depicts the equilibrium outcome (φ∗G, φ
∗
i ) together with
CPs’ best response functions for a numerical example.
In cases where the unconstrained investment level of CP i is, at the same time, above the offer threshold
and below the adoption threshold, i.e., φ+i < Φ
a′(φ+G) and φ
+
i > Φ
o(φ+G), both the general-interest CP and
the special-interest CP reduce their respective investment level strategically. The intersection of CPs’ best
responses is then given by the intersection of CP G’s function for a strategically reduced investment, i.e., the
adoption threshold Φa
′
, and CP i’s function for a strategically reduced investment, i.e., the offer threshold Φo.
Figure 13 illustrates the market outcome for a situation where both CPs strategically reduce their investment
in equilibrium relative to the unconstrained investment levels.
In conclusion, with endogenous investments by both CPs, the social login is always offered. Either, the equi-
librium investment and choice of increase in targeting rate is given by the intersection of the unconstrained
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investment levels (φ+G , φ
+
i ), or by the respective corner solution on the offer and/or adoption threshold.
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Abstract
Data portability allows users to transfer data between competing online services. As data gets in-
creasingly valuable for online services and users alike, the enforcement of data portability within
the European Union by the General Data Protection Regulation will have important ramifications
for the competition in online markets. Thus, we develop a game-theoretic model to examine firms’
strategic reaction to data portability and to identify ensuing market outcomes. We show, among
others, that although data portability is designed to protect users, they may be hurt because market
entrants have an incentive to increase the amount of collected data compared to a scenario without
data portability. However, profits for new services and total surplus increase if the costs for im-
plementation are not too large. This likely improves innovation and service variety. Consequently,
our results provide important insights and case-specific recommendations for managers and policy
makers in data-driven online markets.
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1. Introduction
In the digital ecosystem, data is considered to be the key ingredient for many of today’s
business models, crucially determining whether a service is successful. At the same time,
the protection of (personal) data, users and competition becomes increasingly important
for policy makers and competition authorities. For example, the European antitrust inves-
tigations against Google attribute either to the observation that consumers might be dis-
advantaged or that competition and innovation is hampered (c.f., Drozdiak and Schechner
2016, for an overview of European antitrust probes against Google). In fact, personal data
entered or revealed at a specific online service may lead to a lock-in effect for users as
* This paper bases on Wohlfarth (2017).
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switching to competing services induces costs to re-enter the data required by the new
online service (c.f., Klemperer 1987a, for related research). Hereby, (dominant) online ser-
vices may benefit, but innovation and service variety might be reduced as market entry
is deterred. Illustrative examples of data-related switching costs are provided by online
banking accounts (where switching leads to the necessity to re-enter recurring transferals),
online mail or storage services (where switching leads to the necessity to re-enter general
user information, and to re-upload files, photos, contacts or categories), or cloud com-
puting environments (where preferences and adaptations have to be re-injected). These
services suggest that a lock-in does not necessarily stem from network effects alone, i.e.,
the number of participating users or complementary provided services. Instead, as Chen
and Hitt (2002) analyze empirically, there is a variety of factors (additionally) influencing
a users’ loyalty. We build on these observations and argue that the (amount of) already
revealed (personal) data is a crucial factor for (i) online services active in data-driven mar-
kets because it determines the service’s competitive strength and thus, profitability, and
also for (ii) users because they might be locked-in to a certain service.
It is well known that established systems designed to lock-in users may hamper the
success of new services and lead to excessive rents of incumbent firms (c.f., Katz and Shapiro
1994, Farrell and Klemperer 2007) and—eventually—to market failures. In this spirit, the
European Commission has recently formulated a general “right to data portability” for
personal data. Consequently, a standardized way of how information can be ported from one
online service to another is required (c.f., European Commission 2016b, p.45, Article 20);
an issue most voluntarily provided functionalities for users to export previously revealed
data do not explicitly account for (c.f., Facebook n.d., Google n.d.), and an issue also
highlighted by the Deputy Chief Technology Officer of the United States (c.f., Macgillivray
and Shambaugh 2016). Ultimately, the European Commission’s initiative aims to promote
users’ negotiation power vis-a`-vis (dominant) online services by reducing lock-in effects,
i.e., protecting the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons (c.f., European
Commission 2016b, p.32, Article 1). However, the economic effects of such an intervention
on consumer’s surplus, on the amount of data online services collect from their customers,
on online service’s profits, and on service variety are unclear to date. Albeit the regulation
becomes binding for all European member states as of May 2018, academic analyses have
so far been limited to the legal and technical dimensions of data portability. An analysis
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of strategic incentives, business strategies and economic outcomes is lacking, as Nobel
prize laureate Jean Tirole outlined in his speech on competition and regulation of online
platforms (c.f., Valero 2016).
This paper addresses this research gap and analyses the competitive effects of a user’s
ability to port data from an incumbent online service / content provider (CP) to a market
entrant. Hereby, we analyze the CPs’ incentives (not) to promote data portability and
their business strategies in data-driven markets. Additionally, we shed light on the ensuing
effects on consumers as this is pivotal to the argumentation of the European Commission
and the U.S. Deputy Chief Technology Officer, alike. In doing so, we develop a game-
theoretic model that considers the economic effects arising from a right to data portability
by considering two CPs generating revenues primarily through data revealed by users
active at their platform. Thus, we abstract from any explicit business model (e.g., based
on advertisements, or based on selling aggregated user-data to third parties) and simply
assume that data revealed by users can be transformed into revenue. Hence, additional
data has a positive effect on a CP’s profits. On the other hand, revealing data bears costs
(i.e., a disutility) for users: either they have some effort revealing data as such (say, the
time needed to enter the data), or—more general—users give away data, to which they
attribute some value to (e.g., privacy costs in a broader sense). Consequently, whereas
collecting more data is beneficial for CPs, users experiencing a higher disutility might
switch to competing CPs or even leave the market. However, users’ ability to do so is
impeded by established switching-costs and lock-ins. The ability to port data by means of
data portability arguably lifts the established restrictions on users, but may also impact
the CPs’ data consumption. These effects have to be taken into account when analyzing
the competitive effects.
Our obtained results show that data portability is not necessarily beneficial for users
because CPs entering the market have an incentive to increase the amount of data users
have to reveal. Thus, the ultimate goal to protect users is not necessarily achieved. Con-
versely, the CPs’ incentives (not) to promote data portability are unambiguous if the costs
for implementing data portability are zero or comparably low: Whereas dominant CPs
(incumbents) always suffer from data portability, emerging CPs (entrants) challenging
incumbents are better off. However, as total surplus increases under a data portability
regime, predominantly due to the arising benefits for the entrant who is able to generate
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higher revenues, the decision to enforce a right to data portability is far more complex
than currently realized.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Within the next section, we briefly
review previous literature related to data portability and highlight the multi-faceted char-
acter of this topic. In Section 3, we lay out the game-theoretic model and assumptions.
Afterwards, we deduce and highlight the model’s main results in Section 4 and extend the
model by (i) introducing costs associated with the implementation of data portability (Sec-
tion 5.1), (ii) assuming that also irrelevant data is transferred to the new CP (Section 5.2),
and (iii) assuming that positive direct network effects for users exist (Section 5.3). Finally,
we conclude by highlighting managerial and policy implications, limitations, and avenues
for future research in Section 6.
2. Literature Review
We refer to data portability as consumer’s ability to transfer (personal) data revealed at
one CP to another CP. To the best of our knowledge, the IS literature has so far not
considered this concept explicitly in terms of strategic incentives, business strategies, or
economic outcomes. Albeit, the technical literature demonstrated the feasibility of that
concept by proposing models to conveniently port data, e.g., between cloud computing
vendors. In this vein, Ranabahu and Sheth (2010) propose semantic web techniques to
achieve portability and Petcu and Vasilakos (2014) inter alia highlight open standards
and open application programming interfaces (APIs) as technical solutions. Thus, most
technical studies provide a proof of concept that data portability is technically feasible but
do not explicitly discuss the possible trade-offs for the involved parties.
In light of the General Data Protection Regulation becoming effective in 2018, several
legal investigations have been carried out. Graef (2015) conducts a legal analysis of data
portability in social networks with respect to the (European) competition law and summa-
rizes relevant cases. Vanberg and U¨nver (2017) inter alia highlight arising security issues as
well as “disproportionate costs for small am medium sized companies” (Vanberg and U¨nver
2017, p.14) induced by introducing a right to data portability. Swire and Lagos (2013)
explicitly refer to consumer welfare and “express serious concerns about the RDP [right
to data portability]” (Swire and Lagos 2013, p.338) because, (i) the problems addressed
by the regulation (e.g., monopoly power through lock-ins) were legally already covered by
competition law, (ii) personal data could easily be exported, i.e., security problems arise,
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and (iii) it was unclear how a common standard could be achieved if a variety of different
service providers were involved. The authors conclude that “the proposed RDP appears
to reduce consumer welfare” (Swire and Lagos 2013, p.379), but do not offer or discuss
economic incentives or outcomes, which additionally highlights the necessity of economic
backing in this context.
Moreover, this study is related to two strands of the economic literature, which will
be highlighted in the following. First, as we assume users to be locked-in when using a
data-intensive online service due to costs to port these data, we draw on the literature
investigating the role of switching costs. The results derived from this literature show that
an incumbent firm has an incentive to lower its price anticipating that an entrant enters the
market (Klemperer 1989). In essence, firms thus fiercely compete in early periods to gain
market shares which can then be harvested in later periods (Klemperer 1987a,b). Hence,
switching costs induce softened competition in later periods which allows the remaining
firms to set higher prices. Indeed, as Gehrig and Stenbacka (2004) show analytically, com-
peting firms have an incentive to establish high switching costs. The authors show that
these can be achieved by (maximum) horizontal differentiation (additionally, see Hotelling
1929, d’Aspremont et al. 1979). Within the taxonomy introduced by Ray et al. (2012), our
study deals with “user-related” switching costs as they include the effort a user needs to
invest to “ensure a satisfactory switch of service and to recreate or transfer features” (Ray
et al. 2012, p.199). More precisely, one may argue that within the framework provided by
Ray et al. (2012), transfer costs are of particular importance to users. To demarcate our
approach from previous literature related to the existence of switching costs and lock-ins,
the fact that we assume data to be the considered good, which inherently determines the
degree of switching costs as well as firm’s profits (c.f., Section 3 for details) is crucial and
should be highlighted. Hence, the strategy derived from the traditional switching cost lit-
erature would induce to set lower prices in early periods (i.e., collect less data) to deter
entry and gain market shares which can thereupon be harvested. This, in turn, is not nec-
essarily the equilibrium strategy of an incumbent in a data-driven market environment,
as (i) switching costs would be lower in successive periods and (ii) profits in later periods
from data already gained in early periods would be reduced. These specific aspects of the
competitive environment further delineate our approach from, e.g., Caminal and Matutes
(1990) which consider endogenous switching costs.
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Second, our study on data portability is related to the strand of the (economic) effects
stemming from interoperability. Within this strand, the literature on compatibility and
standardization between different services, especially the ensuing effects of the availability
of converters as considered by Farrell and Saloner (1992), should be highlighted. In their
theoretical model, Farrell and Saloner show that the availability of (imperfect) converters
allows users to benefit from other users using a competing technology, i.e., a converter
induces benefits through compatibility. Thus, direct network effects resulting from inter-
operability are a central aspect of the depicted model. Another important view on inter-
operability is highlighted within the study conducted by Pollock (2009). Pollock evaluates
the effects of controlling the possibility to convert “‘’software’ or services’ associated with
one platform to run on another” assuming a two-sided market (Pollock 2009, p.155). Thus,
Pollock considers interoperability being determined by indirect network effects. Addition-
ally, the impact of the ability to control the mode of interoperability itself is investigated.
Thus, the author allows the platform to directly control the costs of flow of information,
i.e., the costs for interoperability. However, although interoperability plays a pivotal role
in online markets, the mentioned studies do not depict the concept of data portability for
several reasons. In general, interoperability should not be confounded with the portability
of data (c.f., Graef 2015). Additionally, next to several technical dimensions, the central
economic distinction can be seen in (i) the role of network externalities, which are not
necessarily relevant in the context of data portability as a user’s lock-in in data-driven
markets is crucially influenced by the (amount of) data revealed at a certain online service
and not solely by network externalities (c.f., examples provided in Section 1), and (ii) the
scope of the platform’s ability to control the flow of data: since the mentioned European
regulation is binding for all services alike, most existing online services are left with no
possibility to strategically set the amount of data that can be ported, i.e., online services
are unable to control the costs for portability.
Our proposed game-theoretic model, which will be outlined in the following section,
captures the trade-offs for the involved parties and considers the specific aspects of data-
driven business models. We use this model to answer the following two main research
questions:
RQ 1 How does a right to data portability affect the amount of data that online services
collect?
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RQ 2 How does a right to data portability affect the consumers?
Additionally, we investigate the effects on an incumbent’s and an entrant’s profits, which
arguably influences service variety and innovation in the long run, and investigate which
regime (data portability or no data portability) is more efficient with regard to total welfare.
3. Outline of the Economic Model
To highlight the competitive effects of a right to data portability and to capture the impli-
cations on market entry and innovation, we consider a market with two competing, dif-
ferentiated CPs (i=A,B) offering substitutable services, and heterogeneous users having
a natural preference for one of the CPs. Thus, we assume a unit mass of users, uniformly
distributed between zero and one (Hotelling 1929) and CPs located at either end of the
users’ preference spectrum (d’Aspremont et al. 1979, Gehrig and Stenbacka 2004) differen-
tiated by some primary attribute (Irmen and Thisse 1998, Iyer and Soberman 2000), i.e.,
CP A is located at x= 0, CP B is located at x= 1 and both CPs are in competition for
the same users. Moreover, to investigate the competitive effects on the amount of required
data, market entry and service variety, we consider two time periods (t= 1,2) and assume
that CP A is active in t= 1 and t= 2, whereas CP B enters in t= 2. Thus, CP A might
be classified as an incumbent content provider, whereas CP B is an entrant.
In period t= 1, a user located at x choosing to become active at CP A derives a utility
of U t=1A (x) = vA− τ ·x− rt=1A , where vA is the base-utility a user derives from being active
at CP A (e.g., determined by the service’s functionalities, the ease-of-use, etc.), τ is the
parameter specifying the competitive intensity in the market (i.e., if τ is high, the user’s
inherent preference for one of the CP gets relatively more important), and rt=1A is the
disutility a user derives from revealing (personal) data at CP A in t= 1 (see introductory
examples stated above; we refer to ri as data consumption or amount of data required or
collected by CP i). We assume users to be myopic (c.f., Bala and Goyal 2000, Gilboa and
Matsui 1991), i.e., they only consider their utility in the first period, when they decide
to be active at CP A in t = 1 as they are unable to anticipate the market entry of CP
B. Thus, the indifferent user between choosing CP A and not choosing any CP at all is
located at x∗,t=1 = vA−r
t=1
A
τ
and users located at x> x∗,t=1 are not active at CP A in t= 1.
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In period t= 2, CP B enters the market. Users now have the choice between two com-
peting CPs and choose the one from which they derive the higher utility. A user located
at location x and active at CP A derives in the second period a utility of
U t=2A (x) =
vA− τ ·x− r
t=2
A , if U
t=1
A (x)≥ 0
vA− τ ·x− rt=2A − rt=1A , else.
Note that rt=2A is the strategic variable of CP A in t= 2 and equals the amount of additional
data required by CP A in t = 2 for users being active at CP A. This utility function
captures the fact that, in the second period, users do not experience further disutility
from data already revealed in t= 1 if the same CP is used again. For example, if a user
entered (personal) data (e.g., her name, address, date of birth, interests, or uploaded photos
and documents), she does not have to re-enter, re-validate or re-upload this information.
Conversely, users who were not active in t = 1 have to enter all required data if they
decide to become active in the second period. Thus, these users need to enter data with
an amount of rt=1A + r
t=2
A (if they decide to become active at CP A in t= 2) or rB (if they
decide to become active at CP B, see below). For these users, the corresponding disutility
is thus independent from the ability to port data, because they have not revealed any data
previously.
A user located at x who becomes active at CP B in t= 2 derives a utility of
Ud,t=2B (x) =
vB − τ · (1−x)− rB + r
t=1
A , if U
t=1
A (x)≥ 0 with data portability (d= P )
vB − τ · (1−x)− rB , else (d=NP or U t=1A (x)< 0).
The utility function Ud,t=2B (x) captures the effect that users becoming active at CP B need
to enter all required data (i.e., rB) either if they have not been active in t= 1, or if there
is no ability to port already revealed data (d=NP ). Moreover, the equation captures the
effects of a right to data portability if users switch CPs: if users have been active at CP
A in the first period, i.e., U t=1A (x) ≥ 0, and are able to port already entered data to the
new CP without incurring any costs (as envisaged by the European Commission, d= P ),
they only need to reveal the net amount of required data at CP B in t= 2, i.e., rB − rt=1A .
Intuitively, if we assume the amount of information required at CP B to be at least as high
as the amount of information required at CP A, i.e., rB ≥ rt=1A , users only have to reveal
Data Portability on the Internet: An Economic Analysis
108
the additional information required by CP B.1
To calculate the indifferent user in t = 2, we need to account for the different cases
just outlined. Hereby, we assume the market to be fully covered and, to investigate the
effects of a right to data portability, that at least one user can potentially port her user
data from CP A to CP B. Thus, if users have the possibility to port their data (d= P )
and were active in period one, the indifferent user in t = 2 can be calculated by solving
vA − τ · x− rt=2A = vB − τ · (1− x)− rB + rt=1A . If users do not have the possibility to port
their data (d = NP ), but were active in period one, the indifferent user in t = 2 can be
calculated by solving vA − τ · x− rt=2A = vB − τ · (1− x)− rB. Technically, it might also
be possible that the indifferent user in period two is located right to the location of the
indifferent user in period one, i.e., U t=1A (x
∗,d,t=2)< 0. However, as shown in Appendix A,
this case is not feasible and consequently, omitted within the main analysis.
Thus, the indifferent user in t= 2 is located at:
x∗,d,t=2 =
−
rt=2A +r
t=1
A −rB−τ−vA+vB
2τ
, if U t=1A (x
∗,d,t=2)≥ 0 (d= P ),
− rt=2A −rB−τ−vA+vB
2τ
, else (U t=1A (x
∗,d,t=2)< 0, d=NP ).
Based on the market shares given by the location of the indifferent user, the CPs’ profits
can be specified. We assume that CPs with data-driven business models benefit from data
entered in one period also in later periods as the obtained information is still valuable to
them (e.g., in terms of the ability to target ads, or tailor/customize services). Within the
base model, we do not consider any costs associated with the introduction of the right to
data portability; however, we relax this assumption in the third extension (see Section 5.1).
Thus, for now, total profits of CP A after two periods are given by
pidA = x
∗,t=1 · rd,t=1A︸ ︷︷ ︸
pid,t=1A
+x∗,d,t=2 · (rd,t=1A + rd,t=2A )︸ ︷︷ ︸
pid,t=2A
.
CP B, which is only active in t= 2, makes total profits of
pidB = (1−x∗,t=1) · rdB + (x∗,t=1−x∗,d,t=2) · ((rdB − rd,t=1A ) + rd,t=1A ),
pidB = (1−x∗,d,t=2) · rdB.
1 If CP B provides a higher base-utility than CP A (i.e., vA < vB , see the following section for further details),
CP B always requires more data in equilibrium, i.e., switching users need to enter additional data. If we drop this
assumption, the interpretation of the “net amount of required data” is less intuitive. However, this assumption is not
required from an analytical perspective.
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Note that we implicitly made two further assumptions. First, we assumed that CPs cannot
discriminate between old, new and switching users, i.e., the amount of data a CP requires
from a specific user in t= 2 is independent of this user’s decision in t= 1. Thus, all users
active at a CP need to reveal the same amount of data (we refer to the limitations in
Section 6.2 for a discussion of the implications if this assumption is relaxed). Second, we
assumed that all data that is transferred to CP B is valuable for the entrant. We relax
this assumption in the second extension of the model (see Section 5.2).
Figure 1 illustrates the assumed market setting. Here, squares above the user depict
the (net) amount of data (illustrated by symbols) different users (j = 1,2) would have to
reveal in the considered period for becoming active at the respective CP. In contrast, circles
underneath the CPs indicate the amount of data a CP requires. In the illustrated scenario,
user 1 is active in period one, whereas user 2 becomes active only in period two. Without
data portability, user 1 has to re-enter the data already revealed to CP A at CP B, if she
wants to switch to CP B in the second period (thus, she needs to re-enter: star, moon and
heart, and additionally needs to enter: thunderbolt). In contrast, with data portability,
user 1 has the ability to port her already entered data and thus only has to enter the net
amount of required data (here: thunderbolt), if she wants to switch to CP B. For user 2,
who has not been active in the first period, both cases are identical, i.e., user 2 has to enter
all of the CP’s required data independent of the considered regime (i.e., star, moon, heart
and sun to become active at CP A or star, moon, heart and thunderbolt to become active
at CP B). Note that Figure 1 only illustrates the (net) amount of data that is required
by the CPs and needs to be entered by users in the respective period. The user’s actual
decision which CP to patronize is not illustrated in Figure 1 because it depends (inter alia)
on the base-utilities.
In summary, the considered two-stage game proceeds as follows:
Stage 1 The incumbent CP A sets the amount of required data rt=1A for period t= 1
anticipating CP B’s action in period t= 2. Then, users decide whether to become active
at CP A (if U t=1A (x)≥ 0).
Stage 2 Both CPs simultaneously set the amount of required data for period t= 2, i.e.,
CP A sets rt=2A and CP B sets rB. Then again, users decide at which CP they choose to
become active. Under the full market coverage assumption, users in t = 2 are active at
exactly one CP. If U t=2A (x)>U
d,t=2
B (x), users are active at CP A and vice versa.
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Figure 1 Illustration of the assumed market setting.
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Note. Without data portability (d=NP ), user 1 has to re-enter her already revealed data if she switches to CP B in
t= 2. However, with data portability (d= P ), user 1 has the ability to port her already entered data and thus only
needs to enter the net amount of required data. User 2 did not enter any data in t= 1. Consequently, irrespective
whether a right to data portability is introduced, she cannot port any data in t= 2.
4. Results and Discussion
To identify the effects of a right to data portability, we compare the case with data porta-
bility (d= P ) to the case without data portability (d=NP ). In doing so, we solve for the
subgame perfect equilibrium through backward induction beginning in Stage 2 to deduce
the equilibrium amounts of required data. The results are successively used to analyze the
effects on CPs’ profits, consumer’s surplus and total surplus.
In Stage 2 both CPs compete for users and revenues. Consequently, a CP’s decision is
affected by the decision of its competitor and the corresponding actions of users, i.e., the
CPs take into account the amount of data required by the competing CP. Analytically,
these effects are captured by simultaneously solving ∂pi
d,t=2
A /∂rt=2A = 0 and ∂pi
d
B/∂rB = 0, which
yields the CP’s equilibrium amount of required data for period t= 2 (in the following, a
star (∗) in the superscript refers to an equilibrium result).
In Stage 1 CP A serves the market as monopolist. However, it anticipates the effects
on second-period profits in its decision how much data to collect. Analytically, we use the
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equilibrium results of Stage 2 (i.e., r∗,dB and r
∗,d,t=2
A ) to specify CP A’s profits over two
periods (pidA) and then solve ∂pi
d
A/∂rt=1A = 0 to obtain the optimal amount of required data
for CP A in period t= 1 (i.e., r∗,d,t=1A ).
4.1. Amount of Required Data by the CPs
A comparison of equilibrium amounts of required data shows that CP A requires a higher
amount of data under the regime without data portability (d = NP ).2 Interestingly, the
data consumption of CP A without data portability in the first period is even higher than
the monopoly data consumption r∗Monopoly, i.e., the amount of data CP A would require
without the entry of CP B:
r∗,NP,t=1A =
3τ + 10vA− vB
17
>
vA
2
= r∗,P,t=1A = r
∗
Monopoly.
This highlights the effect of anticipated entry: Intuitively, CP A requires a high amount
of data to generate (higher) switching costs to weaken competition in later periods. The
effect of weakened competition even dominates the (negative effect of) reduced period
one market shares and, compared to a regular one-period monopoly, reduced profits. The
observation that CP A requires an even higher amount of data than in monopoly is, at first
sight, in contrast to the traditional switching cost literature. Here, anticipated entry results
in price wars lowering early-period prices to gain market shares, which can thereupon
be harvested in later periods (c.f., Klemperer 1989, 1995). But, within our considered
setting of a data-driven market environment, lock-ins are not generated by participation
alone (e.g., positive network externalities or the functionalities of a service), which could
be stimulated by low prices (additionally, c.f., Section 5.3), but additionally by a user’s
invested effort to enter, i.e., a user’s disutility to reveal (personal) data. Thus, lock-in
effects do play a pivotal role for CPs in these market environments, although the underlying
rationale differs compared to traditional market environments. This is because (i) data
required by a CP (i.e., “prices” set) in early periods are directly relevant to CPs’ profits
in later periods, and (ii) the incumbent’s “price setting” is (additionally) constrained by
entrants in later periods. With data portability (d= P ), the incumbent CP requires the
monopoly amount of data. Because lock-in effects vanish through the users’ ability to port
data to the competing CP in the following period, the incumbent CP cannot benefit from
2 Technically, the amount of required data with data portability can only be higher if τ <−vA/2+ vB/3. However, this
requires that x∗,d,t < 0, which is not feasible (c.f., Appendix A for details).
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establishing lock-ins anymore. Consequently, CP A maximizes its profits in the first period
by requiring the same amount of data it would require in a one-period game, where it acts
as monopolistic CP.
With respect to the amount of required data in the second period, this restricting effect
is also observable: the incumbent CP always requires less data if users are able to port
their data, i.e.,
r∗,NP,t=2A =
15τ − vA− 5vB
17
>
6τ − vA− 2vB
6
= r∗,P,t=2A .
Conversely, evaluating optimal data collection by CP B reveals that the required amount
of data with data portability is always higher than in the case without data portability:
r∗,NPB =
16τ − 9vA + 6vB
17
< τ − vA− vB
3
= r∗,PB .
Intuitively, CP B requires more data with data portability because users that switch from
CP A only have to reveal the net amount of required data due to the possibility to port
the already entered data. Consequently, these users experience less disutility in the case
of switching, because the net amount of required data is lower (rB − rt=1A ≤ rB), all else
being equal, leading to higher market shares and profits for the entrant under this regime.
Proposition 1 summarizes these findings:
Proposition 1. Under a data portability regime, incumbents require less user data,
whereas entrants unambiguously increase their amount of required data for users becoming
active at their service.
Next, to deduce possible business strategies for CPs (additionally, c.f., managerial impli-
cations in Section 6.1) and to analyze the factors influencing the CP’s data consumption in
equilibrium, we conduct comparative statics. First, we find that CP A’s first-period data
consumption increases in its base-utility vA, whereas its second-period data consumption
decreases in vA, i.e., ∂r
∗,d,t=1
A /∂vA > 0 and ∂r
∗,d,t=2
A /∂vA < 0 irrespective of the considered regime.
The negative effect on the second-period amount of required data by CP A can be explained
by the incumbent’s rationale to protect its market share in a competitive environment:
Through an increased base-utility, CP A is able to require a large(r) amount of data in
period one. Protecting this market share in period two (through a comparably low amount
of required data in this period) dominates the positive effects arising from requiring more
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data in the second period. On the contrary, if its base-utility is decreasing, protecting mar-
ket shares does not dominate the positive effects of requiring additional data in period two.
Second, an increase in CP B’s base-utility vB lowers CP A’s data collection: in period one
to increase the share of users that are locked-in, in period two due to stronger competitive
forces. Since the lock-in effect vanishes with data portability, the first-period amount of
required data is unaffected by vB (in d= P ). In conclusion: ∂r
∗,NP,t=1
A /∂vB < 0, ∂r
∗,P,t=1
A /∂vB =
0, ∂r
∗,d,t=2
A /∂vB < 0. Third, the competitiveness of the market (τ) has an unambiguous effect
on CP A’s data consumption: the lower the competitive intensity of the market (increase in
τ), the higher the amount of required data, i.e., ∂r
∗,NP,t=1
A /∂τ > 0 and ∂r
∗,d,t=2
A /∂τ > 0. Finally,
for CP B, comparative statics show that an increase in the competitor’s base-utility (vA)
reduces the amount of required data. In contrast to the incumbent, an increase in the own
base-utility (vB) unambiguously increases the amount of required data. The effect of the
competitiveness of the market on CP B’s data consumption is qualitatively the same as
the effect on CP A’s data consumption, i.e., the lower the competitive intensity of the
market, the higher the amount of required data. Thus, it can be summarized that a (in
terms of service quality) strong competitor or a higher competitive intensity of the market
reduces the CPs’ amount of required data. If a CP increases its own quality, it requires
more data in the first period being active.
4.2. CPs’ Profits
To analyze CPs’ profits (pidi ), we evaluate optimal profits given the just derived equilibrium
amounts of required data. Within the feasible parameter range (c.f., Appendix A), the
incumbent always suffers from data portability (i.e., piPA ≤ piNPA ), whereas the entrant always
benefits from data portability (i.e., piPB ≥ piNPB ; see Appendix B for analytical details). Thus,
since data portability unambiguously increases an entrant’s profits, service variety (and
innovation) is arguably increased in the long run as entrants are more likely to enter the
market due to higher profits. Hence, if the market is dominated by a single firm, data
portability may be a suitable device to foster competition.
Comparative statics show that an increase in the CP’s own base utility has always
a positive effect on its profist. Conversely, an increase in the competitor’s base utility
decreases a CP’s profits (i.e., ∂pidi/∂vi > 0 and ∂pi
d
i/∂v−i < 0 for i = {A,B} and −i denoting
the competing CP i). Interestingly, the effect of a less competitive market (i.e., an increase
in τ) is ambiguous: with respect to piPA , pi
NP
A and pi
NP
B , a less competitive market is always
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beneficial only if the competing CP −i is strong in terms of its base-utility, i.e., v−i
vi. Otherwise, the effect of the competitive intensity of the market (τ) depends on the
competitive characteristics of the considered market.3 With regard to piPB , the effect of the
competition parameter is unambiguous: the less competitive the market, the higher the
profits.
4.3. Consumer’s Surplus
To examine the effects on consumer’s surplus (CSdi ), we compare the users’ utility account-
ing for the different regimes. With respect to users active at CP A, consumer’s surplus for
both periods is given by:
CSdA =
∫ x∗,t=1
0
U t=1A (x)dx︸ ︷︷ ︸
period t=1
+
∫ x∗,d,t=2
0
U t=2A (x)dx︸ ︷︷ ︸
period t=2
Note that users active at CP B differ with regard to their utility in the case with data
portability depending on whether they have not been active in the first period (and conse-
quently have a utility of UNP,t=2B (x)), or whether they have been active in the first period,
switch from CP A to CP B and port their data. Hence, the latter group has a lower disu-
tility for a given amount of data required by CP B (and thus, has an utility of UP,t=2B (x)).
If data portability is not enforced, all users becoming active at CP B derive a utility of
UNP,t=2B (x). In conculusion, consumer’s surplus can be calculated by:
CSdB =

∫ x∗,t=1
x∗,P,t=2 U
P,t=2
B (x)dx+
∫ 1
x∗,t=1 U
NP,t=2
B (x)dx , with data portability (d= P ),∫ 1
x∗,NP,t=2 U
NP,t=2
B (x)dx , without data portabiility (d=NP ).
By comparing consumer’s surplus in equilibrium, it can be seen that a regime without data
portability may leave users actually better off. Thus, the sum of consumer’s surplus at both
CPs may decrease with data portability, i.e., CSPA+B = CS
P
A + CS
P
B < CS
NP
A + CS
NP
B =
CSNPA+B (see Appendix C for analytical details). Consequently, although data portability
is most commonly justified by the potential benefits for end customers (c.f., Macgillivray
and Shambaugh 2016, European Commission 2016b), this goal is not necessarily achieved.
3 Formally, the derivative changes its sign in the feasible parameter range. The effect of an increasing τ on piPA is
positive if τ >
√
22v2
A
−12vAvB+4v2B/6; the effect of an increasing τ on piNPA is positive τ >
√
26v2
A
−12vAvB+4v2B/6; the
effect of an increasing τ on piNPB is positive if τ > (6vB−9vA)/16.
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Moreover, it can be shown that a (relatively) low degree of competition (high τ) may lead
to users being worse off with data portability.4 More precisely, as we have shown above, CPs
require higher amounts of data if the degree of competition is low (because ∂r
∗,d,t
i /∂τ > 0).
This, in turn, increases the disutility a user derives from being active at the considered CP,
which, consequently, reduces consumer’s surplus (i.e., ∂CSdA+B/∂τ < 0). However, if the CPs’
base-utilities are relatively equal (vB < 447/160 ·vA), consumers unambiguously benefit under
a data portability regime. Additionally, higher base-utilities always affect the consumer’s
surplus positively (∂CSdA+B/∂vi > 0). Proposition 2 summarizes these findings:
Proposition 2. The possibility to port data from one online service to another online
service has ambiguous effects on consumer’s surplus. If both services offer a comparable
service quality for users, consumer’s surplus always increases. Conversely, if the entrant
offers a better service, users may suffer under a data portability regime.
Figure 2 illustrates the possible negative effect on consumer’s surplus for a specific
parameter constellation (vA = 1, vB = 4) by showing total consumer’s surplus, as well as
the consumer’s surplus at each CP with and without data portability for different degrees
of competition.
4.4. Total Surplus
Finally, the total surplus (TSd) being the sum of consumer’s surplus and CPs’ profits, i.e.,
TSd =
∑
i=A,B
(pidi +CS
d
i )
is examined (see Appendix D for analytical details). Within the feasible parameter range, it
can be concluded that the total surplus is unambiguously increasing with data portability,
i.e., TSP > TSNP . Thus, although consumers might be worse off in some cases and CP
A always experiences lower profits under a regime with a right to data portability, the
increased profits of CP B always outweigh these effects.
5. Extensions
In the following, we explore three extensions to the base model, which confirm the robust-
ness of the main insights highlighted by Proposition 1 and 2 and provide more nuanced
results.
4 More precisely, if τ > (174vB−822vA+17
√
6658v2
A
−752vAvB+16v2B)/726 users are better off without data portability (see
Appendix C).
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Figure 2 Illustration of consumer’s surplus for different degrees of competition.
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Note. Illustration of total consumer’s surplus with data portability (d= P , solid line) and without data portability
(d=NP , dash-dotted line) for vA = 1 and vB = 4. Additionally, the consumer’s surplus at each CP i for the different
regimes is illustrated (dashed (dotted) lines refer to CP A (B, respectively)).
5.1. Costs for Providing the Possibility to Port Data (Subscript F )
Until now, we assumed that the possibility to port (personal) data does not incur any
costs for the CPs. However, giving users the possibility to port personal data may result
in additional costs such as costs for the programming effort to implement the technical
functionalities. To account for such costs, we extend the model by assuming that CPs face
some exogenous costs F if a right to data portability is introduced. Consequently, CPs’
profit functions with a right to data portability now incorporate an additional fixed term.
CP A’s profits can then be calculated by piPA,F = pi
P
A − F and CP B’s profits by piPB,F =
piPB − F , respectively. Note that the profit functions without a right to data portability
(d=NP ) remain unchanged because CPs do not face any additional costs if they do not
have to implement such functionalities, i.e., piNPA,F = pi
NP
A and pi
NP
B,F = pi
NP
B .
The timing of the game remains unchanged. Again, we solve for the subgame perfect
equilibrium through backward induction beginning in Stage 2. In doing so, it is easy to
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see that the CP’s data consumption remains unchanged by introducing (fixed) costs to
implement the possibility to port data. Moreover, this implies that not only all insights
with respect to the amount of required data remain unchanged (c.f., Proposition 1), but
also with respect to consumer’s surplus, i.e., users can still be worse off if a right to
data portability is introduced (c.f., Proposition 2). Conversely, CPs’ profits change if a
right to data portability is introduced. Obviously, CPs’ profits are affected negatively
by introducing costs, i.e., ∂piPi,F/∂F < 0 for i ∈ {A,B}. Consequently, the entrant is not
necessarily better off if a right to data portability is introduced. Instead, the entrant is
worse off (i.e., piPB,F <pi
NP
B,F ), if the fixed costs for the implementation of a functionality to
port data exceed the critical threshold Fˆ , i.e., if
F > Fˆ :=
(10vA− vB + 3τ) · (35vB − 44vA + 99τ)
5205 · τ .
Thus, if the costs associated with providing the possibility to port personal data are too
high, the right to data portability does not necessarily stimulate market entry or innovation
as entrants may find it unprofitable to enter the market at all. Moreover, total surplus may
now decrease with the introduction of a right to data portability because all CPs as well
as users can be worse off. Therefore, policy makers need to deliberately define not only the
scope of data that can actually be ported, but also specify the concrete mechanism of data
portability in order to reduce costs. For example, in many cases the transmission should
not occur directly between different CPs as this arguably increases implementation costs,
particularly as the transmission needs to be secure in order to protect users’ sensitive data.
5.2. Porting Irrelevant Data (Subscript ID)
Although this paper investigates the effects of data portability on two CPs being in direct
competition and providing substitutable services, these CPs may not necessarily require
identical data from users becoming active at their platform. Whereas we address a bench-
mark case in our base model by assuming that all data that is transferred to the competing
CP is valuable, we now modify our model to account for cases where also irrelevant data
is ported to the entrant (CP B).
In doing so, we introduce the parameter γ ∈ [0,1] defining the share of ported data that
is (also) useful for the CP where the data is ported to (here: the entrant). For example, a
user may have entered her name, date of birth and cellphone number at CP A in t= 1 (i.e.,
rt=1A ) and now ports this data to CP B in t= 2. However, CP B requires the name, date of
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birth and address from users becoming active at the platform (i.e., rB) and cannot analyze
or monetize a user’s cellphone number. Consequently, only some share of the ported data
is relevant for the new CP. Thus, the net amount of required data is not given by rB− rt=1A
as in the base model, but by rB − γ · rt=1A . Hence, if data portability is possible, the utility
of users that have been active at CP A in t= 1 and switch to CP B changes compared to
the base model. Assuming that only a share of the ported data is useful for the new CP,
a user located at x becoming active at CP B in t= 2 derives a utility of
Ud,t=2B,ID (x) =
vB − τ · (1−x)− rB + γ · r
t=1
A , if U
t=1
A (x)≥ 0 with data portability (d= P ),
vB − τ · (1−x)− rB , else (d=NP or U t=1A (x)< 0).
Consequently, with data portability, the location of the indifferent user changes in t= 2,
which also affects the CPs’ profits (c.f., Appendix E for analytical details) as well as the
amount of required data. Note that this extension is a generalization of the base model
outlined above. Thus, assuming γ = 0, the results are identical to the base model without
data portability because none of the ported data is useful for the entrant. Conversely,
assuming γ = 1, the results are identical to the model with data portability where all ported
data is relevant for the entrant.
To deduce more nuanced results, we solve the game through backward induction. Due
to the extreme cases already analyzed, we restrict our analysis to γ ∈ (0,1). In summary,
we obtain:
r∗,P,t=1A,ID =
(3τ + vA− vB)γ− 3τ − 10vA + vB
γ2− 2γ− 17 with r
∗,NP,t=1
A > r
∗,P,t=1
A,ID > r
∗,P,t=1
A ,
r∗,P,t=2A,ID =
(−3τ + 2vA + vB)γ− 15τ + vA + 5vB
γ2− 2γ− 17 with r
∗,NP,t=2
A > r
∗,P,t=2
A,ID > r
∗,P,t=2
A ,
r∗,PB,ID =
2τγ2− (4τ + 3vA)γ− 16τ + 9vA− 6vB
γ2− 2γ− 17 with r
∗,NP
B < r
∗,P
B,ID < r
∗,P
B .
Thus, a higher γ increases the entrant’s amount of required data, i.e., an entrant CP’s
data consumption increases with the amount of data that is ported and valuable to that
CP, whereas the incumbent’s amount of required data is reduced (i.e., ∂r
∗,P,t=k
A,ID /∂γ < 0 with
k ∈ {1,2} and ∂r∗,PB,ID/∂γ > 0). Additionally, the incumbent’s period one amount of required
data now also (negatively) depends on vB (in contrast to the base model where vB does
not affect data consumption in period t = 1). However, Proposition 1 continues to hold,
i.e., the incumbent still requires less data and the entrant requires more data if users
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have the possibility to port (some share of their) personal data. Moreover, CPs’ profits
behave intuitively with regard to the introduced parameter γ, i.e., the incumbent’s profits
decrease, whereas the entrant’s profits increase the more data is valuable for the entrant,
i.e., ∂piPA,ID/∂γ < 0 and ∂piPB,ID/∂γ > 0. Consequently, the incumbent may be able protect its
profits by strategically reducing the amount of explicitly stored information that can be
ported with a right to data portability, e.g., by inferring information from a user’s action
on the website instead of requiring data to be actively entered by users (because only data
provided by users may be subject to data portability, c.f., European Commission 2016b)
or by requiring data from users that is only useful in combination with other data that is
not subject to data portability.
Assuming that not all data is valuable for the entrant also affects consumer’s surplus.
Still, Proposition 2 continues to holds, i.e., if the entrant provides a better service quality,
users may actually be worse off with a right to data portability. Here, it can be seen that
γ ∈ (0,1) dampens the effect of data portability on consumer’s surplus compared to the
base model with data portability (γ = 1), i.e., in cases where users are worse off with
data portability with γ ∈ (0,1], they suffer less with γ ∈ (0,1). Consequently, from a policy
perspective, restricting the amount of data that can be ported may be a device to protect
users. Still, total surplus is always higher with a right to data portability.
5.3. The Role of Network Effects (Subscript NWE)
As highlighted in the previous sections, network effects are not a precondition for online
CPs to become successful and are not necessarily the (main) source of users to become
locked-in. However, the utility a user derives may nevertheless be affected by the number
of other users active at that platform, i.e., direct network effects may exist influencing
the user’s decision, but also the CPs’ strategies in setting the amount of required data.
Intuitively, the presence of positive network effects may reduce a user’s incentive to switch
to an entrant CP because the derived utility from the already installed base may outweigh
the potentially higher base-utility from the joining CP–although data already entered can
be ported to that joining CP with a right to data portability. To investigate the role of
network effects formally, we modify the users’ utility function and incorporate positive
direct network effects. In doing so, we assume that the total number of active users at
the considered CP has a positive effect on a user’s utility, i.e., Ud,t=kA,NWE(x) = U
d,t=k
A (x) +
ω · x∗,d,t=k for CP A with k ∈ {1,2} and Ud,t=2B,NWE(x) = Ud,t=2B (x) +ω · (1− x∗,d,t) for CP B,
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respectively with ω > 0. By changing the utility function, the location of the indifferent
user also changes. Relying on the concept of fulfilled expectations (i.e., in equilibrium, the
network size determined by the location of the indifferent user equals the expected one),
the indifferent user in period t= 1 is now located at x∗,t=1NWE =
vA−rA
τ−ω . The indifferent user
in period t= 2 is now located at:
x∗,d,t=2NWE =

vB+ω−τ−rB+rt=1A +rt=2A −vA
2(ω−τ) , if U
t=1
A,NWE(x
∗,d,t=2
NWE )≥ 0 (d= P ),
vB+ω−τ−rB+rt=2A −vA
2(ω−τ) , else (U
t=1
A,NWE(x
∗,d,t=2
NWE )< 0, d=NP ).
The resulting profit functions as well as our proposed two stage game remain qualitatively
unchanged (additionally, c.f., Appendix F).
We solve for the subgame perfect equilibrium using backward induction and derive the
period one and period two data consumption as shown in Appendix F.1. Compared to
the base model without network effects (c.f., Section 3), one can easily show that CPs
never require more data, i.e., the existence of positive direct network effects has a nega-
tive impact on CPs’ data consumption, i.e., ∂r
∗,d,t=k
i,NWE/∂ω < 0 with k ∈ {1,2}. However, our
results with respect to CPs’ data consumption highlighted in Section 4.1 continue to hold,
i.e., r∗,NP,t=1A,NWE > r
∗,P,t=1
A,NWE, r
∗,NP,t=2
A,NWE > r
∗,P,t=2
A,NWE and r
∗,NP
B,NWE < r
∗,P
B,NWE, and consequently, also
Proposition 1 continues to hold.
As the CP’s data consumption changes, incorporating network effects has ramifications
on all players within our considered market setting. However, our deduced results of intro-
ducing a right to data portability qualitatively remain unchanged which further highlights
the robustness of our results: The incumbent always suffers from the existence of a right to
data portability, the entrant is always better off, and total surplus always increases. More-
over, the effect of data portability on consumers remains ambiguous. Although consumer’s
surplus with a right to data portability is now higher in more cases, i.e., the intersection
of both functions is shifted to the edge of the feasible parameter range (c.f., Figure 3
for an illustration and comparison), users nevertheless may experience a lower consumer’s
surplus, i.e., also Proposition 2 continues to hold.
6. Conclusion
Data portability allows users to transfer their data entered at a certain service to another
service. Although some online services have implemented such features voluntarily, a stan-
dardized and mandatory ability for users to port (personal) data is pursued by the Euro-
pean Commission for all online services available in the EU’s member states through the
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Figure 3 Comparison: Consumer’s surplus with and without network effects.
Degree of Competition
high low
CS
high
low
𝐶𝑆#$%,'()* 𝐶𝑆#$%,'()'*𝐶𝑆#$%* 𝐶𝑆#$%'*
Note. Total consumer’s surplus with and without incorporating network effects with and without a right to data
portability for different degrees of competition using the parameters vA = 1, vB = 4 and ω = 0.05. The upper (lower)
two curves refer to a model with (without) incorporating network effects.
General Data Protection Regulation (European Commission 2016b). Additionally, this
topic also gains momentum for non-European policy makers, as the request for information
in the United States suggests (c.f., Macgillivray and Shambaugh 2016).
Despite the importance of this issue resulting from the far-reaching implications on
business strategies of online services and thus on the total economy, we are—to the best of
our knowledge—the first to analyze the resulting competitive effects theoretically. In doing
so, we not only shed light on current policy issues, but also highlight relevant implications
on the interface of the IS, the technical and the economic realm to better understand
and develop systems’ value propositions. For this purpose, we propose a game-theoretic
model that captures competing online services’ strategic incentives and identify the feasible
market outcomes together with the implications for all stakeholders. In conclusion, we find
that if the CP’s costs to implement data portability are not too large, on the one hand, data
portability fosters market entry, which arguably enhances service variety and innovation,
but on the other hand, incumbent services unambiguously suffer from data portability.
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Whereas such an outcome might be desired by policy makers to alleviate concerns about
dominant online services, we highlight that end users may actually suffer from a right
to data portability, because the new service has an incentive to increase the amount of
collected data compared to a regime without data portability. However, as the total surplus
increases due to higher overall profits, a decision to introduce a mandatory right to data
portability invokes a complex assessment. In the following, we outline policy implications
as well as strategies for services active in data-driven markets based on the obtained results
and discuss avenues for future research.
6.1. Policy and Managerial Implications
From a policy perspective, the rationale to introduce a (general) right to data portability
is clearly focused on the protection of end users (see, e.g., European Commission 2016b,
Article 1). Consequently, our results stated above imply that data portability should not
be applied to all online services because consumer’s might actually be worse off. On the
other hand, considering the total economy, overreaching goals such as the Digital Single
Market Strategy (DSM strategy) within the European Union (c.f., European Commission
2016a) or former-president Obama’s executive order on competition from April 2016 (c.f.,
Obama 2016) highlight the importance of open, fair and non-discriminatory (data-driven)
markets. As we show that the entrant’s profits increase under data portability, a right
to data portability may attribute to these goals. However, these goals are only achieved
if the resulting costs (for implementation as well as administration) of a right to data
portability are low. Therefore, our findings evoke the necessity for policy makers to carefully
weigh whether they want to promote market entry to stimulate innovation and successively
service variety, or purely focus on consumer’s surplus.
If new services should be incentivized to enter the market, data portability should be
enforced strictly with few exceptions. To date, the concept of data portability proposed by
the European Commission solely focuses on personal data revealed by users themselves.
Hence, data revealed by third persons (say, reviews for a private lift, or endorsements on
professional networking sites) are excluded in the current version of the proposed regu-
lation. Therefore, policy makers might think of extending the scope of data that can be
ported. In fact, as highlighted in the mid-term review on the implementation of the Digital
Single Market Strategy, the European Commission already “subject to impact assessment,
prepare[s] a legislative proposal [...] which takes into account [...] the principle of porting
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non-personal data” (European Commission 2017, p.11). In most cases, extending the scope
of portable data would be in line with the goal of enhancing consumer’s surplus. However,
it has to be taken into consideration that (i) porting sensitive data (e.g., credit card num-
bers, tax IDs, social security numbers, etc.) bears important privacy and security risks,
although users entered these data voluntarily, and (ii) there are instances where users are
actually worse off with a right to data portability, as we have shown throughout all of
our analyses. Our results suggest that users are likely to be worse off if base-utilities are
asymmetric, e.g., if the entrant has a superior value proposition providing the user a higher
base-utility. Arguably, entry is then beneficial for the entrant even without a right to data
portability. Consequently, one may hypothetically think of a concept where data portabil-
ity is only granted to some services. Whereas this seems possible in theory, the likeliness
of success of such an approach is questionable as (i) this concept would contradict popular
“neutrality regimes”, which might get increasingly important on a service level (c.f., Easley
et al. 2017), (ii) the current political view aims at giving end users back the control of
their (personal) data; independent from the considered service (c.f., European Commission
2016b), and (iii) the nature of the internet with independent parties and hard-to-control
data flows make supervision costly. However, as we have shown that the negative effects
of data portability on consumer’s surplus can be dampened by restricting the amount of
data that can be ported, this might be a possible way to facilitate market entry and to
limit potential adverse effects on consumers.
From a managerial perspective, it has to be emphasized that incumbent services have an
unambiguous incentive to inhibit the concept of data portability because their opportunity
to soften competition vanishes, leading to reduced profits. In contrast, entrant services
or start-ups should promote the concept of data portability because their flexibility in
setting the amount of data that is collected rises, leading to higher profits and thus, earlier
profitability. If services have no possibility to influence the scope of data that can be
ported (see above), incumbents should pursue a differentiation strategy if the entrant is
superior in terms of its base-utility. This reduces the competitiveness of the market and
consequently, benefits the incumbent. For this purpose, incumbents may try to change
(aspects of) their service offering (i.e., differentiate) to escape the fierce competition with
the new service. In contrast, a strategy designed to imitate the competitor can be seen
as an incumbent’s opportunity if the entrant is relatively equal in terms of its base-utility
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and if the competitive intensity of the market is already comparably low. This might be
achieved by matching all of the entrant’s value propositions to increase competition and
thus, profits (see effects of the market’s competitiveness on profits outlined in Section 4.2).
Additionally, incumbents may try to (i) infer information from a user’s browsing behavior
as data that has not been actively provided by users is not covered by the right to data
portability, and (ii) require “proxy data” from users that is only useful for services if they
exist in combination with other data (that is not subject to data portability). The entrant
always benefits from a less competitive market and should thus differentiate as much as
possible from the incumbent, e.g., by acting as the industry’s innovation leader.
6.2. Limitations and Avenues for Future Research
Finally, we wish to conclude by highlighting possible model extensions and limitations.
There are several interesting aspects of data-driven business models that should be taken
into consideration and analyzed in future studies. First, the market environment could be
changed to capture the effects of data portability on two existing, competing services. In
our terminology, CP B would then already be active in period one and data can be ported
from CP A to CP B and vice versa. Arguably, as the CP’s flexibility in setting the amount
of required data is reduced, CPs should unambiguously suffer under a regime that enforces
data portability. Conversely, such a scenario would be beneficial for end users. Second, the
possibility to discriminate between new users and existing users might be seen as a possible
model extension. However, this extension would assume that services have a non-uniform
data consumption for data from different user groups, which may increase programming
efforts and potentially complicates the provision of a streamlined and consistent (service)
portfolio. With data portability, the entrant would then collect a relatively high amount
of data from new (i.e., not switching) users and additionally maintain flexibility for the
share of users that may switch services, leading to reduced consumer’s surplus. Third, we
assumed that data entered once has no effect on a user’s utility in succeeding periods.
Whereas we believe that this is a suitable benchmark, one may argue that the disutility of
already entered data only diminishes over time, i.e., the effects of trust for a certain service
might be included into the analysis. This could be achieved by assuming that there is a
lower (or no) disutility if the same service is used again, whereas there is some disutility if
the same data is ported to another service. Fourth, we assumed myopic users for analytical
tractability and simplicity. However, it would be interesting to extend the model to also
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consider strategic users, i.e., users that anticipate the entrant’s market entry in t = 2.
Finally, a right to data portability arguably induces positive effects on other CPs, which
supply independent or complementary services, but are not modeled within this study
focusing on competing CPs. Thus, the positive effect of data portability on service variety
and innovation may be stronger than assumed in this study. Comparable, also users may
obtain a benefit (or less disutility) from revealing data, or obtain an increased utility from
the mere possibility to port (personal) data, which would increase consumer’s and total
surplus.
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Appendix A: Thresholds for the Feasible Parameter Range and Location of
Indifferent User
In this paper, we build on Hotelling’s model of horizontal differentiation (c.f., Hotelling 1929) in order to
identify the competitive effects of introducing a right to data portability. In doing so, we assume that a unit
mass of users is uniformly distributed on the interval [0,1]. By calculating market shares, which can directly
be deduced from the location of the indifferent user, we formally need to ensure that the indifferent user is
in all cases located within the interval [0,1]. Consequently, for the regime with data portability and for the
regime without data portability, we require x∗,t=1 ≤ 1, x∗,d,t=2 ≥ 0 and x∗,NP,t=2 ≤ 1, i.e., the CPs’ market
shares are always positive and do not exceed 100%. As highlighted above, we assume (i) full market coverage
in t= 2 for analytical tractability and (ii) to analyze the effects of data portability, an entrant’s base-utility
that is large enough so that (at least) one user can potentially port its user data from CP A to CP B, i.e.,
Ud,t=2B (x
∗,t=1)≥ 0.
Next, we show that U t=1A (x
d,t=2) ≥ 0 is satisfied in all relevant cases, i.e., the indifferent user in
period two is given by x∗,P,t=2 = −(rt=2A +rt=1A −rB−τ−vA+vB)/2τ with data portability, and by x∗,NP,t=2 =
−(rt=2A −rB−τ−vA+vB)/2τ without data portability. In doing so, assume U t=1A (x∗,d,t=2)< 0. The location of the
indifferent user is then calculated by solving vA − τ · x − rt=2A − rt=1A = vB − τ · (1 − x) − rB which yields
x∗,t=2new = x
∗,P,t=2 =−(rt=2A +rt=1A −rB−τ−vA+vB)/2τ. Note that by assuming U t=1A (x∗,d,t=2)< 0, the indifferent user
is located right to the indifferent user in period t= 1, i.e., x∗,t=2new > x
∗,t=1. Consequently, users do not port
their data although they would be able to do so, i.e., now the case with and without data portability coin-
cides. We use x∗,t=2new to specify firms’ profits. Again, we solve the game through backward induction. We use
the obtained equilibrium results and calculate U t=1A (x
∗,t=2
new ). The resulting term is only smaller than zero iff
τ > τmin := 2vA/3 + vB/3. However, we assumed that CP B’s base utility is large enough so that at least one
user can potentially port its user data (see above). This implies that τ < τmax := 5vA/12 + vB/3. It can easily
be seen that τmin > τmax. Consequently, proofing by contradiction, U t=1A (x
∗,d,t=2)≥ 0 is always satisfied.
Please note that we only specified binding restrictions, i.e., all other restrictions are less restrictive or
always satisfied (e.g., x∗,t=1 ≥ 0).
Appendix B: CPs’ Profits (pidi )
With data portability (d= P ), the CPs’ profits are:
piPA =
18τ2 + 12τ(vA− vB) + 11v2A− 4vAvB + 2v2B
36τ
,
piPB =
(3τ − vA + vB)2
18τ
.
Without data portability (d=NP ), the CPs’ profits are:
piNPA =
18τ2 + τ(18vA− 12vB) + 13v2A− 6vAvB + 2v2B
34τ
,
piNPB =
(16τ − 9vA + 6vB)2
578τ
.
To determine whether CPs are better off with data portability, we calculate the intersection of the CP’s
profit functions under the different regimes (i.e., piPi and pi
NP
i ). Although the profit functions intersect two
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times, both intersections are outside the feasible parameter range given by the restrictions specified in the
Appendix A. Consequently, the effect of data portability on the incumbent and entrant is unambiguous.
It can easily be shown that the incumbent (entrant) always suffers (benefits) from data portability, i.e.,
piPA ≤ piNPA and piPB ≥ piNPB .
Appendix C: Consumer’s Surplus (CSdi )
With data portability (d= P ), consumer’s surplus equals:
CSPA =
−45τ2 + τ(24vA + 30vB) + 22v2A− 8vAvB + 5v2B
72τ
,
CSPB =
−45τ2 + τ(12vA + 6vB) + 7v2A− 4vAvB + 7v2B
72τ
.
Without data portability (d=NP ), consumer’s surplus equals:
CSNPA =
−1368τ2 + τ(264vA + 912vB) + 763v2A− 88vAvB + 152v2B
2312τ
,
CSNPB =
(16τ − 9vA + 6vB)(80τ − 45vA + 38vB)
2312τ
.
To determine whether users are better off with data portability, we calculate CSPA +CS
P
B =CS
NP
A +CS
NP
B
and reorder the result with respect to τ . This leads to two solutions labeled by τ1 and τ2. It can be shown
that τ1 := (174vB−822vA+17
√
6658v2
A
−752vAvB+16v2B)/726 can be within the feasible parameter range specified
in Appendix A, whereas τ2 := (174vB−822vA−17
√
6658v2
A
−752vAvB+16v2B)/726 is always outside of that feasible
parameter range. Consequently, the effect of data portability on consumer’s surplus is ambiguous and users
may suffer from a right to data portability. Whereas the effect of data portability on consumer’s surplus
is positive if τ < τ1, the effect is negative if τ > τ1. Please note that τ1 is not always within the feasible
parameter range: if vB < 447vA/160, the intersection is always outside the feasible parameter range.
Appendix D: Total Surplus (TSd)
With data portability (d= P ), total surplus is:
TSP =
−18τ2 + 36τ(vA + vB) + 55v2A− 20vAvB + 10v2B
72τ
.
Without data portability (d=NP ), total surplus is:
TSNP =
−200τ2 + τ(888vA + 496vB) + 783v2A− 500vAvB + 178v2B
1156τ
.
All intersections of the functions are outside the feasible parameter range specified by the restrictions given
in Appendix A. Consequently, the effect on total surplus is unambiguous. It can easily be shown that total
surplus always increases with data portability, i.e., TSP >TSNP . Please note that this result assumes that
total surplus is the unweighted sum of producer’s and consumer’s surplus.
Appendix E: Porting Irrelevant Data: Location of Indifferent User and CPs’
Profits (ID)
Assuming that users also port irrelevant data from CP A to CP B, the user’s utility function changes to
Ud,t=2B,ID (x) if they become active at CP B. Consequently, also the location of the indifferent user changes
in period t= 2. Note that CP A’s utility function and the location of the indifferent user in t= 1 remains
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unchanged.
To calculate the indifferent user in t = 2, we (again) need to account for the different cases that may
evolve. We stick to the assumption used in the main text. Thus, if users have the possibility to port their
data (d= P with subscript ID), the indifferent user in t= 2 can be calculated by solving vA− τ ·x− rt=2A =
vB−τ ·(1−x)−rB+γ ·rt=1A . The indifferent user without data portability (d=NP ) can (again) be calculated
by solving vA− τ ·x− rt=2A = vB− τ · (1−x)− rB + rt=1A . Consequently, the indifferent user in t= 2 is located
at
x∗,d,t=2ID =
{
− rt=2A +γ·rt=1A −rB−τ−vA+vB
2τ
, if U t=1A (x
∗,d,t=2
ID )≥ 0, d= P
− rt=2A −rB−τ−vA+vB
2τ
, else (U t=1A (x
∗,d,t=2
ID )≥ 0, d=NP ).
Based on the market shares given by the location of the indifferent user, the profits of the CPs can be
specified. The total profits of CP A for both periods are given by
pidA,ID = x
∗,t=1 · rd,t=1A,ID︸ ︷︷ ︸
pi
d,t=1
A,ID
+x∗,d,t=2ID · (rd,t=1A,ID + rd,t=2A,ID )︸ ︷︷ ︸
pi
d,t=2
A,ID
CP B, which is only active in t= 2, makes total profits of:
pidB,ID = (1−x∗,t=1) · rdB,ID + (x∗,t=1−x∗,d,t=2ID ) · ((rdB,ID − γ · rd,t=1A,ID ) + γ · rd,t=1A,ID ),
pidB,ID = (1−x∗,d,t=2ID ) · rdB,ID.
Using the equilibrium amounts of required data stated above, we get:
piPA,ID =
(2γ− 13)v2A + 6vA(τ − vB/3)(γ− 3)− 18(τ − vB/3)2
2τ(γ2− 2γ− 17) ,
piPB,ID =
2(γ2τ − γ(2τ + 3vA/2)− 8τ + 9vA/2− 3vB)2
τ(γ2− 2γ− 17)2 ,
piNPA,ID = pi
NP
A ,
piNPB,ID = pi
NP
B .
For consumer’s surplus, we get:
CSPA,ID =
1
8((γ2− 2γ− 17)2τ) · (4γ
4v2A− (24(τ + vA/2− vB/3))vAγ3 + (−113v2A + (60τ − 20vB)vA
+ 36(τ − vB/3)2) ∗ γ2 + (150v2A + (564τ − 188vB)vA− 288(τ − vB/3)2γ)
+ 763v2A + (264τ − 88vB)vA− 1368(τ − vB/3)2),
CSPB,ID =
1
8((γ2− 2γ− 17)2τ) · ((−20τ
2 + (24vA + 8vB)τ + 8vA(vA− vB))γ4 + (8τ2 + (−96vA + 16vB)τ
− 116v2A + 40vAvB − 8v2B)γ3 + (600τ2 + (84vA− 288vB)τ + 295v2A− 68vAvB + 16v2B)γ2
+ (−928τ2 + (−1020vA + 352vB)τ + 470v2A + 252vAvB + 16v2B)γ− (1280(τ + (6vB−9vA)/16)
· (−9vA/16− 19vB/40 + τ)),
CSNPA,ID =CS
NP
A ,
CSNPB,ID =CS
NP
B .
Total surplus can be calculated according to the formula given in Section 4.4.
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Appendix F: Network Effects (NWE)
F.1. The Amount of Required Data
As highlighted in Section 5.3, with network effects, a user’s utility function changes. Since the location of the
indifferent user changes, the corresponding profits change yielding different equilibrium amounts of required
data. For CP A, the equilibrium amount of required data in t= 1 equals:
r∗,P,t=1A,NWE = r
∗,P,t=1
A =
vA
2
,
r∗,NP,t=1A,NWE = r
∗,NP,t=1
A −
3ω
17
=
3τ + 10vA− vB − 3ω
17
.
and in t= 2:
r∗,P,t=2A,NWE = τ −ω−
vA
6
− vB
3
,
r∗,NP,t=2A,NWE =
15(τ −ω)− vA− 5vB
17
.
For CP B, the equilibrium amount of required data (in t= 2) equals:
r∗,PB,NWE = r
∗,P
B −ω= τ −ω−
vA− vB
3
,
r∗,NPB,NWE = r
∗,NP
B −
16ω
17
=
16τ − 9vA + 6vB − 16ω
17
.
F.2. CPs’ Profits
The calculation of the CPs’ profits incorporating network effects qualitatively remains unchanged compared
to the base model (c.f., Section 3 for details). Using the location of the indifferent users (c.f., Section 5.3)
and the equilibrium amount of required data (c.f., Appendix F.1), the CPs’ profits with data portability
(d= P ) and with network effects yield:
piPA,NWE =
v2A
4(τ −ω) +
(3(τ −ω) + vA− vB)2
18(τ −ω) ,
piPB,NWE =
(3(τ −ω)− vA + vB)2
18τ − 18ω .
Without data portability (d=NP ) and with network effects:
piNPA,NWE =
18(ω2 + τ2) + (−36τ − 18vA + 12vB)ω+ 12τ(18vA− 12vB) + 13v2A− 6vAvB + 2v2B
34τ − 34ω ,
piNPB,NWE =
(16(τ −ω)− 9vA + 6vB)2
578τ − 578ω .
F.3. Consumer’s Surplus
For consumer’s surplus, we get:
CSPA,NWE =
1
72(τ −ω)2 · (54ω
3 + (−153τ + 18vA + 36vB)ω2 + (144τ2 + (−42vA− 66vB)τ
− 12v2A + 6vAvB + 6v2B)ω− 45τ3 + (24vA + 30vB)τ2 + (22v2A− 8vAvB − 5v2B)τ),
CSPB,NWE =
1
72(τ −ω)2 · (−45τ
3 + (12vA + 6vB + 144ω)τ
2 + (−153ω2 + (−30vA− 6vB)ω
+ 7v2A + 4vAvB + 7v
2
B)τ − 6ω(−9ω2− 3ωvA + v2A + vAvB + v2B)),
CSNPA,NWE =
1
2313(τ −ω)2 · (1728ω
3 + (−4824τ + 108vA + 1152vB)ω2 + (4464τ2 + (−372vA− 2064vB)τ
− 486v2A + 36vAvB + 192v2B)ω− 1368τ3 + (264vA + 912vB)τ2 + (763v2A− 88vAvB − 152v2B)τ,
CSNPB,NWE =−
160
289(τ −ω)2 · (
6ω2/5 + (−11τ/5 + 27vA/40 + 2vB/5)ω+ τ(τ − 9vA/16− 19vB/40))
· (−9vA/16 + 3vB/8−ω+ τ).
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Total surplus can be calculated according to the formula given in Section 4.4.
F.4. Comparison to the Base Model
Compared to the base model without considering network effects, the incumbent can benefit in terms of
profits from the existence of network effects due to higher market shares in the first period. Analytically,
the incumbent’s profit functions with and without the existence of network effects intersect within the
feasible parameter range. If the competitive intensity of the market is low, the incumbent realizes higher
profits with network effects. Formally, if τ < ω/2 +
√
9ω2+22v2
A
−8vAvB+4v2B/6 (with data portability) and if
τ < ω/2+
√
9ω2+26v2
A
−12vAvB+4v2B/6 (without data portability), the incumbent realizes higher profits if network
effects are considered. Conversely, the entrant always realizes lower profits. Unsurprisingly, consumers are
unambiguously better off if positive direct network effects are considered.
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Abstract 
Data portability allows users to transfer data between competing online services. As data 
gets increasingly valuable for online services and users alike, the enforcement of data 
portability within the European Union by the General Data Protection Regulation will 
have important ramifications for the competition in online markets. Thus, we develop a 
game-theoretic model to examine firms’ strategic reaction to data portability and to 
identify ensuing market outcomes. We show, among others, that although data 
portability is designed to protect users, they may be hurt because market entrants have 
an incentive to increase the amount of collected data compared to a scenario without data 
portability. However, profits for new services and total surplus increases if the costs for 
implementation are not too large. This likely improves innovation and service variety. 
Consequently, our results provide important insights and case-specific recommendations 
for managers and policy makers in data-driven online markets. 
Keywords: Data Portability, Competition between Online Services, Economics of IS, 
Switching Costs, Market Entry and Innovation 
Introduction 
In the digital ecosystem, data is considered to be the key ingredient for many of today’s business models, 
crucially determining whether a service is successful. At the same time, the protection of (personal) data, 
users and competition becomes increasingly important for policy makers and competition authorities. For 
example, the European antitrust investigations against Google attribute either to the observation that 
consumers might be disadvantaged or that competition and innovation is hampered (c.f., Drozdiak and 
Schechner, 2016 for an overview of European antitrust probes against Google). In fact, personal data 
entered or revealed1  at a specific online service may lead to a lock-in effect for users as switching to 
competing services induces costs to re-enter the data required by the new online service (c.f., Klemperer, 
1987 for related research). Hereby, (dominant) online services may benefit, but innovation and service 
variety might be reduced as market entry is deterred. Illustrative examples of data-related switching costs 
are provided by online banking accounts (where switching leads to the necessity to re-enter recurring 
transferals), online mail or storage services (where switching leads to the necessity to re-enter general user 
information, and to re-upload files, photos, contacts or categories), or cloud computing environments 
(where preferences and adaptations have to be re-injected). These services suggest that a lock-in does not 
necessarily stem from network effects alone, i.e., the number of participating users or complementary 
provided services. Instead, as Chen and Hitt (2002) analyze empirically, there is a variety of factors 
(additionally) influencing a users’ loyalty. We build on these observations and argue that the (amount of) 
                                                             
1 We will use the terms entered and revealed interchangeably.  
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already revealed (personal) data is a crucial factor for (i) online services active in data-driven markets 
because it determines the service’s competitive strength and thus, profitability, and also for (ii) users 
because they might be locked-in to a certain service. 
It is well known that established systems designed to lock-in users may hamper the success of new services 
and lead to excessive rents of incumbent firms (c.f., Katz and Shapiro, 1994; Farrell and Klemperer, 2007) 
and–eventually–to market failures. In this spirit, the European Commission has recently formulated a 
general ”right to data portability” for personal data. Consequently, a standardized way of how information 
can be ported from one online service to another is required (c.f., European Commission, 2016b, p.45, 
Article 20); an issue most voluntarily provided functionalities for users to export previously revealed data 
do not explicitly account for (c.f., Facebook, n.d.; Google, n.d.), and an issue also highlighted by the Deputy 
Chief Technology Officer of the United States (c.f., Macgillivray & Shambaugh, 2016). Ultimately, the 
European Commission’s initiative aims to promote users’ negotiation power vis-à-vis (dominant) online 
services by reducing lock-in effects, i.e., protecting the ”fundamental rights and freedoms of natural 
persons” (European Commission, 2016b, p.32, Article 1). However, the economic effects of such an 
intervention on consumer's surplus, on the amount of data online services collect from their customers, on 
online service's profits, and on service variety are unclear to date. Albeit the regulation becomes binding for 
all European member states as of May, 2018, academic analyses have so far been limited to the legal and 
technical dimensions of data portability. An analysis of strategic incentives, business strategies and 
economic outcomes is lacking, as Nobel prize laureate Jean Tirole outlined in his speech on competition 
and regulation of online platforms (c.f., Valero, 2015). 
This paper addresses this research gap and analyses the competitive effects of a user’s ability to port data 
from an incumbent online service / content provider (CP) to a market entrant. Hereby, we analyze CPs’ 
incentives (not) to promote data portability and their business strategies in data-driven markets. 
Additionally, we shed light on the ensuing effects on consumers as this is pivotal to the argumentation of 
the European Commission and the U.S. Deputy Chief Technology Officer, alike. In doing so, we develop a 
game-theoretic model that considers the economic effects arising from a right to data portability by 
considering two CPs generating revenues primarily through data revealed by users active at their platform. 
Thus, we abstract from any explicit business model (e.g., based on advertisements, or based on selling 
aggregated user-data to third parties) and simply assume that data revealed by users can be transformed 
into revenue. Hence, additional data has a positive effect on a CP’s profit. On the other hand, revealing data 
bears “costs” (i.e., a disutility) for users: either they have some effort revealing data as such (say, the time 
needed to enter the data), or–more general–users give away data, to which they attribute some value to 
(e.g., privacy costs in a broader sense). Consequently, whereas collecting more data is beneficial for CPs, 
users experiencing a higher disutility might switch to competing CPs or even leave the market. However, 
users’ ability to do so is impeded by established switching-costs and lock-ins. The ability to port data by 
means of data portability arguably lifts the established restrictions on users, but may also impact CPs’ data 
consumption. These effects have to be taken into account when analyzing the competitive effects. 
Our obtained results show that data portability is not necessarily beneficial for users because CPs entering 
the market may have an incentive to increase the amount of data users have to reveal. Thus, the ultimate 
goal to protect users is not necessarily achieved. Conversely, the CPs’ incentives (not) to promote data 
portability are unambiguous if the costs for implementing data portability are zero or comparably low: 
Whereas dominant CPs (incumbents) always suffer from data portability, emerging CPs (entrants) 
challenging incumbents are better off. However, as total surplus increases under a data portability regime, 
predominantly due to the arising benefits for the entrant who is able to generate higher revenues, the 
decision to enforce a right to data portability is far more complex than currently realized. 
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Within the next section, we briefly review previous 
literature related to data portability and highlight the multi-faceted character of this topic. Then, we lay out 
the game-theoretic model and assumptions. Afterwards, we deduce and highlight the model’s main results 
and extend the model by (i) introducing costs associated with the implementation of data portability and 
(ii) assuming that also irrelevant data is transferred to the new CP. Finally, we conclude by highlighting 
managerial and policy implications, limitations, and avenues for future research. 
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Literature Review	
We refer to data portability as consumer’s ability to transfer (personal) data revealed at one CP to another 
CP. To the best of our knowledge, the IS literature has so far not considered this concept explicitly in terms 
of strategic incentives, business strategies, or economic outcomes. Albeit, the technical literature 
demonstrated the feasibility of that concept by proposing models to conveniently port data, e.g., between 
cloud computing vendors. In this vein, Ranabahu and Sheth (2010) propose semantic web techniques to 
achieve portability and Petcu and Vasilakos (2014) inter alia highlight open standards and open application 
programming interfaces (APIs) as technical solutions. Thus, most technical studies provide a proof of 
concept that data portability is technically feasible but do not explicitly discuss the possible trade-offs for 
the involved parties. 
In light of the General Data Protection Regulation becoming effective in 2018, several legal investigations 
have been carried out. Graef (2015) conducts a legal analysis of data portability in social networks with 
respect to the (European) competition law and summarizes relevant cases. Swire and Lagos (2013) explicitly 
refer to consumer welfare and “express serious concerns about the RDP [right to data portability]” (Swire 
and Lagos, 2013, p.338) because, (i) the problems addressed by the regulation (e.g., monopoly power 
through lock-ins) were legally already covered by competition law, (ii) personal data could easily be 
exported, i.e., security problems arise, and (iii) it was unclear how a common standard could be achieved if 
a variety of different service providers were involved. The authors conclude that “the proposed RDP appears 
to reduce consumer welfare” (Swire and Lagos, 2013, p.379), but do not offer or discuss economic incentives 
or outcomes, which additionally highlights the necessity of economic backing in this context. 
Moreover, this study is related to two strands of the economic literature, which will be highlighted in the 
following. First, as we assume users to be locked-in when using a data-intensive online service due to costs 
to port these data, we draw on the literature investigating the role of switching costs. The results derived 
from this literature show that an incumbent firm has an incentive to lower its price anticipating that an 
entrant enters the market (Klemperer, 1989). In essence, firms thus fiercely compete in early periods to 
gain market shares which can then be harvested in later periods (Klemperer, 1987a; Klemperer, 1987b). 
Hence, switching costs induce softened competition in later periods which allows the remaining firms to 
set higher prices. Indeed, as Gehrig and Stenbacka (2004) show analytically, competing firms have an 
incentive to establish high switching costs. The authors show that these can be achieved by (maximum) 
horizontal differentiation (see additionally Hotelling, 1929 and d’Aspermont et al., 1979). Within the 
taxonomy introduced by Ray et al. (2012), our study deals with “user-related” switching costs as they 
include the effort a user needs to invest to “ensure a satisfactory switch of service and to recreate or transfer 
features” (Ray et al., 2012, p.199). More precisely, one may argue that within the framework provided by 
Ray et al. (2012), transfer costs are of particular importance to users. To demarcate our approach from 
previous literature related to the existence of switching costs and lock-ins, the fact that we assume data to 
be the considered good, which inherently determines the degree of switching costs as well as firm’s profits 
(c.f., the following section for details) is crucial and should be highlighted. Hence, the strategy derived from 
the traditional switching cost literature would induce to set lower prices in early periods (i.e., collect less 
data) to deter entry and gain market shares which can thereupon be harvested. This, in turn, is not 
necessarily the equilibrium strategy of an incumbent within a data-driven market environment, as 
(i) switching costs would be lower in successive periods and (ii) profits in later periods from data already 
gained in early periods would be reduced. These specific aspects of the competitive environment further 
delineate our approach from, e.g., Caminal and Matutes (1989) which consider endogenous switching costs. 
Second, our study on data portability is related to the strand of the (economic) effects stemming from 
interoperability. Within this strand, the literature on compatibility and standardization between different 
services, especially the ensuing effects of the availability of converters as considered by Farrell and Saloner 
(1992), should be highlighted. In their theoretical model, Farrell and Saloner show that the availability of 
(imperfect) converters allows users to benefit from other users using a competing technology, i.e., a 
converter induces benefits through compatibility. Thus, direct network effects resulting from 
interoperability are a central aspect of the depicted model. Another important view on interoperability is 
highlighted within the study conducted by Pollock (2009). Pollock evaluates the effects of controlling the 
possibility to convert “’software’ or ‘services’ associated with one platform to run on another” assuming a 
two-sided market (Pollock, 2009, p.155). Thus, Pollock considers interoperability being determined by 
indirect network effects. Additionally, the impact of the ability to control the mode of interoperability itself 
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is investigated. Thus, the author allows the platform to directly control the costs of flow of information, i.e., 
the costs for interoperability. However, although interoperability plays a pivotal role in online markets, the 
mentioned studies do not depict the concept of data portability for several reasons. In general, 
interoperability should not be confounded with the portability of data (c.f., Graef, 2015). Additionally, next 
to several technical dimensions, the central economic distinction can be seen in (i) the role of network 
externalities, which are not necessarily relevant in the context of data portability as a user’s lock-in in data-
driven markets is crucially influenced by the (amount of) data revealed at a certain online service and not 
solely by network externalities (c.f., examples provided in the previous section), and (ii) the scope of the 
platform’s ability to control the flow of data: since the mentioned European regulation is binding for all 
services alike, most existing online services are left with no possibility to strategically set the amount of data 
that can be ported, i.e., online services are unable to control the costs for portability. 
Our proposed game-theoretic model, which will be outlined in the following section, captures the trade-offs 
for the involved parties and considers the specific aspects of data-driven business models. We use this 
model to answer the following two main research questions: 
RQ 1 How does a right to data portability affect the amount of data that online services collect? 
RQ 2 How does a right to data portability affect the consumers? 
Additionally, we investigate the effects on an incumbent’s and an entrant’s profit, which arguably influences 
service variety and innovation in the long run, and investigate which regime (data portability or no data 
portability) is more efficient with regard to total welfare.  
Outline of the Economic Model 
To highlight the competitive effects of a right to data portability and to capture the implications on market 
entry and innovation, we consider a market with two competing, differentiated CPs (𝑖 = 𝐴, 𝐵) offering 
substitutable services, and heterogeneous users having a natural preference for one of the CPs. Thus, we 
assume a unit mass of users, uniformly distributed between zero and one (Hotelling, 1929) and CPs located 
at either end of the users’ preference spectrum (d’Aspermont et al., 1979; Gehrig and Stenbacka, 2004) 
differentiated by some primary attribute (Irmen and Thisse, 1998; Iyer and Soberman, 2000), i.e., CP 𝐴 is 
located at 𝑥 = 0, CP 𝐵 is located at 𝑥 = 1 and both CPs are in competition for the same users. Moreover, to 
investigate the competitive effects on the amount of required data, market entry and service variety, we 
consider two time periods (𝑡 = 1, 2) and assume that CP 𝐴 is active in	𝑡 = 1 and 𝑡 = 2, whereas CP 𝐵 enters 
in 𝑡 = 2. Thus, CP 𝐴 might be classified as an incumbent content provider, whereas CP 𝐵 is an entrant. 
In period 𝑡 = 1, a user located at 𝑥 choosing to become active at CP 𝐴 derives a utility of 𝑈./01 𝑥 = 𝑣. −𝜏𝑥 − 𝑟./01, where 𝑣.  is the base-utility a user derives from being active at CP 𝐴 (e.g., determined by the 
service’s functionalities, the ease-of-use, etc.), 𝜏 is the parameter specifying the competitive intensity in the 
market (i.e., if 𝜏 is high, the user’s inherent preference for one of the CP gets relatively more important), 
and 𝑟./01 is the disutility a user derives from revealing (personal) data at CP	𝐴 in 𝑡 = 1 (see introductory 
examples stated above; we refer to 𝑟6 as data consumption or amount of data required or collected by CP	𝑖). 
We assume users to be myopic (c.f., Bala and Goyal, 2000; Gilboa and Matsui, 1999), i.e., they only consider 
their utility in the first period, when they decide to be active at CP 𝐴 in 𝑡 = 1 as they are unable to anticipate 
the market entry of CP 𝐵. Thus, the indifferent user between choosing CP 𝐴 and not choosing any CP at all 
is located at 𝑥∗,/01 = 	 89:;9<=>?  and users located at 𝑥 > 𝑥∗,/01 are not active at CP 𝐴 in 𝑡 = 1. 
In period 𝑡 = 2, CP 𝐵 enters the market. Users now have the choice between two competing CPs and choose 
the one from which they derive the higher utility. A user located at location 𝑥 and active at CP 𝐴 derives in 
the second period a utility of 𝑈./0A 𝑥 = 𝑣. − 𝜏𝑥 − 𝑟𝐴𝑡=2														 ,	if	𝑈./01 𝑥 	≥ 0𝑣. − 𝜏𝑥 − 𝑟𝐴𝑡=2 − 𝑟𝐴𝑡=1 ,	else																					. 
Note that 𝑟./0A is the strategic variable of CP	𝐴 in 𝑡 = 2 and equals the amount of additional data required 
by CP 𝐴 in 𝑡 = 2 for users being active at CP 𝐴. This utility function captures the fact that, in the second 
period, users do not experience further disutility from data already revealed in 𝑡 = 1 if the same CP is used 
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again. For example, if a user entered (personal) data (e.g., its name, address, date of birth, interests, or 
uploaded photos and documents), it does not have to re-enter, re-validate or re-upload these information. 
Conversely, users who were not active in 𝑡 = 1 have to enter all required data if they decide to become active 
in the second period. Thus, these users need to enter data with an amount of 𝑟./01 + 𝑟./0A (if they decide to 
become active at CP 𝐴 in 𝑡 = 2) or 𝑟J (if they decide to become active at CP 𝐵, see below). For these users, 
the corresponding disutility is thus independent from the ability to port data, because they have not 
revealed any data previously. 
A user located at 𝑥 who becomes active at CP 𝐵 in 𝑡 = 2 derives a utility of 𝑈JK,/0A 𝑥 = 𝑣J − 𝜏 1 − 𝑥 − 𝑟J + 𝑟./01 ,	if	𝑈./01 𝑥 	≥ 0	with	data	portability	(𝑑 = 𝑃)																							𝑣J − 𝜏 1 − 𝑥 − 𝑟J														 ,	else	(without	data	portability	(𝑑 = 𝑁𝑃)	or	𝑈./01 𝑥 < 0). 
The utility function 𝑈JK,/0A 𝑥  captures the effect that users becoming active at CP 𝐵  need to enter all 
required data (i.e., 𝑟J) either if they have not been active in 𝑡 = 1, or if there is no ability to port already 
revealed data (𝑑 = 𝑁𝑃). Moreover, the equation captures the effects of a right to data portability if users 
switch CPs: if users have been active at CP 𝐴 in the first period, i.e., 𝑈./01 𝑥 	≥ 0, and are able to port already 
entered data to the new CP without incurring any costs (as envisaged by the European Commission, 𝑑 = 𝑃), 
they only need to reveal the net amount of required data at CP 𝐵 in 𝑡 = 2, i.e., 𝑟J − 	𝑟./01. Intuitively, if we 
assume the amount of information required at CP 𝐵 to be at least as high as the amount of information 
required at CP 𝐴, i.e., 𝑟J ≥ 𝑟./01, users only have to reveal the additional information required by CP 𝐵.2 
To calculate the indifferent user in 𝑡 = 2, we need to account for the different cases just outlined. Hereby, 
we assume the market to be fully covered and, to investigate the effects of a right to data portability, that at 
least one user can potentially port her user data from CP 𝐴 to CP 𝐵. Thus, if users have the possibility to 
port their data (𝑑 = 𝑃) and were active in period one, the indifferent user in 𝑡 = 2 can be calculated by 
solving 𝑣. − 𝜏𝑥 − 𝑟./0A = 	 𝑣J − 𝜏 1 − 𝑥 − 𝑟J + 𝑟./01. If users do not have the possibility to port their data 
(𝑑 = 𝑁𝑃), but were active in period one, the indifferent user in 𝑡 = 2 can be calculated by solving 𝑣. − 𝜏𝑥 −𝑟./0A = 	 𝑣J − 𝜏 1 − 𝑥 − 𝑟J. Consequently, the indifferent user in 𝑡 = 2 is located at3 
𝑥∗,K,/0A = − 𝑟./0A + 𝑟./01 − 𝑟J − 𝜏 − 𝑣. + 𝑣J2𝜏 ,	if	𝑈./01 𝑥∗,K,/0A ≥ 0, 𝑑 = 𝑃															− 𝑟./0A − 𝑟J − 𝜏 − 𝑣. + 𝑣J2𝜏 														 ,	else	(if	𝑈./01 𝑥∗,K,/0A ≥ 0, 𝑑 = 𝑁𝑃). 
Based on the market shares given by the location of the indifferent user, the CPs’ profits can be specified. 
We assume that CPs with data-driven business models benefit from data entered in one period also in later 
periods as the obtained information is still valuable to them (e.g., in terms of the ability to target ads, or 
tailor/customize services). Within the base model, we do not consider any costs associated with the 
introduction of the right to data portability; however, we relax this assumption in the first extension. Thus, 
for now, the total profit of CP 𝐴 after two periods is given by 𝜋.K = 𝑥∗,/01 ⋅ 𝑟./01^9_,<=> + 𝑥∗,K,/0A ⋅ (𝑟./01 + 𝑟./0A)^9_,<=` . 
CP 𝐵, which is only active in 𝑡 = 2, makes a total profit of 𝜋JK = (1 − 𝑥∗,/01) ⋅ 𝑟J + (𝑥∗,/01 − 𝑥∗,K,/0A) ⋅ ( 𝑟J − 𝑟./01 + 𝑟./01),𝜋JK = (1 − 𝑥∗,K,/0A) ⋅ 𝑟J.  
                                                             
2 If CP 𝐵 provides a relatively higher base-utility than CP 𝐴 (i.e., 𝑣. < 𝑣J, see the following section for further details), 
CP 𝐵 always requires more data in equilibrium, i.e., switching users need to enter additional data. If we drop this 
assumption, the interpretation of the “net amount of data” is less intuitive. However, this assumption is not required 
from an analytical perspective. 
3 Note that it might technically also be possible that the indifferent user in period two is located right to the location of 
the indifferent user in period one, i.e., 𝑈./01 𝑥∗,K,/0A < 0. However, as shown in the first subsection of the appendix, 
this case is not feasible and consequently, omitted within the main analysis. 
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Note that we implicitly made two further assumptions. First, we assumed that CPs cannot discriminate 
between old, new and switching users, i.e., the amount of data a CP requires from a specific user in 𝑡 = 2 is 
independent of this user’s decision in 𝑡 = 1. Thus, all users active at a CP need to reveal the same amount 
of data (we refer to the limitations for a discussion of the implications if this assumption is relaxed). Second, 
we assumed that all data that is transferred to CP 𝐵 is valuable for the entrant. We relax this assumption in 
the second extension of the model (see below). 
Figure 1 illustrates the assumed market setting. Here, squares above the user depict the (net) amount of 
data (illustrated by symbols) different users (𝑗 = 1,2) would have to reveal in the considered period for 
becoming active at the respective CP. In contrast, circles underneath the CPs indicate the amount of data a 
CP requires. In the illustrated scenario, user 1 is active in period one, whereas user 2 becomes active only 
in period two. Without data portability, user 1 has to re-enter the data already revealed to CP 𝐴 at CP 𝐵, if 
it wants to switch to CP 𝐵 in the second period (thus, he needs to re-enter: star, moon and heart, and 
additionally needs to enter: thunderbolt). In contrast, with data portability, user 1 has the ability to port its 
already entered data and thus only has to enter the net amount of required data (here: thunderbolt), if it 
wants to switch to CP 𝐵. For user 2, who has not been active in the first period, both cases are identical, i.e., 
user 2 has to enter all of the CP’s required data independent of the considered regime (i.e., star, moon, heart 
and sun to become active at CP 𝐴 or star, moon, heart and thunderbolt to become active at CP 𝐵). Note that 
Figure 1 only illustrates the (net) amount of data that is required by the CPs and needs to be entered by 
users in the respective period. The user’s actual decision which CP to patronize is not illustrated in Figure 1 
because it depends (inter alia) on the base-utilities. 
In summary, the considered two-stage game proceeds as follows:  
Stage 1 The incumbent CP 𝐴 sets the amount of required data 𝑟./01  for period 𝑡 = 1 anticipating 
CP 𝐵 's action in period 𝑡 = 2. Then, users decide whether to become active at CP 𝐴  (if 𝑈./01 𝑥 ≥ 0). 
Stage 2 Both CPs simultaneously set the amount of required data for period 𝑡 = 2, i.e., CP 𝐴 sets 𝑟./0A and CP 𝐵 sets 𝑟J. Then again, users decide at which CP they choose to become active. 
Under the full market coverage assumption, users in 𝑡 = 2 are active at exactly one CP. If 𝑈./0A 𝑥 > 𝑈JK,/0A 𝑥 , users are active at CP 𝐴 and vice versa. 
 
Figure 1. Illustration of the assumed market setting. 
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Results and Discussion 
To identify the effects of a right to data portability, we compare the case with data portability (𝑑 = 𝑃) to 
the case without data portability (𝑑 = 𝑁𝑃). In doing so, we solve for the subgame perfect equilibrium 
through backward induction beginning in Stage 2 to deduce the equilibrium amounts of required data. The 
results are successively used to analyze the effects on CPs’ profits, consumer's surplus and total surplus. 
In Stage 2 both CPs compete for users and revenues. Consequently, a CP’s decision is affected by the 
decision of its competitor and the corresponding actions of users, i.e., the CPs take into account the amount 
of data required by the competing CP. Analytically, these effects are captured by simultaneously solving b	^9_,<=`b	;9<=` = 0 and b	^c_b;c = 0, which yields the CP’s equilibrium amount of required data for period 𝑡 = 2 (in the 
following, a star (∗) in the superscript refers to an equilibrium result). 
In Stage 1 CP 𝐴 serves the market as monopolist. However, it anticipates the effects on second-period 
profits in its decision how much data to collect. Analytically, we use the equilibrium results of Stage 2 (i.e., 𝑟J∗,K and 𝑟.∗,K,/0A) to specify CP 𝐴’s profit over two periods (𝜋.K) and then solve b	^9_b	;9<=> = 0 to obtain the optimal 
amount of required data for CP 𝐴 in period 𝑡 = 1 (i.e., 𝑟.∗,K,/01). 
Amount of Required Data by the CPs 
A comparison of equilibrium amounts of required data shows that CP 𝐴 requires a higher amount of data 
under the regime without data portability 𝑑 = 𝑁𝑃 .4 Interestingly, the data consumption of CP 𝐴 without 
data portability in the first period is even higher than the monopoly data consumption 𝑟defegehi∗ , i.e., the 
amount of data CP 𝐴 would require without the entry of CP 𝐵: 𝑟.∗,jk,/01 = 3𝜏 + 10𝑣. − 𝑣J17 > 	𝑣.2 = 𝑟.∗,k,/01 = 𝑟defegehi∗ . 
This highlights the effect of anticipated entry: Intuitively, CP 𝐴 requires a high amount of data to generate 
(higher) switching costs to weaken competition in later periods. The effect of weakened competition even 
dominates the (negative effect of) reduced period one market shares and, compared to a regular one-period 
monopoly, reduced profits. The observation that CP 𝐴 requires an even higher amount of data than in 
monopoly is, at first sight, in contrast to the traditional switching cost literature. Here, anticipated entry 
results in price wars lowering early-period prices to gain market shares, which can thereupon be harvested 
in later periods (c.f., Klemperer 1989; Klemperer, 1995). But, within our considered setting of a data-driven 
market environment, lock-ins are not generated by participation alone (e.g., positive network externalities 
or the functionalities of a service), which could be stimulated by low prices, but additionally by a user’s 
invested effort to enter, or a user’s disutility to reveal (personal) data. Thus, lock-in effects do play a pivotal 
role for CPs in these market environments, although the underlying rationale differs compared to 
traditional market environments. This is because (i) data required by a CP (i.e., “prices” set) in early periods 
are directly relevant to CPs’ profits in later periods, and (ii) the incumbent's “price setting” is (additionally) 
constrained by entrants in later periods. With data portability (𝑑 = 𝑃), the incumbent CP requires the 
monopoly amount of data. Because lock-in effects vanish through the users’ ability to port data to the 
competing CP in the following period, the incumbent CP cannot benefit from establishing lock-ins anymore. 
Consequently, CP 𝐴 maximizes its profit in the first period by requiring the same amount of data it would 
require in a one-period game, where it acts as monopolistic CP. 
With respect to the amount of required data in the second period, this restricting effect is also observable: 
the incumbent CP always requires less data if users are able to port their data, i.e., 𝑟.∗,jk,/0A = 1517 𝜏 − 117 𝑣. − 517 𝑣J > 𝜏 − 16 𝑣. − 13 𝑣J = 𝑟.∗,k,/0A. 
                                                             
4 The amount of required data with data portability can only be higher if 𝜏 < 	− 1A 𝑣. + 1p 𝑣J. This requires that 𝑥∗,K,/ < 0, 
which is not feasible. In successive analyses, we additionally require that 𝑥∗,K,/ ≤ 1 (c.f., Appendix for details). 
Data Portability on the Internet: An Economic Analysis
140
 Data Portability on the Internet 
  
 Thirty Eighth International Conference on Information Systems, South Korea 2017 8 
Conversely, evaluating optimal data collection by CP 𝐵 reveals that the required amount of data with data 
portability is always higher than in the case without data portability: 𝑟J∗,jk = 16𝜏 − 9𝑣. + 6𝑣J17 < 𝜏 − 𝑣. − 𝑣J3 = 𝑟J∗,k. 
Intuitively, CP 𝐵 requires more data with data portability because users that switch from CP 𝐴 only have to 
reveal the net amount of required data due to the possibility to port the already entered data. Consequently, 
these users experience less disutility in the case of switching, because the net amount of required data is 
lower (𝑟J − 𝑟./01 ≤ 𝑟J), all else being equal, leading to higher market shares and profits for the entrant under 
this regime. Proposition 1 summarizes these findings: 
Proposition 1 (CP’s data consumption) 
Under a data portability regime, incumbents require less user data, whereas entrants 
unambiguously increase their amount of required data for users becoming active at their service. 
Next, to deduce possible business strategies for CPs (c.f., managerial implications) and to analyze the factors 
influencing the CP’s equilibrium amount of required data, we conduct comparative statics. First, we find 
that CP 𝐴's first-period data consumption increases in its base-utility 𝑣., whereas its second-period data 
consumption decreases in 𝑣., i.e., b	;9∗,_,<=>b	89 > 0 and 		b	;9∗,_,<=`b	89 < 0 irrespective of the considered regime. The 
negative effect on the second-period amount of required data by CP 𝐴 can be explained by the incumbent’s 
rationale to protect its market share in a competitive environment: Through an increased base-utility, CP 𝐴 is able to require a large(r) amount of data in period one. Protecting this market share in period two 
(through a comparably low amount of required data in this period) dominates the positive effects arising 
from requiring more data in the second period. On the contrary, if its base-utility is decreasing, protecting 
market shares does not dominate the positive effects of requiring additional data in period two. Second, an 
increase in CP 𝐵's base-utility 𝑣J lowers CP 𝐴's data collection: in period one to increase the share of users 
that are locked-in, in period two due to stronger competitive forces. Since the lock-in effect vanishes with 
data portability, the first-period amount of required data is unaffected by 𝑣J  (in 𝑑 = 𝑃). In conclusion, b	;9∗,st,<=>b	8c < 0, b	;9∗,_,<=`b	8c < 0 and b	;9∗,t,<=>b	8c = 0. Third, the competitiveness of the market (𝜏) has an unambiguous 
effect on CP 𝐴's data consumption: the lower the competitive intensity of the market (increase in 𝜏), the 
higher the amount of required data, i.e., b	;9∗,st,<=>b	? > 0  and 		b	;9∗,_,<=`b	? > 0 . Finally, for CP 𝐵 , comparative 
statics show that an increase in the competitor's base-utility (𝑣.) reduces the amount of required data. In 
contrast to the incumbent, an increase in the own base-utility (𝑣J) unambiguously increases the amount of 
required data. The effect of the competitiveness of the market on CP 𝐵's data consumption is qualitatively 
the same as the effect on CP 𝐴's data consumption, i.e., the lower the competitive intensity of the market, 
the higher the amount of required data. Thus, it can be summarized that a (in terms of service quality) 
strong competitor or a higher competitive intensity of the market reduces the CPs’ amount of required data. 
If a CP increases its own quality, it requires more data in the first period being active. 
CPs’ Profits 
To analyze CPs’ profits (𝜋6K), we evaluate optimal profits given the just derived equilibrium amounts of 
required data. Within the feasible parameter range (c.f., Appendix), the incumbent always suffers from data 
portability (i.e., 𝜋.k ≤ 𝜋.jk), whereas the entrant always benefits from data portability (i.e., 𝜋Jjk ≤ 𝜋Jk; see 
Appendix for analytical details). Thus, since data portability unambiguously increases an entrant’s profit, 
service variety (and innovation) is arguably increased in the long run as entrants are more likely to enter 
the market due to higher profits. Hence, if the market is dominated by a single firm, data portability may 
be a suitable device to foster competition. 
Comparative statics show that an increase in the CP’s own base utility has always a positive effect on its 
profit. Conversely, an increase in the competitor’s base utility decreases a CP’s profit (i.e., b	^u_b	8u > 0 and b	^u_b	8vu < 0 for 𝑖 = 𝐴, 𝐵  and – 𝑖 denoting the competing CP 𝑖). Interestingly, the effect of a less competitive 
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market (i.e., an increase in 𝜏) is ambiguous: with respect to 𝜋.k, 𝜋.jk and 𝜋Jjk, a less competitive market is 
always beneficial only if the competing CP −𝑖 is strong in terms of its base-utility, i.e., 𝑣:6 ≫ 𝑣6. Otherwise, 
the effect of the competitive intensity of the market (𝜏) depends on the competitive characteristics of the 
considered market.5 With regard to 𝜋Jk, the effect of the competition parameter is unambiguous: the less 
competitive the market, the higher the profit. 
Consumer’s surplus 
To examine the effects on consumer’s surplus (𝐶𝑆6K), we compare the users’ utility accounting for the 
different regimes. With respect to users active at CP 𝐴, consumer’s surplus for both periods is given by: 
𝐶𝑆.K = 𝑈./01 𝑥 𝑑𝑥{∗,<=>| period	/01 + 𝑈./0A 𝑥 𝑑𝑥
{∗,_,<=`
| period	/0A . 
Note that users active at CP 𝐵 differ with regard to their utility in the case with data portability depending 
on whether they have not been active in the first period (and consequently have a utility of 𝑈Jjk,/0A(𝑥)), or 
whether they have been active in the first period, switch from CP 𝐴	 to CP 𝐵 and port their data. Hence, the 
latter group has a lower disutility for a given amount of data required by CP 𝐵 (and thus, has an utility of 𝑈Jk,/0A 𝑥 ). If data portability is not enforced, all users becoming active at CP 𝐵 derive a utility of 𝑈Jjk,/0A(𝑥). 
In total, consumer’s surplus can be calculated by: 
𝐶𝑆JK = 𝑈Jk,/0A 𝑥 𝑑𝑥 + 𝑈Jjk,/0A 𝑥 𝑑𝑥1{∗,<=>{
∗,<=>
{∗,t,<=` ,	with	data	portability	(𝑑 = 𝑃)										𝑈Jjk,/0A 𝑥 𝑑𝑥1{∗,st,<=` 																																						 ,	without	data	portability	(𝑑 = 𝑁𝑃). 
Comparing consumer’s surplus in equilibrium, it can be seen that a regime without data portability may 
leave users actually better off. Thus, the sum of consumer’s surplus at both CPs may decrease with data 
portability, i.e., 𝐶𝑆.}Jk = 𝐶𝑆.k + 𝐶𝑆Jk < 𝐶𝑆.jk + 𝐶𝑆Jjk = 𝐶𝑆.}Jjk  (see Appendix for analytical details). 
Consequently, although data portability is most commonly justified by the potential benefits for end 
customers (c.f., Macgillivray & Shambaugh, 2016; European Commission, 2016b), this goal is not 
necessarily achieved.  
Moreover, it can be shown that a (relatively) low degree of competition (high 𝜏) may lead to users being 
worse off with data portability.6 More precisely, as we have shown above, CPs require higher amounts of 
data if the degree of competition is low (because b	;u∗,_,<b	? > 0). This, in turn, increases the disutility a user 
derives from being active at the considered service, which, consequently, reduces consumer’s surplus (i.e., b	~9c_b	? < 0 ). However, if the CPs’ base-utilities are relatively equal ( 𝑣J < 1| ⋅ 𝑣. ), consumers 
unambiguously benefit under a data portability regime. Additionally, higher base-utilities always affect the 
consumer’s surplus positively (b	~9c_b	8u > 0). Proposition 2 summarizes these findings: 
Proposition 2 (consumer’s surplus) 
The possibility to port data from one online service to another online service has ambiguous 
effects on consumer’s surplus. If both services offer a comparable quality for users, consumer’s 
surplus always increases. Conversely, if the entrant offers a better service, users may suffer under 
a data portability regime. 
                                                             
5 Formally, the derivative changes its sign in the feasible parameter range. The effect of an increasing 𝜏 on 𝜋.k	 is positive 
if 𝜏 > 1 22𝑣.A − 12𝑣.𝑣J + 4𝑣JA, on 𝜋.jk is positive if 𝜏 > 1 26𝑣.A − 12𝑣.𝑣J + 4𝑣JA, and on 𝜋Jjk is positive if	𝜏 > 8c:891 . 
6 More precisely, if 𝜏 > 18c:AA89}1 89`:A898c}18c`A  users are better off without data portability (see Appendix). 
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Figure 2 illustrates the possible negative effect on consumer’s surplus for a specific parameter constellation 
(𝑣. = 1, 𝑣J = 4) by showing total consumer’s surplus, as well as the consumer’s surplus at each CP with and 
without data portability for different degrees of competition. 
 
Figure 2. Illustration of total consumer’s surplus for 𝒗𝑨 = 𝟏 and 𝒗𝑩 = 𝟒 with data portability 
(𝒅 = 𝑷, solid line) and without data portability (𝒅 = 𝑵𝑷, dash-dotted line). 
Total surplus 
Finally, the total surplus (𝑇𝑆K) being the sum of consumer’s surplus and CPs’ profits, i.e., 𝑇𝑆K = (𝜋6K +60.,J 𝐶𝑆6K)	 
is examined (see Appendix for analytical details). Within the feasible parameter range, it can be concluded 
that the total surplus is unambiguously increasing with data portability, i.e., 𝑇𝑆k > 𝑇𝑆jk. Thus, although 
consumers might be worse off in some cases and CP 𝐴 always experiences a lower profit under a regime 
with a right to data portability, the increased profit of CP 𝐵 always outweighs these effects. 
Extensions 
In the following, we explore two extensions to the base model, which confirm the robustness of the main 
insights highlighted by Proposition 1 and 2 but provide more nuanced results. 
Costs for Providing the Possibility to Port Data (Subscript 𝑭) 
Until now, we assumed that the possibility to port (personal) data does not incur any costs for the CPs. 
However, giving users the possibility to port personal data may result in additional costs such as costs for 
the programming effort to implement the technical functionalities. To account for such costs incurred on 
CPs, we extend the model by assuming that CPs face some exogenous costs 𝐹 if a right to data portability is 
introduced. Consequently, CPs’ profit functions with a right to data portability now incorporate an 
additional fixed term. CP 𝐴’s profit can then be calculated by 𝜋.,k = 𝜋.k − 𝐹 and CP 𝐵’s profit by 𝜋J,k = 𝜋Jk −𝐹, respectively. Note that the profit functions without a right to data portability (𝑑 = 𝑁𝑃) remain unchanged 
because CPs do not face any additional costs if they do not have to implement such functionalities, 
i.e.,	𝜋.,jk = 𝜋.jk and 𝜋J,jk = 𝜋Jjk. 
The timing of the game remains unchanged. Again, we solve for the subgame perfect equilibrium through 
backward induction beginning in Stage 2. In doing so, it is easy to see that the CP’s data consumption 
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remains unchanged by introducing (fixed) costs to implement the possibility to port data. Moreover, this 
implies that not only all insights with respect to the amount of required data remain unchanged (c.f., 
Proposition 1), but also with respect to consumer’s surplus, i.e., users can still be worse off if a right to data 
portability is introduced (c.f., Proposition 2). Conversely, the CPs’ profits change if a right to data portability 
is introduced. Obviously, the CPs’ profits are affected negatively by introducing costs, i.e., 
b	^u,tb	 < 0 for 𝑖 ∈ 	{𝐴, 𝐵}. Consequently, the entrant is not necessarily better off if a right to data portability is introduced. 
Instead, the entrant is worse off (i.e., 𝜋J,k < 𝜋J,jk), if the fixed costs for the implementation of a functionality 
to port data exceed the critical threshold 𝐹, i.e., if 𝐹 > 𝐹 ≔ 	 10𝑣. − 𝑣J + 3𝜏 ⋅ (35𝑣J − 44𝑣. + 99𝜏)5205 ⋅ 𝜏 . 
Thus, if the costs associated with providing the possibility to port personal data are too high, the right to 
data portability does not necessarily stimulate market entry or innovation as entrants may find it 
unprofitable to enter the market at all. Moreover, total surplus may now decrease with the introduction of 
a right to data portability because all CPs as well as users can be worse off. Therefore, policy makers need 
to deliberately define not only the scope of data that can actually be ported, but also specify the concrete 
mechanism of data portability in order to reduce costs. For example, in many cases the transmission should 
not occur directly between different CPs as this arguably increases implementation costs, particularly as 
the transmission needs to be secure in order to protect users’ sensitive data. 
Porting Irrelevant Data (Subscript 𝑰𝑫) 
Although this paper investigates the effects of data portability on two CPs being in direct competition and 
providing substitutable services, these CPs may not necessarily require identical data from users becoming 
active at their platform. Whereas we addressed a benchmark case in our main model by assuming that all 
data that is transferred to the competing CP is valuable, we now modify our model to account for cases 
where also irrelevant data is ported to the entrant CP 𝐵.7 
In doing so, we introduce the parameter 𝛾 ∈ [0,1] defining the share of ported data that is (also) useful for 
the CP where the data is ported to (here: the entrant). For example, a user may have entered her name, date 
of birth and cellphone number at CP 𝐴  in 𝑡 = 1  (i.e., 	𝑟./01 ) and now ports this data to CP 𝐵  in 𝑡 = 2 . 
However, CP	𝐵 requires the name, date of birth and address from users becoming active at the platform 
(i.e.,	𝑟J) and cannot analyze or monetize a user’s cellphone number. Consequently, only some share of the 
ported data is relevant for the new CP. Thus, the net amount of required data is not given by 	𝑟J − 𝑟./01	 as 
in the base model, but by 𝑟J − 𝛾 ⋅ 𝑟./01. Hence, if data portability is possible, the utility of users that have 
been active at CP 𝐴 in 𝑡 = 1 and switch to CP 𝐵 changes compared to the base model. Assuming that only a 
share of the ported data is useful for the new CP, a user located at 𝑥 becoming active at CP 𝐵 in 𝑡 = 2 derives 
a utility of 𝑈J,K,/0A 𝑥 = 𝑣J − 𝜏 1 − 𝑥 − 𝑟J + 𝛾 ⋅ 𝑟./01 ,	if	𝑈./01 𝑥 	≥ 0	with	data	portability	(𝑑 = 𝑃)																							𝑣J − 𝜏 1 − 𝑥 − 𝑟J																			 ,	else	(without	data	portability	(𝑑 = 𝑁𝑃)	or	𝑈./01 𝑥 < 0). 
Consequently, with data portability, the location of the indifferent user changes in 𝑡 = 2, which also affects 
the CPs’ profits (c.f., Appendix for analytical details) as well as the amount of required data. Note that this 
extension is a generalization of the base model outlined above. Thus, assuming 𝛾 = 0 , the results are 
identical to the case without data portability because none of the ported data is useful for the entrant. 
Conversely, assuming 𝛾 = 1, the results are identical to the case with data portability where all ported data 
is relevant for the entrant. 
To deduce more nuanced results, we solve the game through backward induction. Due to the extreme cases 
already analyzed, we restrict our analysis to 𝛾 ∈ (0,1). In summary, we obtain: 
                                                             
7 Note that we frame this extension to a CP’s perspective. An alternative interpretation of this extension would assume 
that a user does not transfer all of his previously revealed data to the new CP, e.g., because the data is outdated. 
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𝑟.,∗,k,/01 = 3𝜏 + 𝑣. − 𝑣J 𝛾 − 3𝜏 − 10𝑣. + 𝑣J𝛾A − 2𝛾 − 17 												with			𝑟.∗,jk,/01 > 𝑟.,∗,k,/01 > 𝑟.∗,k,/01,	 𝑟.,∗,k,/0A = −3𝜏 + 2𝑣. + 𝑣J 𝛾 − 15𝜏 + 𝑣. + 5𝑣J𝛾A − 2𝛾 − 17 						with				𝑟.∗,jk,/0A > 𝑟.,∗,k,/0A > 𝑟.∗,k,/0A, 𝑟J,∗,k = 2𝜏𝛾A − 4𝜏 + 3𝑣. 𝛾 − 16𝜏 + 9𝑣. − 6𝑣J𝛾A − 2𝛾 − 17 							with				𝑟J∗,jk < 𝑟J,∗,k < 𝑟J∗,k.																		 
Thus, a higher 𝛾 increases the entrant’s amount of required data, i.e., an entrant CP’s data consumption 
increases with the amount of data that is ported and valuable to that CP, whereas the incumbent’s amount 
of required data is reduced (i.e., 
b	;9, ¡∗,t,<=¢b	£ < 0 with 𝑘 ∈ {1,2} and b	;c, ¡∗,tb	£ > 0). Additionally, the incumbent’s 
period one amount of required data now also (negatively) depends on 𝑣J (in contrast to the base model 
where 𝑣J does not affect data consumption in period one). However, Proposition 1 continues to hold, i.e., 
the incumbent still requires less data and the entrant requires more data if users have the possibility to port 
(some share of their) personal data. Moreover, CPs’ profits behave intuitively with regard to the introduced 
parameter 𝛾, i.e., the incumbent’s profit decreases, whereas the entrant’s profit increases the more data is 
valuable for the entrant, i.e., b	^9, ¡tb	£ < 0 and b	^c, ¡tb	£ > 0. Consequently, the incumbent may be able protect its 
profits by strategically reducing the amount of explicitly stored information that can be ported with a right 
to data portability, e.g., by inferring information from a user’s action on the website rather than requiring 
data to be actively entered by users (because only data provided by users may be subject to data portability, 
c.f., European Commission 2016b) or by requiring data from users that is only useful in combination with 
other data that is not subject to data portability. 
Assuming that not all data is valuable for the entrant also affects consumer’s surplus. Still, Proposition 2 
continues to holds, i.e., if the entrant provides a better service quality, users may actually be worse off with 
a right to data portability. Here, it can be seen that 𝛾 dampens the effect of data portability on consumer’s 
surplus compared to the regime without data portability. Thus, in cases where users have been better off 
with “full” data portability (i.e., 𝛾 = 1 ), they still benefit with 𝛾 ∈ (0,1) , but not to the same extent. 
Analogously, in cases where users are worse off with data portability, they may still suffer with 𝛾 ∈ (0,1), 
but not to the same extent. Consequently, from a policy perspective, restricting the amount of data that can 
be ported may be a device to protect users. Still, total surplus would be higher than without data portability. 
Conclusion 
Data portability allows users to transfer their data entered at a certain service to another service. Although 
some online services have implemented such features voluntarily, a standardized and mandatory ability for 
users to port (personal) data is pursued by the European Commission for all online services available in the 
EU’s member states through the General Data Protection Regulation (European Commission, 2016b). 
Additionally, this topic also gains momentum for non-European policy makers, as the request for 
information in the United States suggests (c.f., Macgillivray and Shambaugh, 2016).  
Despite the importance of this issue resulting from the far-reaching implications on business strategies of 
online services and thus on the total economy, we are–to the best of our knowledge–the first to analyze the 
resulting competitive effects theoretically. In doing so, we not only shed light on current policy issues, but 
also highlight relevant implications on the interface of the IS, the technical and the economic realm to better 
understand and develop systems’ value propositions. For this purpose, we propose a game-theoretic model 
that captures competing online services’ strategic incentives and identify the feasible market outcomes 
together with the implications for all stakeholders.  
In conclusion, we find that if the CP’s costs to implement data portability are not too large, on the one hand, 
data portability fosters market entry, which arguably enhances service variety and innovation, but on the 
other hand, incumbent services unambiguously suffer from data portability. Whereas such an outcome 
might be desired by policy makers to alleviate concerns about dominant online services, we highlight that 
end users may actually suffer from a right to data portability, because the new service has an incentive to 
increase the amount of collected data compared to a regime without data portability. However, as the total 
surplus increases due to higher overall profits, a decision to introduce a mandatory right to data portability 
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invokes a complex assessment. In the following, we outline policy implications as well as strategies for 
services active in data-driven markets based on the obtained results and discuss avenues for future research.  
Policy and Managerial Implications 
From a policy perspective, the rationale to introduce a (general) right to data portability is clearly focused 
on the protection of end users (see, e.g., European Commission, 2016b, Article 1). Consequently, our results 
stated above imply that data portability should not be applied to all online services because consumer’s 
might actually be worse off. On the other hand, considering the total economy, overreaching goals such as 
the Digital Single Market Strategy (DSM strategy) within the European Union (c.f., European Commission, 
2016a) or former-president Obama’s executive order on competition from April, 2016 (c.f., Obama, 2016) 
highlight the importance of open, fair and non-discriminatory (data-driven) markets. As we show that the 
entrant’s profit increases under data portability, a right to data portability may attribute to these goals. 
However, this is only achieved if the resulting costs (for implementation as well as administration) of a right 
to data portability are low. Therefore, our findings evoke the necessity for policy makers to carefully weigh 
whether they want to promote market entry to stimulate innovation and successively service variety, or 
purely focus on consumer’s surplus. 
If new services should be incentivized to enter the market, data portability should be strictly enforced with 
few exceptions. To date, the concept of data portability proposed by the European Commission solely 
focuses on personal data revealed by the users themselves. Hence, data revealed by third persons (say, 
reviews for a private lift, or endorsements on professional networking sites) are excluded in the current 
version of the proposed regulation. Therefore, policy makers might think of extending the scope of data that 
can be ported.8 In most cases, this strategy would be in line with the goal of enhancing consumer’s surplus. 
However, it has to be taken into consideration that (i) porting sensitive data (e.g., credit card numbers, tax 
IDs, social security numbers, etc.) bears important privacy and security risks, although users entered these 
data voluntarily, and (ii) there are instances where users are actually worse off with a right to data 
portability, as we have shown above. Our results suggest that users are likely to be worse off if base-utilities 
are asymmetric, e.g., if the entrant has a superior value proposition providing the user a higher base-utility. 
Arguably, entry is then beneficial for the entrant even without a right to data portability. Consequently, one 
may hypothetically think of a concept where data portability is only granted to some services. Whereas this 
seems possible in theory, the likeliness of success of such an approach is questionable as (i) this concept 
would contradict popular “neutrality regimes”, which might get increasingly important on a service level 
(c.f., Easley et al., forthcoming), (ii) the current political view aims at giving end users back the control of 
their (personal) data–independent from the considered service (c.f., European Commission, 2016b), and 
(iii) the nature of the Internet with independent parties and hard-to-control data flows make supervision 
costly. However, as we have shown that the effects of data portability on consumer’s surplus can be 
dampened by restricting the amount of data that can be ported, this might be a possible way to facilitate 
market entry and to limit potential negative effects on consumers. 
From a managerial perspective, it has to be emphasized that incumbent services have an unambiguous 
incentive to inhibit the concept of data portability because their opportunity to soften competition vanishes, 
leading to reduced profits. In contrast, entrant services or start-ups should promote the concept of data 
portability because their flexibility in setting the amount of data that is collected rises, leading to higher 
profits and thus, earlier profitability. If services have no possibility to influence the scope of data that can 
be ported (see above), incumbents should pursue a differentiation strategy if the entrant is superior in terms 
of base-utility. This reduces the competitiveness of the market and consequently benefits the incumbent. 
For this purpose, incumbents may try to change (aspects of) their service offering (i.e., differentiate) to 
escape the fierce competition with the new service. In contrast, a strategy designed to imitate the competitor 
can be seen as an incumbent’s opportunity if the entrant is relatively equal in terms of base-utility. This 
might be achieved by matching all of the entrant’s value propositions to increase competition and thus, 
profits (see effects of the market’s competitiveness on profits outlined above). Additionally, incumbents 
may try to (i) infer information from a user’s browsing behavior as data that has not been actively provided 
                                                             
8 As highlighted in the mid-term review on the implementation of the Digital Single Market Strategy, the European 
Commission already “subject to impact assessment, prepare[s] a legislative proposal […] which takes into account […] 
the principle of porting non-personal data” (European Commission, 2017, p.11) 
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by users is not covered by the right to data portability, and (ii) require “proxy data” from users that is only 
useful for services if they exist in combination with other data (that is not subject to data portability). The 
entrant always benefits from a less competitive market and should thus differentiate as much as possible 
from the incumbent, e.g., by acting as the industry’s innovation leader. 
Limitations and Avenues for Future Research 
Finally, we wish to conclude by highlighting possible model extensions and limitations. There are several 
interesting aspects of data-driven business models that should be taken into consideration and analyzed in 
future studies. First, the market environment could be changed to capture the effects of data portability on 
two existing, competing services. In our terminology, CP 𝐵 would then already be active in period one and 
data can be ported from CP 𝐴 to CP 𝐵 and vice versa. Arguably, as the CP’s flexibility in setting the amount 
of required data is reduced, CPs should unambiguously suffer under a regime that enforces data portability. 
Conversely, such a scenario would be beneficial for end users. Second, the possibility to discriminate 
between new users and existing users might be seen as a possible model extension. However, this extension 
would assume that services require non-uniform amounts of data from different user groups, which may 
increase programming efforts and potentially complicates the provision of a streamlined and consistent 
(service) portfolio. With data portability, the entrant would then collect a relatively high amount of data 
from new (i.e., not switching) users and additionally maintain flexibility for the share of users that may 
switch services, leading to reduced consumer’s surplus. Third, in this article, our theoretical model is limited 
to lock-ins arising from the data entered by users. Thus, we do not examine the effects of network 
externalities, which could arise from participation of additional users or complementary third-parties. 
These network externalities, if relevant for the user’s utility, may soften the positive effects of data 
portability, as the benefits arising from the size of a network cannot be transferred with portability alone, 
but would require interoperability concepts. As we have outlined in our literature review, there are previous 
studies that analyze these effects in isolation. Adding network effects to our model, this, all else being equal, 
would arguably lead to less increased (reduced) profits for the entrant (incumbent). Fourth, we assumed 
that data entered once has no effect on a user’s utility in succeeding periods. Whereas we believe that this 
is a suitable benchmark, one may argue that the disutility of already entered data only diminishes over time, 
i.e., the effects of trust for a certain service might be included into the analysis. This could be achieved by 
assuming that there is a lower (or no) disutility if the same service is used again, whereas there is some 
disutility if the same data is ported to another service. Fifth, we assumed myopic users for analytical 
tractability and simplicity. However, it would be interesting to extend the model to also consider strategic 
users, i.e., users that anticipate the entrant’s market entry. Finally, a right to data portability arguably 
induces positive effects on other CPs, which supply independent or complementary services, but are not 
modeled within this study focusing on competing CPs. Thus, the positive effect of data portability on service 
variety and innovation may be stronger than assumed in this study. Comparable, also users may obtain a 
benefit (or less disutility) from revealing data, or obtain an increased utility from the mere possibility to 
port (personal) data, which would increase consumer’s and total surplus. 
Appendices 
Thresholds for the Feasible Parameter Range and Location of Indifferent User 
In this paper, we build on Hotelling’s model of horizontal differentiation (c.f., Hotelling, 1929) in order to 
identify the competitive effects of data portability. In doing so, we assume that a unit mass of users is 
uniformly distributed on the interval [0,1]. By calculating market shares, which can directly be deduced 
from the location of the indifferent user, we formally need to ensure that the indifferent user is in all cases 
located within the interval [0,1]. Consequently, for the regime with data portability and for the regime 
without data portability, we require 𝑥∗,/01 ≤ 1, 𝑥∗,K,/0A ≥ 0 and 𝑥∗,jk,/0A ≤ 1, i.e., the CPs’ market shares are 
always positive and do not exceed 100%. As highlighted above, we assume (i) full market coverage in 𝑡 = 2 
for analytical tractability and (ii) to analyze the effects of data portability, an entrant’s base-utility that is 
large enough so that (at least) one user can potentially port its user data from CP 𝐴  to CP 𝐵 , i.e., 𝑈JK,/0A 𝑥∗,/01 ≥ 0. 
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Next, we show that 𝑈./01 𝑥∗,K,/0A ≥ 0 is satisfied in all relevant cases, i.e., the indifferent user in period two 
is given by 𝑥∗,k,/0A = − ;9<=`};9<=>:;c:?:89}8cA?  with data portability, and by 𝑥∗,jk,/0A = − ;9<=`:;c:?:89}8cA?  
without data portability. In doing so, assume 𝑈./01 𝑥∗,K,/0A < 0. The location of the indifferent user can 
then calculated by solving 𝑣. − 𝜏𝑥 − 𝑟./0A − 𝑟./01 = 	 𝑣J − 𝜏 1 − 𝑥 − 𝑟J  which yields 𝑥f¥¦∗,/0A = 𝑥∗,k,/0A =− ;9<=`};9<=>:;c:?:89}8cA? . Note that by assuming 𝑈./01 𝑥∗,K,/0A < 0, the indifferent user is located right to the 
indifferent user in period one, i.e., 𝑥f¥¦∗,/0A > 𝑥∗,/01. Consequently, users do not port their data although they 
would be able to do so, i.e., now the case with and without data portability coincides. We use 𝑥f¥¦∗,/0A to specify 
firms’ profits. Again, we solve the game through backward induction. We use the obtained equilibrium 
results and calculate 𝑈./01 𝑥f¥¦∗,/0A . The resulting term is only smaller than zero iff 𝜏 > 𝜏§6f ≔ Ap 𝑣. + 1p 𝑣J. 
However, we assumed that CP 𝐵’s base utility is large enough so that at least one user can potentially port 
its user data (see above). This implies that 𝜏 < 𝜏§¨{ ≔ 1A 𝑣. + 1p 𝑣J. It can easily be seen that 𝜏§6f > 𝜏§¨{. 
Consequently, proofing by contradiction, 𝑈./01 𝑥∗,K,/0A ≥ 0 is always satisfied.  
Please note that we only specified binding restrictions, i.e., all other restrictions are less restrictive or always 
satisfied (e.g., 𝑥∗,/01 ≥ 0). 
CPs’ Profits (𝝅𝒊𝒅) 
With data portability (𝑑 = 𝑃), the CP’s profits are: 𝜋.k = 18𝜏A + 12𝜏(𝑣. − 𝑣J) + 11𝑣.A − 4𝑣.𝑣J + 2𝑣JA36𝜏 , 𝜋Jk = (3𝜏 − 𝑣. + 𝑣J)A18𝜏 .																																																						 
Without data portability (𝑑 = 𝑁𝑃), the CP’s profits are: 𝜋.jk = 18𝜏A + 𝜏(18𝑣. − 12𝑣J) + 13𝑣.A − 6𝑣.𝑣J + 2𝑣JA34𝜏 , 𝜋Jjk = (16𝜏 − 9𝑣. + 6𝑣J)A578𝜏 .																																																				 
To determine whether CPs are better off with data portability, we calculate the intersection of the CP’s profit 
functions under the different regimes (i.e., 𝜋6k and 𝜋6jk). Although the profit functions intersect two times, 
both intersections are outside the feasible parameter range given by the restrictions specified in the first 
subsection of the Appendix. Consequently, the effect of data portability on the incumbent and entrant is 
unambiguous. It can easily be shown that the incumbent (entrant) always suffers (benefits) from data 
portability, i.e., 𝜋.k ≤ 𝜋.jk and 𝜋Jjk ≤ 𝜋Jk. 
Consumer’s Surplus (𝑪𝑺𝒊𝒅) 
With data portability (𝑑 = 𝑃), the consumer’s surplus equals: 𝐶𝑆.k = −45𝜏A + 𝜏(24𝑣. + 30𝑣J) + 22𝑣.A − 8𝑣.𝑣J + 5𝑣JA72𝜏 , 𝐶𝑆Jk = −45𝜏A + 𝜏(12𝑣. + 6𝑣J) + 7𝑣.A − 4𝑣.𝑣J + 7𝑣JA72𝜏 .					 
Without data portability (𝑑 = 𝑁𝑃), the consumer’s surplus equals: 𝐶𝑆.jk = −1368𝜏A + 𝜏(264𝑣. + 912𝑣J) + 763𝑣.A − 88𝑣.𝑣J + 152𝑣JA2312𝜏 , 𝐶𝑆Jjk = − 16𝜏 − 9𝑣. + 6𝑣J 80𝜏 − 45𝑣. + 38𝑣J2312𝜏 .																																	 
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To determine whether users are better off with data portability, we calculate 𝐶𝑆.k + 𝐶𝑆Jk = 𝐶𝑆.jk + 𝐶𝑆Jjk and 
reorder the result with respect to 𝜏. This leads to two solutions labeled by 𝜏1 and 𝜏A. It can be shown that 𝜏1 = 18c:AA89}1 89`:A898c}18c`A  can be within the feasible parameter range specified in the first 
subsection of the Appendix, whereas 𝜏A = 18c:AA89:1 89`:A898c}18c`A  is always outside of that 
feasible parameter range. Consequently, the effect of data portability on consumer’s surplus is ambiguous 
and users may suffer from a right to data portability. Whereas the effect of data portability on consumer’s 
surplus is positive if 𝜏 < 𝜏1 , the effect is negative if 𝜏 > 𝜏1 . Please note that 𝜏1  is not always within the 
feasible parameter range: if 𝑣J < 1| 𝑣., the intersection is always outside the feasible parameter range. 
Total Surplus (𝑻𝑺𝒅) 
With data portability (𝑑 = 𝑃), the total surplus is: 𝑇𝑆k = −18𝜏A + 36𝜏(𝑣. + 𝑣J) + 55𝑣.A − 20𝑣.𝑣J + 10𝑣JA72𝜏 . 
Without data portability (𝑑 = 𝑁𝑃), the total surplus is: 𝑇𝑆jk = −200𝜏A + 𝜏(888𝑣. + 496𝑣J) + 783𝑣.A − 500𝑣.𝑣J + 178𝑣JA1156𝜏 . 
All intersections of the functions are outside the feasible parameter range specified by the restrictions given 
in the first subsection of the Appendix. Consequently, the effect on total surplus is unambiguous. It can 
easily be shown that total surplus always increases with data portability, i.e., 𝑇𝑆k > 𝑇𝑆jk. Please note that 
this result assumes that total surplus is the unweighted sum of producer’s and consumer’s surplus. 
Porting Irrelevant Data: Location of Indifferent User and CPs’ Profits (𝑰𝑫) 
Assuming that users also port irrelevant data from CP 𝐴 to CP 𝐵, the user’s utility function changes to 𝑈J,K,/0A 𝑥  if they become active at CP 𝐵. Consequently, also the location of the indifferent user changes in 
period 𝑡 = 2. Note that CP 𝐴’s utility function and the location of the indifferent user in 𝑡 = 1 remains 
unchanged. 
To calculate the indifferent user in 𝑡 = 2, we (again) need to account for the different cases that may evolve. 
We stick to the assumption in the main text. Thus, if users have the possibility to port their data (𝑑 = 𝑃 with 
subscript 𝐼𝐷), the indifferent user in 𝑡 = 2 can be calculated by solving 𝑣. − 𝜏𝑥 − 𝑟./0A = 	 𝑣J − 𝜏 1 − 𝑥 −𝑟J + 𝛾 ⋅ 𝑟./01. The indifferent user without data portability (𝑑 = 𝑁𝑃) can (again) be calculated by solving 𝑣. − 𝜏𝑥 − 𝑟./0A = 	 𝑣J − 𝜏 1 − 𝑥 − 𝑟J. Consequently, the indifferent user in 𝑡 = 2 is located at 
𝑥∗,K,/0A = − 𝑟./0A + 𝛾 ⋅ 𝑟./01 − 𝑟J − 𝜏 − 𝑣. + 𝑣J2𝜏 ,	if	𝑈./01 𝑥∗,K,/0A ≥ 0, 𝑑 = 𝑃			− 𝑟./0A − 𝑟J − 𝜏 − 𝑣. + 𝑣J2𝜏 																			 ,	if	𝑈./01 𝑥∗,K,/0A ≥ 0, 𝑑 = 𝑁𝑃. 
Based on the market shares given by the location of the indifferent user, the profits of the CPs can be 
specified. The total profit of CP 𝐴 for both periods is given by 𝜋.,K = 𝑥∗,/01 ⋅ 𝑟.,/01^9, ¡_,<=> + 𝑥∗,K,/0A ⋅ (𝑟.,K,/01 + 𝑟.,/0A)^9, ¡_,<=` . 
CP 𝐵, which is only active in 𝑡 = 2, makes a total profit of: 𝜋J,K = (1 − 𝑥∗,K,/01) ⋅ 𝑟J, + (𝑥∗,K,/01 − 𝑥∗,K,/0A) ⋅ ( 𝑟J, − 𝛾 ⋅ 𝑟.,/01 + 𝛾 ⋅ 𝑟.,/01),𝜋JK = (1 − 𝑥∗,K,/0A) ⋅ 𝑟J,.  
Using the equilibrium amounts of required data stated above, we get:  
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𝜋.,k = 2𝛾 − 13 𝑣.A + 6𝑣. 𝜏 − 13 𝑣J 𝛾 − 3 − 18 𝜏 − 13 𝑣J A2𝜏 ⋅ (𝛾A − 2𝛾 − 17) , 
𝜋J,k = 2 𝛾A𝜏 − 𝛾 2𝜏 + 32 𝑣. − 8𝜏 + 92 𝑣. − 3𝑣J A	𝜏 ⋅ 𝛾A − 2𝛾 − 17 A ,																				 𝜋.,jk = 𝜋.jk,																																																																																																	 𝜋J,jk = 𝜋.jk.																																																																																																	 
Consumer’s surplus as well as total surplus can be calculated according to the formulas given above. They 
are available from the authors upon request. 
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